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System reliability assessments provide important input to decision-making in relation to design-
related issues as well as during operation and maintenance. The main purpose of a system reliability
assessment is to provide realistic predictions of the future performance of the system, within the
constraints of available data, operating conditions, and modeling capabilities. Special applications
and operating conditions sometimes reveal inadequacies in current assessment methods. One such
application is the blowout preventer (BOP), a safety-critical system that is used to ensure safe
drilling and well interventions of oil and gas wells. The ability of the BOP system to function as a
safety barrier depends on the ongoing operation, whether it is drilling, tripping-in, tripping-out, well
logging, and so on. At the same time, the likelihood of demands to be handled depends on the same
operations. An average estimate of the BOP’s ability to function on demand is therefore not an
adequate reliability parameter. A BOP system deviates from many other safety barrier systems since
it does not have a fail-safe design (except for the choke and kill valves). Another deviation is due to
the many different uses of the BOP and its components. Some of the components are operated more
often than during the periodic proof tests. The usual formulas for reliability calculations based on
periodic proof testing can therefore not be used directly.
In this master thesis, the main objective is to propose solutions to some of the challenges indicated
above, using the BOP as an example. More specifically, the candidate shall:
1. Give a presentation of a typical (standard) BOP system, its requirements and reliability
challenges
a. Describe and classify the main functions and the associated performance requirements
of a BOP system.
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b. Identify and discuss the main operating situations of a BOP in light of the ability of the
BOP to stop well kicks.
c. Identify recent BOP stack configurations and describe the pros and cons of these
related to a standard BOP configuration.
2. Suggest improved approaches to reliability assessment ofBOP systems that can incolporate
some of the above challenges
a. Carry out and document a literature survey on how reliability analyses of BOPs have
been performed in the past, including the selection of reliability measure, and discuss
the limitations of these approaches.
b. Discuss the implications and causes of common cause failures (CCFs) on the
execution of BOP functions
c. Propose a new overall approach to risk and reliability assessment of a BOP system,
which includes proposals for how to solve some of the identified challenges.
d. Identify related issues that need further research, and give recommendations for such
research.
Within three weeks after the date of the task handout, a pre-study report shall be prepared. The report
shall cover the following:
• An analysis of the work task’s content with specific emphasis of the areas where new
knowledge has to be gained.
• A description of the work packages that shall be performed. This description shall lead to a
clear definition of the scope and extent of the total task to be performed.
• A time schedule for the project. The plan shall comprise a Gantt diagram with specification
of the individual work packages, their scheduled start and end dates and a specification of
project milestones.
The pre-study report is a part of the total task reporting. It shall be included in the final report.
Progress reports made during the project period shall also be included in the final report.
The report should be edited as a research report with a summary, table of contents, conclusion, list of
reference, list of literature etc. The text should be clear and concise, and include the necessary
references to figures, tables, and diagrams. It is also important that exact references are given to any
external source used in the text.
Equipment and software developed during the project is a part of the fulfilment of the task. Unless
outside parties have exclusive property rights or the equipment is physically non-moveable, it should
be handed in along with the final report. Suitable documentation for the correct use of such material
is also required as part of the final report.
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Preface
This report documents my master thesis carried out during the spring of 2012. The thesis has
been carried out as part of the Mechanical Engineering MSc program at the Norwegian Univer-
sity of Science and Technology (NTNU), and is concerned with reliability assessment of subsea
drilling blowout preventers for deepwater application. The reader is assumed to be familiar
with the terminology used in the NTNU course TPK4120 Safety and Reliability Analysis and/or
the terminology used in Rausand and Hoyland (2004). The reader is also assumed to have
knowledge of the basics concepts involved with drilling of hydrocarbon wells. It is further as-
sumed that the reader has basic knowledge of the IEC61508 standard for functional safety of
electric/electronic/programmable electronic safety-related systems.
Trondheim, 2012-06-11
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vSummary
The failure of the Deepwater Horizon drilling rig’s blowout preventer has been pointed to as
one of the main causes of the Macondo accident on April 10th 2010. The blowout preventer
system is one the most important safety barriers in a hydrocarbon well. The accident has cre-
ated a demand for improved methods of assessing the reliability of blowout preventer systems.
The objective of this master thesis is to propose improvements to current reliability assessment
methods for complex safety critical systems such as the blowout preventer.
The report begins by presenting a typical subsea drilling blowout preventer system designed
for deepwater application in exploration drilling, with a description of its main components
and functions. The blowout preventer is also classified as a safety barrier in light of well barrier
terminology in relevant standards.
A functional analysis of the blowout preventer system is presented next. Essential functions are
defined, and performance criteria for these functions identified. An approach to classification
of blowout preventer functions is also presented, before the report moves on to the analysis of
four main operational situations to which the blowout preventer is exposed during the course
of a typical drilling program, and whose characteristics have implications for the system’s ability
to act as a safety barrier.
The pros and cons of different widely used blowout preventer system configurations is also dis-
cussed. Three main types of configurations are mentioned in the report; the "modern" config-
uration, the "traditional" configuration and the Deepwater Horizon blowout preventer system
configuration.
A literature survey which documents previous blowout preventer reliability studies performed
by Per Holand on behalf of SINTEF is presented. An evaluation of the validity of the operational
assumptions which have been made in these previous studies is also provided, such as assump-
tions regarding operational situations, failure input data, and several important assumptions
regarding testing of blowout preventer systems. Regulations and guidelines which are relevant
to blowout preventer reliability are also described here.
The report further discusses how the blowout preventer may fail, and which types of failures
modes are considered critical from a safety perspective. Some theoretic principles behind com-
mon cause failures are presented, along with a discussion of how common cause failures should
be included in reliability assessments of safety critical systems through an approach called the
PDS approach. This is followed by a discussion of possible sources for common cause failures
in the blowout preventer system.
As a suggestion towards how reliability assessments of blowout preventers can be improved, and
vi
some of the identified reliability challenges solved, a reliability quantification method is pre-
sented. The method is based on post-processing of minimal cut sets from a fault tree analysis of
the blowout preventer system, and produces more conservative and accurate approximations of
the reliability than those produced through conventional methods. The method is also capable
of taking into account common cause failures. The results from the calculations are presented
and discussed.
Event trees are presented which illustrate the escalation of a well kick in two different opera-
tional situations are presented, along with a discussion of how event tree analysis may be used
to improve the quality of blowout preventer reliability assessments, and the reliability of well
barriers in general.
Finally, the conclusions from the thesis are provided. The main conclusions are summarized
by three key findings. First, that the approach based on fault trees and post-processing of min-
imal cut sets can certainly be used to improve the quality of blowout preventer reliability esti-
mates, and also provides a sound platform for including common cause failures in the analysis.
Second, the failure modes of control system components contribute by far the majority of the
unreliability of the blowout preventer system. And third, a test coverage factor should included
in calculations in order to take into account failures that are unrevealed by function tests for
certain key components in the blowout preventer system.
vii
Sammendrag
Feil i boreriggen Deepwater Horizons utblåsningsventil har blitt pekt på som en av hovedår-
sakene til Macondo-ulykken som inntraff den 10. april 2010. Utblåsningsventilen er en av de
viktigste barriere ved leteboring i en olje-og gassbrønn. Macondo-ulykken har skapt en økt et-
terspørsel etter forbedrede metoder for å vurdere påliteligheten til komplekse, sikkerhetskritiske
systemer slik som utblåsningsventiler. Målet med denne masteroppgaven er å fremlegge forslag
til mulige forbedringer ved de nåværende metodene som brukes for å vurdere påliteligheten til
utblåsningsventiler.
Rapporten begynner med å presentere en typisk utblåsningsventil designet for bruk under lete-
boring i dypvannsbrønner, og den beskrivelse av dens hovedkomponenter- og funksjoner. Ut-
blåsningsventilen blir også klassifisert i lys av terminologi fra relevante standarder i forbindelse
med brønnbarrierer.
Deretter presenteres en funksjonell analyse av utblåsningsventilen. Essensielle funksjoner blir
definert, og ytelseskrav for disse funksjonene identifisert. En fremgangsmåte for klassifisering av
utblåsningsventilers funksjoner blir også presentert, før rapporten går videre med en analyse av
fire sentrale operasjonelle situasjoner som utblåsningsventilen blir utsatt for i løpet av et typisk
boreprogram, og hvis egenskaper har innvirkning på systemets evne til å oppfylle sin funksjon
som sikkerhetsbarriere.
Fordeler og ulemper ved ulike typer kjente konfigurasjoner for utblåsningsventiler blir også
diskutert. Det skilles her mellom tre hovedkonfigurasjoner; den "moderne" konfigurasjonen,
den "tradisjonelle" konfigurasjonen, og konfigurasjonen av utblåsningsventilen som var installert
på Deepwater Horizon da denne var i ferd med å bore BPs Macondo-brønn.
Rapporten dokumenterer også et litteraturstudie som omfatter tidligere studier av påliteligheten
til utblåsningsventiler, i all hovedsak utført av Per Holand på vegne av SINTEF. Gyldigheten til en
rekke operasjonelle antagelser som er gjort i forbindelse med disse pålitelighetsstudiene, både i
forhold til operasjonelle situasjoner, feildata, og en rekke viktige antagelser knyttet til testing av
utblåsningsventiler, blir vurdert. Regler og retningslinjer som er relevante for utblåsningsven-
tiler på norsk sokkel blir også beskrevet her.
Videre diskuteres det hvordan utblåsningsventilen kan feile, og hvilke typer feilmodi som bør
anses som kritiske fra et sikkerhetsperspektiv. Enkelte teoretiske prinsipper angående felles-
feil blir presentert, sammen med en diskusjon som vedrører hvordan fellesfeil bør inkluderes in
pålitelighetsvurderinger av utblåsningsventiler gjennom en metode som kalles PDS-metoden.
Dette etterfølges av noen betrakninger angående mulige kilder til fellesfeil i utblåsningsven-
tiler.
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Som et forslag til hvordan gjeldende metoder for pålitelighetsvurdering av ublåsningsventiler
kan forbedres, presenteres en kvantifiseringsmetode. Metoden er basert på post-prosessering
av minimale kutt sett fra feiltreanalyse av utlblåsningsventiler, hvor hovedpoenget er at meto-
den produserer mer nøyaktige og mer konservative estimater for påliteligheten enn det som
oppnås ved hjelp av konvensjonelle metoder som f. eks å generere estimater automatisk ved
hjelp av software-verktøy for feiltreanalyse. Et annet viktig poeng med metoden er at den er i
stand til å ta hensyn til fellesfeil. Metoden blir anvendt på utblåsningsventilen, og resultatene
fra utregningene blir presentert og diskutert.
Hendelsestrær som illustrerer en eskalert brønnkontrollsituasjon for to ulike operasjonelle situ-
asjonene blir presentert, sammen med en diskusjon angående muligheten for å bruke analyse
av hendelsestrær som en metode for å forbedre kvaliteten på pålitelighetsvurderinger av utblås-
ningsventiler, men også av brønnkontrollsystemer på generell basis.
Til slutt presenteres konklusjonene som kan trekkes fra arbeidet med diplomoppgaven. Kon-
klusjonene kan oppsummeres av tre hovedfunn. Det første er at metoden basert på post-prosessering
av minimale kutt sett fra feiltreanalyse definitivt kan brukes til å oppnå bedre estimater for
påliteligheten til utblåsningsventiler, og er også et passende verktøy for å kunne inkludere felles-
feil i analysen på en god måte. Det andre hovedfunnet er at feil som stammer fra komponenter i
kontrollsystemet bidrar klart mest til upåliteligheten i systemet. Det tredje og siste hovedfunnet
er at en for å ta hensyn til feil som ikke avdekkes av funksjonelle tester av utblåsningsventilene
bør inkludere en "dekningsfaktor" for ikke-perfekte tester av enkelte komponenter når man reg-
ner ut påliteligheten til disse.
Contents
Master Thesis Assignment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v
Sammendrag på norsk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.3 Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.4 Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.5 Structure of the Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2 BOP and drilling operations 6
2.1 BOP system description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.1.2 The main elements of a BOP system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.2 Functional analysis of the BOP system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.2.2 The BOP as a well barrier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.2.3 Essential BOP functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.2.4 BOP functional block diagram . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.2.5 Classification of BOP functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.3 BOP operational situations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.3.2 Analysis of four main operational situations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.4 Recent BOP stack configurations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.4.2 Stack configurations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
ix
CONTENTS x
3 Literature survey 30
3.1 Literature on BOP reliability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3.1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3.1.2 Previous BOP reliability studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3.1.3 Operational assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
3.2 Regulations and guidelines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3.2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3.2.2 Standards pertaining to BOP reliability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3.2.3 BOP testing regulations in the Norwegian Sector of the North Sea . . . . . . 37
4 BOP failures 40
4.1 Overview of all BOP failures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
4.1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
4.1.2 Safety criticality of failures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
4.1.3 Data sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
4.1.4 BOP system failure modes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
4.2 Common cause failures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
4.2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
4.2.2 Theoretic principles behind CCF modeling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
4.2.3 CCF data sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
4.2.4 CCF in the BOP system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
5 Reliability assessment model 46
5.1 Quantification of BOP reliability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
5.1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
5.1.2 Background for the approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
5.1.3 Fault tree analysis of the BOP system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
5.1.4 Event tree analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
6 Summary and Recommendations for Further Work 65
6.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
6.2 Summary and conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
6.3 Recommendations and ideas for further work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
References 68
Appendices 70
A Acronyms 71
CONTENTS xi
B Fault Tree Analysis 74
B.1 Fault trees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
B.2 Fault tree basic events . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
B.3 Minimal cut sets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
C Event trees 115
C.1 Event trees for Case B and C . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
List of Figures
1.1 Master thesis approach (modified from Lundteigen (2009), p.21) . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1 Typical configuration of a subsea drilling BOP system designed for deepwater ap-
plication. Modified from OLF-070 (2004), page 85. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.2 Simplified BOP control system. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.3 BOP control system logic arrangement. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.4 BOP essential functions, as specified in OLF-070 (2004). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.5 Functional block diagram of the BOP system. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.6 The four most common operational situations encountered by the BOP during a
typical depwater exploration drilling program. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.7 RBDs illustrating available BOP functinos in the base case. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.8 Spacing of tool joints through wellbore annulus. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.9 RBD of available BOP functions in Case B. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.10 RBDs illustrating available BOP functions in the high pressure case. . . . . . . . . . 27
5.1 Minimal cut A10, with two common cause component groups. . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
xii
List of Tables
2.1 Inherent sub-functions and their functional requirements and classification for
the overall primary BOP system function Isolate well. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.2 Three common BOP stack configurations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3.1 Routine leak testing of drilling BOP and well control equipment. Source: D-010
(2004), p.157 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
4.1 Failure modes in the BOP system. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
5.1 TOP event A minimal cuts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
5.2 TOP event B minimal cuts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
5.3 TOP event C minimal cuts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
5.4 TOP event D minimal cuts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
5.5 β-factors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
5.6 PFD calculation results for TOP Event A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
5.7 PFD calculation results for TOP Event B. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
5.8 PFD calculation results for TOP Event C. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
5.9 PFD calculation results for TOP Event D. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
xiii
Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Background
The Macondo accident on April 20th 2010 caused the largest accidental offshore oil spill in the
history of the petroleum industry. It has had devastating consequences, both economically and
environmentally. The cause of the accident was a blowout from the BP licensed Macondo well,
which was at the time being drilled by the Transocean-owned rig Deepwater Horizon (DWH).
During the final stages of the drilling process, the rig crew lost control of the well and hydrocar-
bons were released onto the deck. After a short period of time, the hydrocarbons were ignited,
and eventually the DWH rig sank. 11 men were killed during the explosion and subsequent fire,
and a total of 4.9 million barrels of crude oil spilled into the sea.
The failure of the DWH blowout preventer (BOP) has been pointed to as one of the main causes
of the accident. The BOP is one of the most important safety barriers between the rig and the hy-
drocarbons in the well. Thus, BOP reliability is a matter of vital importance in terms of ensuring
safe operation during drilling of hydrocarbon wells. The Macondo accident has created a new
level of interest into this area from the petroleum industry, and a demand for better methods of
assessing the reliability of BOPs.
The industry uses reliability assessments to support decisions regarding the technical design
and operation of safety critical systems. A reliability assessment will generally be performed in
accordance with relevant standards and internal guidelines, such as IEC 61511 (2004), IEC 61508
(2010), and OLF-070 (2004). Methods for quantification of reliability of safety critical systems
have been developed through application of theoretic principles from the reliability engineering
discipline, most of which are presented in Rausand and Hoyland (2004). However, the specific
features of a safety critical system and the conditions under which it operates may sometimes
1
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reveal inadequacies in these assessment methods.
In the case of the BOP, there are important issues that must be taken into account, which have
not been considered in previous reliability assessments. One of these issues is that the ability
of the BOP to function as a safety barrier depends on the operational situation. Another issue
is that, contradictory to most safety critical systems, the BOP has many components which are
operated more often than during the periodic proof tests, because they are part of an operational
function in addition to their application as a safety barrier function. Furthermore, the functional
tests that are performed, are imperfect in the sense that some failures remain unrevealed by
the tests. This means that the standard formulas for reliability calculations based on periodic
proof tests cannot be directly applied to these components, or to the BOP as a whole. The same
reliability calculations also include other assumptions regarding testing that do not necessarily
hold for a BOP system.
Previous attempts to quantify the reliability of BOPs have largely been based on collection and
analysis of rig-specific failure data. The studies carried out by Per Holand on behalf of SINTEF
during the course of the 1980s and 1990s have resulted in important knowledge about a num-
ber of issues related to BOP reliability, such as failures and failure criticality towards both safety
and downtime, failure causes, maintenance, test time consumption and the efficiency of vari-
ous testing strategies (Holand, 1999), (Holand and Skalle, 2001). Based on testing intervals and
estimated failure rates, quantitative techniques have been used to provide an estimate of the
BOP reliability. However, when considering failures and failure causes, previous BOP reliability
assessments have not considered the possible contribution from common cause failures (CCF).
Along with the challenges described above, the inclusion of CCFs may serve as an important
improvement to current reliability assessment methods.
To help prevent accidents such as the Macondo blowout from occurring in the future, the petroleum
industry must find methods of improving the reliability of complex safety critical systems such
as the BOP. However, in order to evaluate the reliability of such systems, an appropriate ap-
proach which gives accurate results must be developed. This master thesis is concerned with
how the reliability of a complex safety critical system such as a BOP should be assessed, in order
to respond to the inadequacies in current assessment methods described above.
1.2 Objectives
The main objective of this master thesis is to propose solutions for some of the challenges re-
lated to reliability assessments of a complex safety critical system such as the BOP. More specif-
ically, the objectives are to:
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• Give a presentation of a typical (standard) BOP system, its requirements and reliability chal-
lenges
– Describe and classify the main functions and the associated performance require-
ments of a BOP system.
– Identify and discuss the main operating situations of a BOP in light of the ability of
the BOP to stop well kicks.
– Identify recent BOP stack configurations and describe the pros and cons of these
related to a standard BOP configuration.
• Suggest improved approaches to reliability assessments of BOP systems that can incorporate
some of the above challenges
– Carry out and document a literature survey on how reliability analyses of BOPs have
been performed in the past, including the selection of reliability measure, and dis-
cuss the limitations of these approaches.
– Discuss the implications and causes of common cause failures (CCFs) on the execu-
tion of BOP functions.
– Propose a new overall approach to risk and reliability assessment of a BOP system,
which includes proposals for how to solve som of the identified challenges.
– Identify related issues that need further research, and give recommendations for
such research.
1.3 Limitations
The most important limitation to the scope of this master thesis is that the only the ability of to
provide initial closure of the annulus and/or well by the means of the BOP system is considered.
The report does not take into account reliability challenges related to e.g. internal closure of the
drill string or kick killing. As a result, some subsystems/components, e.g. choke and kill lines,
are only briefly described, and excluded from the reliability analysis.
This master thesis is limited towards the reliability of subsea BOPs designed for application in
deepwater exploration drilling. It does not concern shallow water BOPs, development drilling
BOPs, or workover/well intervention BOPs.
Finally, it should be noted that the emphasis of the reliability analysis is placed on application
of reliability engineering methodology, rather than on the detailed modeling of the BOP system.
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Some simplifications regarding the composition of the system have therefore been made.
1.4 Approach
The approach to the development of this thesis report is illustrated in Figure 1.1 below. The
work has mainly consisted of two three activities; acquiring through relevant literature, detailed
knowledge of the BOP system so as to be able to perform a qualified reliability assessment, fol-
lowed by qualitative and quantitative analysis of the system reliability using proven methods
from the reliability engineering discilpline.
Development 
of project
 plan
Development of thesis report
Literature survey
Interviews with DNV consultants
Meetings with NTNU and DNV project supervisors
Activities
Identification of 
objectives and project 
execution plan
Results
Suggestions for improvement of existing BOP reliability 
assessment methods, and ideas for further work
Figure 1.1: Master thesis approach (modified from Lundteigen (2009), p.21)
A preliminary study was first performed with the purpose of describing the objectives of the the-
sis, planning the activities which was to constitute the thesis work as well as a course schedule
estimating the planned duration of each activity.
The literature survey performed in the fall of 2011 in relation to a project assignment regarding
the same topic was continued, with the objective of finding information on how different oper-
ational situations and stack configurations affect the ability of the BOP to act as a safety barrier,
to review some of the operational assumptions made in previous BOP reliability studies, and
to gain knowledge about theoretic principles and methodology regarding modeling of common
cause failures.
A thorough qualitative analysis of four common operational situations was performed, which
resulted in important knowledge of how these affect the BOP system’s ability to act as a safety
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barrier in a well control situation. The analysis of operational situations was carried out partly
with help from experts from within DNV, who provided useful input regarding both technical,
operational and reliability aspects.
The results from the qualitative system analysis was then used as a basis for establishing a sug-
gested approach to BOP reliability assessment based on fault tree and event tree models of the
system.
1.5 Structure of the Report
The rest of the report is structured as follows. Chapter 2 gives a description and functional anal-
ysis of the BOP system, as well as an analysis of different operational situations the BOP is ex-
posed to. Chapter 3 documents the literature survey, discussing previous reliability studies as
well presenting the regulations and guidelines which are relevant to BOP systems. In Chapter
4, an overview of BOP failures considered in the following quantitative analysis is presented.
Chapter 4 also describes the some theoretic principles regarding CCF, as well as the methodol-
ogy through which CCF has been modeled in the quantitative analysis of the BOP system. In
Chapter 5, an approach to quantification BOP reliability through post-processing of minimal
cut sets from fault tree analysis is suggested, and the calculated results discussed. Finally, the
thesis is summarized and concluded in Chapter 6, and recommendations and ideas for further
research are suggested.
Chapter 2
BOP and drilling operations
2.1 BOP system description
2.1.1 Introduction
The subsea BOP system is located between the wellhead and the riser in a subsea drilling system.
It is designed to assist in well control and be able to rapidly shut in the well in the event of
unexpected influx of formation fluids into the wellbore. The primary function of the BOP is to
act as the final safety barrier in the case that well control is lost. In addition, the BOP is used for a
range of routine operational tasks, such as the testing of casing pressure and formations strength
(BP, 2010). This section contains a description of a typical deepwater drilling BOP system, its
components and its functions.
2.1.2 The main elements of a BOP system
The three main elements comprising a BOP system are the lower marine riser package (LMRP),
the BOP stack and the control system. In the following, the main components in these subsys-
tems are described.
The BOP system consists of ram and annular type preventers, the valves and piping that used
to supply the preventers with hydraulic fluid, and the choke and kill valves and lines used to
maintain pressure control in the well. All actuating devices are hydraulically operated, and are
activated by human interaction from topside control panels. A typical drilling BOP system de-
signed for deepwater application is equipped with five to six ram type preventers, and either one
or two annular type preventers:
6
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• The annular preventers are designed to seal the wellbore by closing around the drill pipe
on a range of tubular dimensions when the drillstring is running through the BOP.
• Pipe rams are designed to close and seal around the drill pipe.
• Blind shear rams (BSR) are designed to close and seal the wellbore, shearing the drillstring
if it is running through the BOP.
• Casing shear rams (CSR) are designed to shear the casing and drillstring without sealing
the wellbore.
A typical configuration of a subsea BOP system is shown in Figure 2.1. This configuration has
two shear rams, a feature which is becoming increasingly widespread in modern deepwater BOP
design as an attempt to increase the redundancy in the system, and thereby the reliability. Al-
though a number of variations to this stack configuration are used throughout the world, this is
considered the most relevant type of configuration for future applications, and it is thus used as
the basis for the analysis in this report. An overview of the most common BOP stack configura-
tions and the pros and cons of these is described in Section 2.4.
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BOP stack
LMRP
Flexible joint
Upper annular preventer 
(UAP)
Lower marine riser 
package (LMRP) 
connector
Lower annular preventer 
(LAP)
Blind shear ram (BSR)
Casing shear ram (CSR)
Upper pipe ram (UPR)
Middle pipe ram (MPR)
Lower pipe ram (LPR)
Wellhead connector
BOP attached 
lines
Riser attached 
lines Riser
Outer kill valve
Inner kill valve
Upper outer choke valve
Upper inner choke valve
Lower outer choke valve
Lower inner choke valve
Sea level
Figure 2.1: Typical configuration of a subsea drilling BOP system designed for deepwater appli-
cation. Modified from OLF-070 (2004), page 85.
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The lower marine riser package (LMRP)
Flexible joint
Due to lateral movements of the drilling rig during drilling, a flexible joint is installed as the
uppermost component of the LMRP. The flexible joint is normally designed to compensate for
up to 10 degrees angular deflection of the marine drilling riser from the vertical axis of the
BOP.
Annular preventer
Annular preventers, often simply denoted annulars, are used to seal around drill pipe or tubular,
and are located in the upper part of the BOP system, often on the LMRP. The annular preventer
consists of a large internally reinforced rubber packing ring enclosed in a steel housing, which
can seal around virtually any anticipated tubular diameter (Holand, 1985). An annular is nor-
mally the first preventer to be shut if a kick is detected. Annular preventers are positioned above
the ram preventers, because they generally have lower working pressure ratings (5 000 psi) than
those of the ram type preventers (15 000 psi) (Transocean, 2011).
Annulars are also the most frequently used function outside of well control situations, e.g. for
stripping purposes. The concept of stripping is further detailed in Section 2.3. Failure of the
annular preventer function in a well control situation will lead to a loss of both flexibility and
redundancy in the BOP system.
Control pods
One electro-hydraulic subsea control pod is installed on either side of the LMRP assembly. The
two control pods, often denoted the blue and yellow pods, are identical, redundant modules
dedicated to providing function control and communication between the subsea LMRP and
BOP stack components and the topside control system interfaces. A back-up pod named the
white pod is often held on the rig.
All subsea BOP functions are activated via the two control pods. Ensuring the reliability of the
control pods is therefore extremely important from a safety perspective.
LMRP connector
The LMRP connector is a hydraulic connector providing the connection between the bottom of
the LMRP and the top of the BOP stack. The connector allows for the LMRP together with the
rest of the marine drilling riser to be separated from the BOP stack while the well remains shut
in by the BOP. This permits disconnection of the LMRP and riser for retrieval of the control pods
to the surface for repair, and in the event that rig dynamic-position station keeping is lost (BP,
2010).
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The BOP stack
Blind shear ram (BSR)
The blind shear ram is fitted with ram blocks that are capable of cutting through the drillpipe,
and rubber sealing elements which also enables it to seal off the well after the drill pipe has been
severed. The intended function of the BSR is to completely seal off the well in the event that the
BOP fails to successfully mitigated the well contol situation through its non-destructive fucn-
tions. Activating the BSR is a last-resort option in case of emergency, since the cost impact from
severing the drill pipe will be huge both in terms of equipment damage and rig downtime.
The BSR is the only ram in the BOP stack which is capable of both shearing the drill pipe and
sealing off the well. In an escalated well control situation, failure of the BSR to deliver its in-
tended function will likely lead to complete loss of well control, and a blowout through the well-
bore annulus and/or drill pipe. Ensuring that the BSR is reliable is therefore very important from
a safety perspective.
Casing shear ram (CSR)
The CSR is similar to the blind shear ram, but its design is more focused towards shearing caba-
bility. The CSR is not equipped with rubber sealing elements, but is a larger ram equipped with
more powerful cutting blades than the BSR. The CSR is designed to cut through the heaviest drill
pipe and casing.
In cases where the geometry or material properties of the drill pipe or casing exceeds the shear-
ing capability of the BSR, the CSR is critical if the well control situation is allowed to escalate to
a scenario where the drill pipe or casing must be sheared.
Pipe rams
A pipe ram is designed to close and seal the wellbore annulus on a specified range of tubular di-
ameters. A few variations of pipe ram design principles exist, but the main types used are:
• Standard (fixed) pipe rams: Capable of sealing on a specified pipe O.D. tolerance.
• Variable bore rams: (VBR): A more flexible ram capable of sealing on must of the tubular
dimensions which are anticipated in a typical drilling program.
This report bases its analysis on a BOP configuration with three pipe rams; two fixed pipe rams
and one variable bore ram, which is considered the most common configuration for deepwater
drilling BOPs at the present time. The upper and lower pipe rams are here specified as fixed
rams, while the middle pipe ram is considered to be a VBR. The tubular dimensional interval
around which each ram is capable of closing has implications for the BOP system’s redundancy
when different operational conditions are present. These implications and their effect on the
reliability of the system are further detailed in Section 2.3
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Wellhead connector
The wellhead connector is a hydraulically actuated connector which provides the connection
between the bottom of the BOP stack and the top of the subsea wellhead housing.
Choke and kill lines and valves
The main function of the choke and kill lines and valves is to circulate out a kick or kill a well.
During well control operations, the fluid under pressure in the wellbore flows out of the well
through the choke line to the choke, reducing the fluid pressure to atmospheric pressure (Schlum-
berger). The choke and kill lines exit the subsea BOP stack and then run along the outside of the
drilling riser to the surface (Schlumberger).
The valves are designed with a fail-safe "close" hydraulic operation, implying that they will close
by spring action when the opening pressure on the valves is released.
The choke line usually has two outlets; between the MPR and UPR, and between the UPR and
BSR. The kill line is usually connected to the BOP stack between the LPR and MPR.
Note: This report does not concern kick killing operations, and the reliability of choke and kill
lines is therefore not considered.
BOP stack mounted accumulators
A typical BOP stack is equipped with eight accumulator bottles which are used for high-pressure
closing of the BOP functions. The accumulator bottles store pressurized hydraulic fluid which
is supplied from the hydraulic fluid supply lines that run from the topside hydraulic power unit
(HPU), down along the riser to the subsea BOP components.
The main objective of the accumulators is to provide the BOP functions with closing force in
terms of a pre-charge of hydraulic pressure, allowing them to close rapidly upon demand. The
accumulators provide a significant decrease in the closing time for a BOP function (Holand,
1997). The supply system is arranged so that the accumulator bottles; both topside and stack
mounted ones, are charged to the required pressure, and then automatically recharged when the
stored fluid is depleted by activation of BOP functions. The accumulator bottles are common for
the blue and yellow control pods, meaning that a leak in the accumulators will affect both pods.
However, the hydraulic supply system is equipped with accumulator isolation valves topside, in
each pod and on the BOP stack. The accumulator isolation valves can be closed and the BOP’s
functions operated directly from the HPU. This will however have a significant impact on the
closing time for each preventer.
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The BOP control system
Most of the components described above; the annular and ram type preventers, the valves and
the connectors, are hydraulically actuated. The different BOP functions are governed by an
electro-hydraulic control system called a multiplexed (MUX) control system, consisting of both
electrical/electronic and hydraulic components. The control system components are located
both topside and subsea. In this section, a detailed description of the BOP control system is
presented. Figure 2.2 gives a simplified overview of the BOP control system.
HYDRAULIC RESERVOIR
MUX 
Reel
MUX 
Reel
CENTRAL CONTROL UNIT
Driller’s 
Control Panel
Toolpusher’s 
Control Panel
Power 
Supply
R
IS
ER
Yellow 
Pod
Blue 
Pod
R
A
M
S
HYDRAULIC RESERVOIR
HYDRAULIC PUMP
LOW PRESSURE 
ACCUMULATORS
HIGH PRESSURE 
ACCUMULATORS
TOPSIDE
SUBSEA
L
M
R
P
Figure 2.2: Simplified BOP control system.
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Topside interface control panels
The main topside components of an MUX BOP control system are the control panels and elec-
tric/hydraulic supply utilities. Each BOP function must be activated manually by pressing push
buttons on the control panels. There are normally two such control panels on a rig floor; the
driller’s control panel (DCP) and the toolpusher’s control panel (TCP), equipped with multiple
push-buttons for activation of the different BOP functions. Each of the control panels can be op-
erated on two separate, independent control networks run by two programmable logic solvers
(PLC). The control panels also display all available information regarding the condition of the
BOP system, e.g. flow and pressure levels in the wellbore, accumulator pressure levels and mud
volumes pumped.
Power supply
Electric power is supplied from an uninterruptable power supply unit. A central control unit
(CCU) distributes the electric current to the various topside components; the control panels
and the power and communications cables. Signals sent from the control panels are transmitted
from the rig surface to the subsea control pods by the means of power/communications cables
often called MUX cables. These cables are stored in dedicated blue and yellow control pod MUX
reels on the rig floor, and run down along the riser in two sets of lines, one to each of the subsea
control pods.
Hydraulic fluid supply
Figure 2.3 below shows the logic arrangement of the BOP’s hydraulic fluid supply system. Hy-
draulic fluid is supplied from a reservoir connected to an HPU. A pod selector valve directs the
fluid towards either of the two pods, depending on which is selected by the operator to be the
active one. From here, the fluid is transported down along the riser via rigid and flexible conduit
lines to the LMRP. The fluid is further directed through the active pod to the subsea accumula-
tors and the preventers via hard lines.
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Fluid reservoir
Blue pod Yellow pod
  
Surface accumulators
Pod selector valve
HPU
Surface control 
valve
Surface control 
valve
Solenoid 
valve
Solenoid 
valve
Shuttle valve
Control valve
BOP
Pod mounted 
accumulator 
isolator valve
Pod mounted 
accumulator 
isolator valve
Stack mounted 
accumulator 
isolator valve
Subsea accumulator bank
From yellow pod
Figure 2.3: BOP control system logic arrangement.
Control pods and electronic communications
A subsea electronic module (SEM) housing is located in each control pod. The SEM housing
contains two SEMs, A and B, which are identical, redundant components. The operator chooses
which pod and SEM is the active one. When e.g. the blue pod - SEM A is the active component,
the hydraulic fluid supply from the surface is automatically directed accordingly. The most im-
portant function of the SEM is to energize the solenoid valves dedicated to each preventer. If
say, the upper annular is activated through the blue pod - SEM A, the solenoid valve in the blue
pod belonging to the upper annular is energized by SEM A, opening the valve such that a pilot
hydraulic signal is sent to the hydraulic control valve belonging to that function. The hydraulic
control valve is thus opened and allows high pressure fluid to flow from the accumulator bottles
and through the designated shuttle valve, finally closing the annular preventer. The SEM is also
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the provider of the BOP status information displayed on the control panels.
2.2 Functional analysis of the BOP system
2.2.1 Introduction
Having described the relevant systems, subsystems and components of the BOP system and how
these are connected, the focus is now directed towards BOP functions; their properties, their
performance requirements and reliability challenges related to them. First, a short description
of well barriers and how the BOP should be viewed as a barrier in light of the terminology in
D-010 (2004) is given.
2.2.2 The BOP as a well barrier
The NORSOK standard (D-010, 2004) specificies requirements and guidelines pertaining to well
integrity during drilling activities and operations. (D-010, 2004) states the requirement for the
number of well barriers present during well activities in the Norwegian Sector of the North Sea
(NSNS):
"There shall be two well barriers available during all well activities and operations (...), where
a pressure differential exists that may cause uncontrolled outflow from the borehole/well to the
external environment."
A typical exploration program obviously falls under this requirement. Hence there must always
be at least two well barriers present during drilling operations, a primary and a secondary well
barrier. The hydrostatic pressure excerted by the fluid column of drilling mud is defined in D-
010 (2004) as the primary well barrier. The BOP system thus constitutes one of the secondary
well barriers. Other secondary well barriers include the casing, casing cement and the wellhead
(D-010, 2004).
According to Sklet (2006), an active barrier is "a barrier that is dependent on the actions of an
operator, a control system, and/or some energy sources to perform its function." With the exclusion
of some support functions such as the pressure and flow level measurement, the BOP performs
most all of its function upon demand from an operator through electronic and hydraulic energy
sources governed by a control system. Hence, the BOP system should be viewed as an active
well barrier.
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2.2.3 Essential BOP functions
The most essential functions of a BOP system are the prevention of blowouts and the prevention
of well leaks, i.e. the ability to shut in or isolate the well. In the following, the function Isolate well
will be defined as the a safety instrumented function (SIF) performed by the BOP system. The
concept of safety instrumented functions is further detailed in Chapter 5. The BOP is designed
to be able to fulfill the SIF in a variety of ways, depending on the nature of the process demand
and on operational conditions present when the process demand takes place.
OLF-070 (2004) specifies three essential functions in terms of the BOP’s ability to act as a safety
barrier. Together, these three sub-functions must fulfill the requirements for the BOP as a well
barrier. The three essential BOP functions are listed below, and illustrated in Figure 2.4.
1. Seal around drill pipe
2. Seal an open hole
3. Shear drill pipe and seal off well
(a) Function 1: Seal around
drill pipe.
(b) Function 2: Seal an open
hole.
(c) Function 3: Shear drill pipe
and seal off well.
Figure 2.4: BOP essential functions, as specified in OLF-070 (2004).
Function 1 is the most frequently used function. In the event of a well kick, the most common
initial response of the operator on the rig floor is to close the annular preventer and/or one of
the pipe rams, thus sealing the wellbore annulus around the drill pipe.
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Function 2 involves closing the blind shear ram on an open hole, sealing off the well. As implied,
Function 2 will only be relevant in a scenario where the drill pipe is not running through the
BOP.
Note: It is claimed by manufacturers that the annular preventers can be used to seal on an open
hole. However, according to Holand (1997) this is rarely done and no reliability data exist for such
application of annular preventers. Closing the annular preventer on an open hole is therefore not
considered as a valid means of sealing the well when the drill pipe is not running through the
BOP, and thus the effect of this operation is not included in the further analysis.
Function 3 is intended as the "last line of defense" in a scenario where control of the well is lost.
The operator will be very reluctant to resort to this function, because of the huge cost impact of
shearing the drill pipe. Function 3 can only be fulfilled by closing one or more of the shear rams.
The blind shear ram will shear the drill pipe and seal off the well. In deepwater drilling however,
the contribution to wellbore pressure from the hydrostatic pressure excerted by the mud column
is significant and has large implications on the BOP’s ability to seal. The CSR is therefore often
closed previous to the BSR in a demand situation to decrease the pressure against which the
BSR must close. Shearing ram sealing capability is further discussed in Section 2.3.
Note: In a well control situation, the hydrocarbons may travel up the wellbore annulus or up
through the drill pipe. Preventing hydrocarbons from reaching the surface may therefore also
involve closing the drill pipe internally by the means of what is called the "internal BOP" (IBOP),
or stabbing/kelly valve. This report only concerns the closing of the annular and ram preventers
in response to a kick, and does not consider internal closing of the drill pipe.
2.2.4 BOP functional block diagram
The structural and functional interrelationships in the BOP system can be illustrated by a func-
tional block diagram (Rausand and Hoyland, 2004). A functional block diagram of the BOP sys-
tem is shown in Figure 2.5 below.
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Figure 2.5: Functional block diagram of the BOP system.
The functional block diagram gives a clear view of the functions in the the system, and how
these must interface in order to achieve the overall function Isolate well, by closing one or more
of the preventers (i.e. performing one or more of the Functions 1, 2 or 3 defined above). Each
functional block represents function in the system, with inherent sub-functions. In order to be
able to identify all potential failures, one should have an unambigous understanding of the var-
ious functions of each functional block, and the performance criteria related to each of these
functions (Rausand and Hoyland, 2004). A functional requirement is a specification of the per-
formance criteria related to a function (Rausand and Hoyland, 2004). As an example, the func-
tion Provide fluid to control BOP functions may be translated to a functional requirement for the
HPU to supply fluid with output pressure 1500 psi.
2.2.5 Classification of BOP functions
The BOP system is a complex system with a high number of required functions. However, in
terms of safety criticality for the purpose of reliability performance analysis, not all functions
will have the same importance and relevance to the analysis. A useful activity may therefore
be to classify the functions according to their role in the system. Rausand and Hoyland (2004)
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suggest the following method for classifying the functions in a system:
1. 1. Essential functions: The functions required to fulfill the intended purpose of the func-
tional block. In the functional block diagram in Figure 2.3, the essential BOP functions are
the descriptions on each functional block, e.g. one essential function is the ability of the
CCU to Supply electric power to control system.
2. 2. Auxiliary functions: The functions required to support the essential functions. An auxil-
iary function may be less obvious and more difficult to identify, but can be equally impor-
tant as the essential function it supports. An auxiliary function of the CCU power supply
functional block in Figure 2.3 is to Transform current, such that the CCU supplies the con-
trol system with the correct voltage.
3. 3. Protective functions: The functions intended to protect people, equipment and the en-
vironment. An example of a protective function in the BOP system is overpressured cabi-
nets housing the PLCs in order to ensure that these critical components are isolated in the
event of a gas leak.
4. 4. Information functions: The functions dedicated to providing information about the
system. Typical information functions include condition monitoring, pressure and flow
meters, alarms, and so forth. The BOP control system function has a number of inherent
information functions which are used to monitor its condition. One example an infor-
mation function in the BOP system is pressure gauges reporting the pressure levels in the
subsea accumulator bottles.
Table 2.1 is a description of the overall BOP function Isolate well, its sub-functions with re-
lated functional requirements, as well as a classification of each sub-function according to the
method presented above.
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Sub-functions Sub-sub-functions Functional requirements Class
Close annular Annular must be able to seal around any anticipated 
tubular dimension in the wellbore within wellbore 
pressures up to 5 000 psi. 
Close fixed pipe ram Fixed pipe ram must be able to seal around drill pipe 
with 5" drill pipe within wellbore pressures up to 15 000 
psi. 
Close variable bore ram Variable bore ram must be able to seal around tubular 
dimensions ranging from 3.5"-6 7/8" O.D within wellbore 
pressures up to 15 000 psi. 
Seal an open hole Close blind shear ram BSR must close and seal off well within wellbore 
pressures up to 18 000 psi. Essential
Close blind shear ram BSR must  be able to shear drill pipe or tubular on 
wellbore pressures up to 18 000 psi. BSR must seal off 
well against wellbore pressures up to 18 000 psi. 
Close casing shear ram CSR must be able to shear the heaviest drill pipe and 
casing against wellbore pressures up to 18 000 psi. 
Shear drill pipe and 
seal off well
Essential
Essential
BOP - "Isolate well"
Seal around drill pipe
Table 2.1: Inherent sub-functions and their functional requirements and classification for the
overall primary BOP system function Isolate well.
As indicated in Table 2.1 above, the function Isolate well can be accomplished by three sub-
functions. One sub-function, e.g Seal around drill pipe can be accomplished by three sub-sub-
functions, which each involve closing a preventer around whatever drill pipe or tubular is run-
ning through the BOP, e.g. Close annular. These are the essential sub-sub-functions of each
sub-function, and may be further broken down in terms of the auxiliary, information and inter-
face functions contributing to their fulfillment. Development of similar functional overviews for
each function may serve as a useful tool for familiarizing the system before attempting to assess
its reliability.
2.3 BOP operational situations
2.3.1 Introduction
During the course of an exploration drilling program, the BOP will be exposed to different op-
erational situations, and the conditions under which it operates are far from constant. These
conditions have a significant effect the BOP’s ability to perform the functions described in the
previous sections.
Drilling an exploration well is a stepwise procedure during which the BOP will spend most of
the time on the wellhead, but it can also be located on the rig, be traveling down the wellbore
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(tripping in), or be traveling up the wellbore (tripping out). The O.D. of the drill pipe or tubu-
lar which is running through the BOP when it is on the wellhead will also vary, depending on
what operation is carried out or which stage the drilling program has reached. Furthermore, the
pressure inside the wellbore will not be constant. The ability of the BOP to act as a safety barrier
depends on all of these variables, and the conditions that apply to each situation will have con-
sequences for the reliability. The implications from exposure to different operational situations
should therefore be treated carefully in a BOP reliability assessment.
2.3.2 Analysis of four main operational situations
The objective of this section is to analyse the effect on BOP reliability from the four most impor-
tant operational situations encountered by a subsea drilling BOP during the course of a typical
deepwater exploration drilling program. These four cases are listed below, and followed by a
discussion of their effect on BOP ability to seal the well in the event of a kick by performing one
of the three OLF-070 (2004) essential functions presented in Section 2.2.3.
• Case A: Base case. Both annulars and all of the pipe rams can seal around drill pipe or
tubular, the CSR can shear the pipe or tubular and the BSR can shear the drill pipe and
seal the off the well.
• Case B: Large/small drill pipe or tubular O.D. Only the annular preventers and the VBR
can seal around the drill pipe, due to the O.D. of the pipe or tubular running through the
BOP. The BSR and CSR are still considered to have the same shearing and sealing capabil-
ities.
• Case C: High wellbore pressure. Only the UPR, MPR and LPR can seal around the drill
pipe or tubular. The annular preventers cannot be operated because the wellbore pres-
sure exceeds the their pressure rating. The CSR can shear the drill pipe, and the BSR can
subsequently seal off the well against the open hole pressure.
• Case D: Open wellbore. The drill pipe is not running through the BOP. All annular BOP
sealing functions are unaivalable. Only the BSR can be used to seal off the well.
Figure 2.6 illustrates how the each of the above cases A, B, C and D will affect the system redun-
dancy of the BOP.
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UAP
LAP
BSR
CSR
UPR (Fixed)
MPR (VBR)
LPR (Fixed)
A) Base case B) Large/small pipe diameter C) High pressure D) Open hole
Figure 2.6: The four most common operational situations encountered by the BOP during a
typical depwater exploration drilling program.
Case A: Base Case
Case A represents the largest proportion of a typical drilling program. In the study performed
by Holand, a total of 48 kicks were recorded, where 85.4 percent of these occured in a situation
where Case A applied (Holand and Skalle, 2001). Case A is therefore considered the base case. In
this situation, both annulars and all of the ram preventers can be operated.
When the drill pipe is running through the BOP, successfully closing in a kick willl require the
BOP to either seal around the pipe or seal off the well entirely. The preferred operation is ob-
viously to seal around the drill pipe as opposed to sealing off the well entirely, since the latter
implies shearing the drill string and thereby incurring huge downtime and material costs and
possibly losing the well completely. Consequently, the operator will first attempt to execute
Function 1, by choosing to close one of the annular preventers.
Annular vs. pipe ram stripping capabilities
Closing the annular, as opposed to a pipe ram, is the more desirable choice in a well control sit-
uation primarily because of its stripping capabilities. Stripping refers to the act of lowering drill
pipe into the wellbore when the BOP is closed and pressure is contained in the well (Schlum-
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berger). The purpose of stripping is to lower the drill pipe to the bottom of the wellbore, as
kick killing operations should always be conducted with the drill pipe fully lowered (Schlum-
berger).
When the annular is closed, the drill pipe can be carefully stripped through the preventer. The
elastomeric sealing element can be expanded by the force excerted from the drill pipe, allowing
even tool joints to pass through the preventer.
When a pipe ram is closed, the drill pipe stripping capability is much more limited because the
tool joints between each length of pipe cannot pass through the ram. In order to strip the drill
pipe with a pipe ram closed, another ram or annular must be closed, the pipe ram opened, the
pipe stripped until the tool joint surpasses the ram in question, and the ram closed again. This
procedure, called ram-to-ram or ram-to-annular stripping, must then be repeated whenever a
tool joint must pass by a closed pipe ram (Schlumberger).
If the annular successfully seals, the operator will normally opt to also close one of the pipe
rams, before commencing mud circulation. The purpose of closing the pipe ram is to relieve the
pressure on the elastomeric sealing element of the annular preventer. Since the pipe rams are
normally rated for higher working pressures, they are better suited for containing a kick over a
longer time period.
If both annulars fail to close, the most natural course of action is to close one of the pipe rams. In
the base case, it is principally arbitrary which of the pipe rams is closed in terms of sealing capa-
bility. The most common practice is to close the lowermost ram first, keeping the hydrocarbon
influx as far as possible from the rig.
It should be noted that the type of pipe rams fitted on the stack has implications for the hang-
off capabilities of the BOP, both during normal operation and in a well control situation. VBRs
have much more limited hang-off capability compared to traditional, fixed pipe rams. In a well
situation where the desicion is made to activate the BSR, the option to hang-off the drill string
on on of the pipe rams is important due to possible compressive loads in the drill string. If
the drill string is carrying substantial compressive loads, the probability that the BSR can seal
the well is reduced, because the shearing force required to cut through the pipe is substantially
higher than during test conditions. The issue of drill string compression and its effect on BSR
shearing/sealing capability is not evaluated in this report, but is further commented on in (Com-
mittee for Analysis of Causes of the Deepwater Horizon Explosion Fire and Oil Spill to Identify
Measures to Prevent Similar Accidents to the Future, 2011).
A simplified reliability block diagram (RBD) illustrating the base case system redundancy is
shown in Figure2.7 below. If the BOP does fail to seal around the pipe by the means of the
functions shown in Figure2.7a, the operator has the option to activate Function 3, i.e. shear the
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drill pipe and seal off the well. A failure of the BOP to perform this function is dependent on
the shearing and sealing capability of the BSR but often also the shearing capability of the CSR.
If the pressure the shear rams must close is very high, the operator may opt to use both shear
rams. After shearing the pipe with the CSR, the remaining section of drill pipe still in the BOP
can then be hoisted to a level above the BSR, allowing the BSR to close and seal against the mud
without having to shear the drill pipe. The two alternative shearing approaches are illustrated
in Figure 2.7b below. The combined use of the two shearing rams in high pressure situations is
further discussed in relation to Case C below.
UAP
LAP
UPR
(Fixed)
LPR
(Fixed)
MPR
(VBR)
(a) Function 1, base case.
CSR
BSR
BSR
(b) Function 3, base case.
Figure 2.7: RBDs illustrating available BOP functinos in the base case.
Case B: Large/small pipe diameter
At various stages of a drilling program, the drill pipe or tubular running through the BOP has
properties that limit the ability of the the ram preventers to seal around it. Most commonly
this involves a drill pipe or tubular with an O.D. outside the range around which the fixed pipe
rams (here UPR and LPR) can close, leaving the VBR the only available pipe ram. Large or small
drill pipe diameter will therefore have implications for BOP redundancy which are important to
consider from a reliability perspective.
Tool joint spacing
In other cases it may be that the geometric or material properties of the drill pipe or tubular
are of such character that the pipe rams and/or shear rams cannot be operated as intended.
A common example of this is that a drill pipe tool joint is improperly spaced in the wellbore
annulus, meaning the presence of a tool joint in the drill pipe at the depth where the desired
ram is to be closed, as illustrated in Figure 2.8 below. In Figure 2.8a, the tool joints are properly
spaced outside of the ram closing area. Improper spacing of tool joints is particularly critical if
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a tool joint is obstructing the closing of the shearing rams, as none of these rams are designed
to cut through tool joints. Incorrect spacing will also affect the closing of a fixed pipe ram (here
UPR and LPR), because the O.D. of the tool joint is outside the closing range of the rams.
(a) Tool joints properly
spaced in BOP.
(b) Tool joints improperly
spaced in BOP.
Figure 2.8: Spacing of tool joints through wellbore annulus.
For the shear rams, the increased or decreased drill pipe or tubular O.D. has no direct implica-
tion on shearing/sealing capability. However, as described above, incorrectly spaced tool joints
can cause complete failure of a shearing ram. According to West Engineering Services (2004),
attempting to shear at a tool joint will most likely result in an unsuccessful shear and damage or
destroy shear blades. West Engineering Services (2004) further states that the development in
the industry is towards longer tool joint, implying that the proportion of the drill pipe that can
be cut by the shear rams decreases.
The standard length of a drill pipe joint is 9.65 meters (American Petroleum Institute, 2012),
while total tool joint lenghts (pin and box) range from 15 - 18 1/2 in, or 381 - 470 mm (American
Petroleum Institute, 2012). The average length of a tool joint per drill pipe joint is then 0.425 m,
meaning that the proportion of a drill pipe constituted by tool joints which cannot be sheared,
is approximately equal to 4.2 percent (0.425 m/(9.65 m+0.425 m)).
An important task for the driller is to always be aware of where in the BOP annulus the tool
joints are located, i.e. ensure proper spacing. However, the methods applied for calculating
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the location of tool joints is based on the assumption that the riser is true from the surface to
the BOP. As water depths increase, this assumption becomes increasingly inaccurate due to the
deformations in the riser caused by the shear environmental forces it is exposed to (buoyancy,
elongation and so forth). Hence, the ability of the driller to accurately estimate the location of
tool joints in the BOP becomes limited. The effect on the BOP’s ability to perform Function 3
from improper tool joint spacing is therefore an issue of great concern in terms of reliability. A
very conservative assumption would be to say that the location of tool joints is close to arbitrary,
which would further imply that the probability of attempting to shear a tool joint is equal to the
proportion of the drill pipe constituted by tool joints, i.e. approximately 4.2 percent. A shear
ram failure rate of such magnitude would be unacceptable according to OLF-070 (2004).
A simplified block diagram with available ram and annular BOPs in Case B is shown i Figure
2.9 below. For Function 1, the redundancy is reduced from from being a 1oo5 to a 1oo3 voted
system. The function of the shearing rams remains principally unchanged in comparison to the
base case in terms of redundancy.
UAP
LAP
MPR
(VBR)
Figure 2.9: RBD of available BOP functions in Case B.
Case C: High pressure
Case C is the situation where the pressure in the wellbore is particularly high. This may be due
to a well kick or simply due to the hydrostatic pressure excerted by the mud column because
of the water depth. If this is the case, some of the preventers installed on the stack may be
outside of their designed maximum working pressure. Annular preventers are normally rated to
around 5 000 psi working pressure, which is significantly lower than the ram preventers, which
are generally rated around 15 000 psi. The annulars will therefore not be able to close against the
wellbore pressure in a high pressure situation. Thus only the pipe rams and the shearing rams
are available in a well control situation.
For the high pressure case, it is assumed that the pressure is above the maximum pressure
against which the BSR can shear and seal and/or the pressure is high in addition to the drill
pipe or casing running through the BOP being of a heavy type. Based on this assumption, fol-
lows that Function 3 can only be delivered by the BOP through the combined use of the two
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shear rams. The system is then dependent on both shear rams closing in order for the well to be
sealed off, and the redundancy is therefore lost for Function 3, as well as for Function 1. Figure
2.10 shows an RBD illustrating the implications on redundancy from the characteristics of Case
C.
UPR
(Fixed)
LPR
(Fixed)
MPR
(VBR)
(a) Function 1 RBD, Case C.
CSR BSR
(b) Function 3 RBD, Case C.
Figure 2.10: RBDs illustrating available BOP functions in the high pressure case.
Case D: Open wellbore
In Case D the drillstring is not running through the BOP, and the wellbore is "open". This means
that the annular and ram available BOP function. Consequently, the BOP system is much more
vulnerable towards well kicks in the open hole situation. Closing the BSR is principally the only
available method of sealing the wellbore. In Holand and Skalle (2001), the open hole situation
was present in 4.2 percent of the cases where a kick was recorded.
2.4 Recent BOP stack configurations
2.4.1 Introduction
This report is based on a typical BOP stack configuration used for deepwater drilling, equipped
with two annular preventers, two fixed pipe rams and one VBR, a BSR and a CSR. All BOP stacks
are principally similar, but small variations in the configuration of annular and ram BOPs on
the stack can have quite large effects on the system’s ability to act as a safety barrier in different
well control situations. This section presents the most common variations to the "standard"
deepwater BOP system, as well as some comments regarding the effect of these variations on
the system reliability.
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2.4.2 Stack configurations
Table 2.2 below shows three types of BOP stack configurations which are frequently used in
drilling operations throughout the world. These have been denoted the "traditional", "mod-
ern", and "DWH" configurations. The "modern" configuration is the configuration considered
as standard configuration in this report.
Fixed VBR Test
Classic 2 3 - - 1 -
Modern 2 1 2 - 1 1
DWH 2 - 2 1 1 1
Casing 
Shear Ram
Pipe Rams Blind Shear 
Ram
Annular 
Preventer
BOP Stack 
Configuration
Table 2.2: Three common BOP stack configurations.
The "traditional" BOP stack
The "traditional" BOP stack configuration differs from the standard configurations in two main
aspects:
1. All three pipe rams are standard, fixed pipe rams
2. The stack is not equipped with a CSR
These two main configuration differences each have one important implication on the BOPs
ability to act as a safety barrier. The consequence of having only fixed pipe rams is that the
pipe rams may be incapable of sealing around certain tubulars running through the BOP, which
reduces the system redundancy in some operational situations. The exclusion of the CSR sets
limitation for the shearing ability of the BOP system. CSRs typically have better shearing ca-
pability than blind shear rams, as they are designed to shear the heaviest drill pipe and casing.
The likelihood of achieving a successful shear in the most demanding well control situations
is therefore higher if the stack is equipped with a CSR. The traditional BOP stack is still in use
in many offshore locations throughout the world, but the industry is generally moving towards
increased focus on redundant shearing capability.
Deepwater Horizon stack configuration
The Deepwater Horizon (DWH) BOP stack was installed on the wellhead of the BP licensed Ma-
condo well while it was being drilled by Transocean’s DWH drilling rig at the time of the catas-
trophic blowout in April 2010. The stack configuration very similar to the "modern" config-
uration, except for the three pipe rams. The DWH BOP pipe rams differ from the "modern"
configuration in two important aspects:
1. All three pipe rams were VBRs.
2. The lowermost variable bore ram was converted to what is called a test ram.
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The strength of this configuration is that the inclusion of three VBRs provided the DWH BOP
with great flexibility and redundancy for sealing around tubular diameters. The DWH BOP VBRs
were able to seal around all of the most commonly anticipated drill pipe or tubular O.Ds.
The two main weaknesses of the DWH configuration from a safety perspective is the conversion
of the lower VBR into a test ram and the limited hang-off capability of the VBRs compared to
fixed pipe rams.
A test ram is a pipe ram whose sealing ability has been inverted to seal against pressure from
above. Test rams reduce the time required to prepare for BOP pressure testing and also reduces
the time required to resume operation after the test is complete. A test ram is however no longer
capable of sealing against wellbore pressure from below, hence the system "loses" one of its
redundant annular sealing functions.
Chapter 3
Literature survey
3.1 Literature on BOP reliability
3.1.1 Introduction
The main objective of this master thesis is to point towards some improvements in the methods
used for reliability assessment of BOP systems. For this purpose, it is necessary to conduct an
investigation into previous BOP reliability studies, in order to identify possible weaknesses in
the approaches used to analyse the reliability.
3.1.2 Previous BOP reliability studies
The most important and widely recognised literary sources of information on previous BOP
reliability studies available to the author of this report has been the technical reports written
mainly by Per Holand on behalf of SINTEF Safety and Reliability. These reports are part of an
efforrt from SINTEF which spanned more than two decades, during which the organisation was
collecting and analysing information on BOP reliability, from 1981 to 1999. Per Holand’s most
recent, most relevant BOP reliability study, Phase II DW, was carried out during the years from
1997 to 1998 (Holand, 1999).
The Phase II DW study was based on experienced failure data recorded in daily drilling reports
from 83 wells drilled in depths ranging from 400 to 2000 meters in the US GoM OCS (Holand,
1999). These wells were drilled with 26 different rigs during 1997 and 1998. The results from the
analysis of the data has been presented as a technical report; Reliability of Subsea BOP Systems
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for Deepwater Application, Phase II DW. The report presents detailed failure statistics for BOP
components, and evaluates these from both downtime and safety perspectives.
In 2001, the 1999 report was supplemented by an additional report, Deepwater Kicks and BOP
Performance, from a follow-up study focusing on kicks and associated BOP problems and safety
availability aspects (Holand and Skalle, 2001). The study applies detailed kick statistics collected
from the same wells as the 1999 report to discuss parameters affecting kick occurrence and kick
killing operation, and investigates occurences of BOP failures resulting from wear and tear due
to kick killing operations. Furthermore, the BOP as a safety barrier is analysed on the basis of
kick experience and BOP configuration, and an alternative configuration and test practice that
will improve BOP safety availability and reduce downtime is proposed.
3.1.3 Operational assumptions
In both Holand (1999) and Holand and Skalle (2001), fault tree analysis (FTA) has been used
to estimate the probability of a blowout. To achieve these estimates, the author has made a
number of operational assumptions regarding the BOP system, such as BOP stack design, test
intervals, failure observation and so forth. In order to be able to identify possible weaknesses
in Holand’s approach to quantification of BOP reliability, each of these assumptions should be
carefully treated. Below, the operational assumptions stated in Holand (1999) and Holand and
Skalle (2001), are evaluated.
BOP stack design
The FTAs in (Holand and Skalle, 2001) and (Holand, 1999) is based on the following BOP stack
configuration:
• Two annular preventers
• One blind shear ram
• Three pipe rams
Note: Although it is not specified explicitly, it is assumed that the BOP stack presented by Holand
and Skalle (2001) is equipped with two fixed pipe rams with different ram block diameters (UPR
and LPR) and one VBR (MPR).
The BOP is assumed to be equipped with a main control system only, i.e. the analysis does
not include an acoustic backup system that can operate the blind shear ram, middle pipe ram
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and lower pipe ram (Holand and Skalle, 2001). Furthermore, the fault tree is based on a pilot
hydraulic control system from the early 1980s.
The main difference in the BOP configuration on which Holand bases the FTA versus the BOP
system considered here is the control system principle. The introduction of the MUX control
system has a range of implications for the reliability of the system. Most importantly, it funda-
mentally changes the way a demand from the operator is transformed into the actuation of a
preventer. It also relieves the system of a number of hydraulic components, and replaces these
with electronic ones.
A typical BOP stack used at the time when the data for Holand’s studies were collected was
not equipped with a CSR. The inclusion of the CSR is important, as it significantly increases
the shearing capacity of the BOP. A CSR is designed to shear the heaviest drill pipe and casing,
whereas the shearing capacity of a traditional BSR is limited to less heavy drill pipe types. The
CSR provides the BOP with an increased level of redundancy in an escalated well control situa-
tion where attempt must be made to cut the drill pipe and seal off the well.
Tubulars running through the BOP when a demand occurs
In Holand (1999), the author assumes six different operational situations where the BOP must
act as a safety barrier in the event of a kick, which have similar characteristics as the four main
operational situations described in Section 2.3:
1. All preventers available.
2. LPR not available due to drill pipe diameter
3. Only the LPR and UPR available. Annulars cannot be used due to wellbore pressure, MPR
and BSR unavailable due to drill pipe diameter.
4. Only MPR available. Wellbore pressure exceeds annular rating, LPR and UPR and BSR
unavailable due to drill pipe diameter/material properties.
5. Only the annulars can seal around the casing in the hole (no rams available).
6. One pod is pulled for repair, all preventers available.
There are some confusing contradictions in the specification of these six situations. First, in 2.,
the LPR is considered unavailable because "the ram blocks have different diameter from the pipe
in the hole" (Holand, 1999), i.e. the LPR is either larger or smaller than both the UPR and the
MPR. Next, in 3., the MPR is unavailable "due to large pipe diameter" (Holand, 1999), whereas
the UPR and LPR can still be used. This dictates that the MPR ram block diameter must be
CHAPTER 3. LITERATURE SURVEY 33
smaller than those of the two other pipe rams. However, in 4., only the MPR can be used "due
to large pipe diameter" (Holand, 1999), i.e. the MPR ram blocks must be larger than those of the
UPR and LPR, which is contradictory to 3. Whether these inaccuracies have implications for the
results from Holand’s calculations is not known.
Situations such as 5., where only the annulars can seal around casing in the hole, and 6., where
one pod is located topside, are not considered in this report.
Failure input data
The failure data collected during both the Phase I DW and Phase II DW studies are used as input
data for the fault tree analysis in (Holand, 1999) and (Holand and Skalle, 2001). The data input
is specifically the failure frequencies determined for failures that occured in the "safety critical
period" of the two studies, meaning that the failures were observed when the BOP was on the
wellhead. Hence, failures that have occurred during the time when the BOP was either on the rig,
being run, or undergoing the installation test have been disregarded. This is a sound approach
which appropriately reflects the criticality of on-wellhead failures.
The failure frequencies used as input in Holand (1997) are an important source of data input to
the quantitative analysis performed in this report. An overview of failure data used in this report
can be found in Appendix B.2.
BOP testing and implications of testing on reliability
To verify that the BOP is maintained as a safety barrier, regular proof tests of its functions and its
ability to withstand pressure are performed. The purpose of proof testing a safety critical system
such as the BOP is to detect failures which are only revealed by a process demand, and repair
them before they are allowed affect the system’s ability to act as a safety barrier when a process
demand occurs.It is important to emphasise that only failures considered in the analysis here
are those which (Rausand and Hoyland, 2004):
1. Have the potential to prevent activation of an essential BOP function on demand.
2. Are revealed only by proof testing of the BOP system.
Such failures can be classified as dangerous undetected (DU) failures, according to (IEC 61508,
2010). DU failures are often also called hidden or dormant failures.
Testing of BOPs consists of two main types of tests; functional tests and pressure tests. An im-
portant difference between these tests is that a pressure test involves testing of both the function
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and the ability to close in a well pressure, while a function test only checks the ability of the BOP
to carry out the function, and not the ability to close in a well kick.
Functional testing
Functional tests are carried out with regular intervals, and involves testing the BOPs ability to
carry out the function, e.g. closing an annular preventer. Function tests include the checking of
(Holand, 1986):
• closure time of preventers and remotely controlled valves
• accumulator recharging times
• volumes pumped
Pressure testing
Pressure tests are performed in order to ensure that the BOP components have the sealing ef-
fect required for closing in a well kick. Pressure tests will often reveal failures in components
and hydraulic lines, such as leakages. Pressure tests also include the checking of closure times,
recharging times and pumped volumes as listed above.
Calculation of BOP unavailability and test frequencies
Generally, it can be assumed that the higher the test frequency, the higher the BOP availabil-
ity(Holand, 1999). If the objective was to minimize the probability of failures without any re-
gards to downtime, the theoretically optimal solution would be to minimize the test interval.
From the operational perspective however, the purpose of proof testing the BOP is rather to
maintain a certain safety level while attempting to optimize the test intervals and procedures
with respect to total test time consumption, i.e. rig downtime caused by testing. In the follow-
ing, some important assumptions regarding BOP testing made in Holand (1999) and Holand
and Skalle (2001) will be evaluated.
The mean fractional deadtime (MFDT) of a component is the mean proportion of time the com-
ponent is in a failed state, i.e. unavailable (Holand, 1991). The probability of failure on demand
(PFD) is then equal to the MFDT. Considering a component with a failure rate λ which is tested
at intervals τ, the equation for the MFDT, or probability of failure on demand (PFD), is:
PF D =MF DT = λτ
2
(3.1)
for λτ « 1.
In the Holand (1999) and Holand and Skalle (2001), the following assumptions have been made
in order to be able to calculate the PFD of components (Holand, 1999):
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1. Tests are perfect; all inherent failures are detected by each test.
This assumption is not conservative. As mentioned above, the shear rams cannot be fully
function tested when the BOP is installed on the wellhead without shearing the drill pipe.
For this reason, tests of the shearing function are generally only performed during factory
acceptance tests and during re-certifications. Otherwise shear ram test are limited to a
test of the closing and sealing function against an open wellbore, which will not confirm
that the shearing rams are able to shear the pipe. Hence, arguably the most vulnerable
function of the shearing rams, and perhaps of the most important function from a safety
perspective, namely the ability to shear the drill pipe in an emergency, is not tested during
weekly function tests. The shearing function may therefore fail upon demand due to a DU
failure which is undetectable by the weekly tests, or a test independent failure. According
to Hauge et al. (2010), the probability of a test independent failure (TIF) occuring upon a
demand, PT I F , should be included in the reliability calculations for such cases.
Hauge and Onshus (2010b) define the probability of a component/system TIF, PT I F as:
"The probability that the component/system will fail to carry out its intended function due
to a (latent) failure not detectable by functional testing(...)."
The implication of TIF on reliability calculations is discussed in section 5.1.
Alternatively, the issue of imperfect shear ram tests can be overcome by the inclusion of
a test coverage factor C in PFD calculations where the test is known to be imperfect. It
is then assumed that the fraction (1-C) of DU failures that cannot be revealed by weekly
functional tests, are revealed during a re-certification. The implication of this approach
on reliability calculations is also discussed in 5.1.
2. The test interval is assumed to be fixed.
In a practical situation the test interval is likely to be unfixed. If the test interval is unfixed
during a period of time, and the τ value used in the calculation of the PFD is the average
test interval, the result from 5.1 will be too optimistic. It is however an assumption which
is necessary to make in order to achieve PFD estimates for system components.
3. Components are independent and have constant failure rates.
This assumption is non-conservative. When assuming independent components, the
quantification of BOP reliability disregards a all potential failures caused by inherent de-
pendencies in the system.
In relation to component dependency, it is important to clearly separate the concepts of
dependent failures and failure of multiple independent components due to a shared cause,
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or common cause failures (CCF). Dependent failures may be classified into three main
groups: CCF, cascading failures and negative dependencies (Rausand and Hoyland, 2004).
Cascading failures are multiple failures initiated by the failure of one component in the
system that results in a chain-reaction (Rausand and Hoyland, 2004), e.g. a building col-
lapsing completely due to the fracture of a single load-supporting beam.
Negative dependency refers to single failures which reduce the likelihood of other com-
ponents failing (Rausand and Hoyland, 2004), e.g. an electrical fuse failing reduces the
likelihood that any lightbulb powered from this fuse experiences a failure, since the elec-
tric current is removed from the system.
While either of these types of dependency may exist in the BOP system, cascading failures
and negative dependencies will not be discussed further in this report. In Section 4.2, an
introduction to CCF is presented, along with a proposed methodology for including CCF
in PFD calculations for BOP, and a discussion of the potential implication of CCF on BOP
reliability.
3.2 Regulations and guidelines
3.2.1 Introduction
In most countries, governmental bodies stipulate laws and regulations for petroleum compa-
nies operating in their geographic domain. In the NSNS, all petroleum related offshore opera-
tions are under the autority of the Petroleum Safety Authority Norway (PSA). The PSA is a gov-
ernmental body within the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD), and is charged with the
responsibility of acting as the regulatory authority for technical and operational safety. As such,
the PSA shall enforce the laws and regulations that apply to the Norwegian Sector of the North
Sea. All companies operating in this area must comply to the regulations set forth by the PSA.
In order to help the industry comply to these laws and regulations, standards are developed by
organizations acting on behalf of the government and/or the industry.
3.2.2 Standards pertaining to BOP reliability
Standards are documents that specify guidelines ranging from safe design specifications for off-
shore structures to guidelines for waste management. The purpose of such standards is to help
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the petroleum industry comply to regulations and to act according to what is considered "best
practice" in the industry.
The US GoM OCS is governed by the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and
Enforcement (BOEMRE), while the standards applicable to the area are issued mostly by the
American Petroleum Institute (API). In Europe, the majority of industrial standards are devel-
oped by the International Standarization d Organization (ISO) and the Internation Electrotech-
nical Committee (IEC). Standards that apply to offshore operations on the NSNS are issued on
behalf of the Norwegian petroleum industry and the governing autorities, PSA and NPD, by the
Norwegian Oil Industry Association (OLF). In terms of safety and reliability issues, and for the
purpose of this report, the most important standards that apply to the petroleum industry in
Norway are:
• IEC 61508 Functional Safety of electrical/electronic/programmable electronic safety-instrumented
systems
• IEC 61511 Functional Safety - Safety instrumented systems for the process industry sector
• OLF 070 Application of IEC 61508 and IEC 61511 in the Norwegian Petroleum Industry
• NORSOK D-010 Well integrity in drilling and well operations
IEC 61508 (2010) is a general standard which specifies functional safety guidelines that apply
to all types of industrial activity. IEC 61511 (2004) is a standard which is harmonized with the
general functional safety standard, but modified in order to apply more directly to the process
industry. OLF-070 (2004) is a further modified standard which specifies guidelines for how to act
in accordance with the two before mentioned standards while operating in the NSNS as part of
the petroleum industry in Norway. D-010 (2004) is a standard which specifies requirements and
guidelines for well design and planning and execution of well operations in Norway, in accor-
dance with the previously mentioned standards. These standards specify a variety of guidelines
and requirements both directly and indirectly applicable to BOP systems.
3.2.3 BOP testing regulations in the Norwegian Sector of the North Sea
The regulations pertaining to BOP testing also depend on which government has domain over
the area in question. Some governments do not have any regulations for BOP testing. In these
cases, internal company policies determine the requirements. In the NSNS, there are govern-
mental regulations for BOP testing, specified by the PSA. The PSA stipulates regulations for test
types and frequencies, and for tests to be performed at various stages of the drilling program.
These requirements must be followed in order to be allowed operation in the NSNS. According
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to (Holand, 1999), the following BOP tests are specified in these regulations:
• Installation tests
• Test after running casing
• Regular interval pressure tests (Maximum intervals of 14 days)
• Regular interval function tests(Maximum 7 days after the previous pressure test)
Table 3.1 shows an overview of the required test types and frequencies, as specified in D-010
(2004).
NORSOK standard D-010 Rev 3, August 2004 
 
 
NORSOK standard Page 157 of 158 
Annex A 
(Normative) 
Leak test pressures and frequency for well control equipment 
Table A.1 - Routine leak testing of drilling BOP and well control equipment 
 
Before drilling out 
of casing Periodic 
 
Frequency 
 
 
Element 
Stump 
Surfac
e 
Deeper 
casing 
and 
liners 
Before 
well 
testing Weekly 
Each 
14 
days 
Each 6 
months 
BOP 
Annulars 
Pipe rams 
Shear rams 
Failsafe valves 
Well head connector 
Wedge locks 
MWDP 1) 
MWDP 
MWDP 
MWDP 
MWDP 
Function 
Function 
Function 
Function 
Function 
MSDP 
MSDP 1) 
MSDP 
MSDP 
MSDP 3) 
TSTP 1) 
TSTP 
TSTP 
TSTP 
TSTP 
Function 
Function 
Function 
Function 
MSDP 1) 
MSDP 
 
MSDP 3) 
MSDP 
WP x 0,7 
WP 
WP 
WP 
WP 
Choke/kill 
line and 
manifold 
Choke/kill lines 
manifold 
Valves 
Remote chokes 
MWDP 
MWDP 
Function 
MSDP 
MSDP 
Function 
 
MSDP 
MSDP 
Function 
 
TSTP 
TSTP 
Function 
 
 MSDP 
MSDP 
Function 
 
WP 
WP 
 
 
Other 
equipment 
Kill pump 
Inside BOP 
Stabbing valves 
Upper kelly valve 
Lower kelly valve 
WP 2) 
MWDP 2) 
MWDP 2) 
MWDP 2) 
MWDP 2) 
 MSDP 
MSDP 
MSDP 
MSDP 
MSDP 
 
TSTP 
TSTP 
 MSDP 
MSDP 
MSDP 
MSDP 
MSDP 
WP 
WP 
WP 
WP 
WP 
Legend 
WP working pressure 
MWDP maximum well design pressure 
MSDP maximum section design pressure 
Function Function testing: testing shall be done 
from alternating panels/pods. 
TSTP tubing string test pressure 
1) Or maximum 70 % of WP 
2) Or at initial installation 
3) From above if restricted by BOP 
arrangement  
NOTE 1 All tests shall be 1,5 MPa to 2 MPa/5 min and 
high pressure/10 min. 
 
NOTE 2 If the drilling BOP is disconnected/re-connected 
or moved between wells without having been disconnected from 
its control system, the initial leak test of the BOP components 
can be omitted. The wellhead connector shall be leak tested. 
 
NOTE 3 The BOP with associated valves and other 
pressure control equipment on the facility shall be subjected to a 
complete overhaul and shall be recertified every five years. The 
complete overhaul shall be documented. 
 
Table 3.1: Routine leak testing of drilling BOP and well control equipment. Source: D-010 (2004),
p.157
Annulars, rams, failsafe valves, and wellhead connectors must all be function tested weekly (D-
010, 2004). During these function tests it is required that testing is done from alternating panels
and pods, meaning that the testing of functions is alternated between the DCP and the TCP,
while also alternating which pod the commands are run through.
Annulars, pipe rams, failsafe valves and wellhead connector are also to be pressure tested to
the maximum casing section design pressure minimum once per 14 days (D-010, 2004). This
means that the components are to be tested to the pressure which represents the maximum
design pressure of the next section of casing to be set in the wellbore. Norwegian regulations
further require pipe rams, shear rams, failsafe valves and wellhead connector to be pressure
tested to working pressure at least once every six months. Annulars shall be tested to 70 percent
of working pressure with the same time interval.
All BOP pressure tests shall be to 1.5 MPa-2 MPa for 5 minutes, followed by high pressure for 10
minutes (D-010, 2004).
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All installation tests must include a BOP test to the pressure which equals the maximum section
design pressure (MSDP) of the casing string that is designed to withstand the highest pressure
(D-010, 2004). Granted this test has been performed, the BOP installation test can be limited to
testing of all functions (annular/ram preventers etc.) as well as the wellhead connector and the
choke and kill lines (D-010, 2004).
When about to drill out of casing, it is required that the BOP is pressure tested to the MSDP of
the next section of casing (D-010, 2004). Surface function testing of annulars, rams and failsafe
valves, as well as surface MSDP test of the wellhead connector is also required before drilling
out of casing (D-010, 2004).
Chapter 4
BOP failures
4.1 Overview of all BOP failures
4.1.1 Introduction
In order to assess the reliability of a safety critical system such as the BOP, the system familiariza-
tion and functional analysis should be followed by a process of identifying the potential failures
in the system. Ideally, system failures should be identified through qualitative techniques such
as failure mode, effects and criticality analysis (FMECA/FMEA), hazard identification (HAZID)
and hazard and operability study (HAZOP), involving personnel from multiple disciplines with
expert knowledge of the system, and/or extensive experience with the system’s use. The failure
modes identified in this section are partly based on failure modes from Holand (1999), Holand
and Skalle (2001) and Holand (1997), expert judgments from DNV personnel, and otherwise
based on the the author’s best judgment. While the identification of failures may therefore
contain some inadequacies, the emphasis of the further analysis is placed on the methodology
rather than the detailed failure analysis of the system.
4.1.2 Safety criticality of failures
When assessing the ability of the BOP to act as a safety barrier, we are interested in failures
which have the potential to prevent the BOP from performing functions required to mitigate
a well control situation, or a process demand. We therefore only include in the analysis the
failures which can be classified as DU failures, according to the definition presented in Section
3.1.
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A safety critical system is normally not operated outside of a process demand. In this respect,
the BOP is different from many other safety critical systems, because some of its functions are
operated in relation to normal operation, e.g. annular preventers are closed for stripping of drill
pipe and so forth. Hence, critical failures preventing these functions from being activated may
be detected during normal operation, i.e. outside of a process demand. The assumption that
failures are only detected during proof tests is therefore not completely accurate for the BOP sys-
tem. However, the inaccuracy of the assumption will have a conservative effect on calculations,
and the assumption is therefore accepted.
4.1.3 Data sources
A collection and analysis of BOP failure data has not been performed as part of this master thesis.
The required data input for the quantitative analysis has been failure rates and test intervals for
the relevant BOP components. The main sources of such data have been the FTAs performed
in relation to the BOP reliability studies Phase I DW and Phase II DW (Holand, 1997), and the
reliability data for typical subsea components (solenoid valve, SEM etc.) listed in Hauge and
Onshus (2010a). Due to lack of available data, it has been necessary to use "guesstimates" for
some component failure rates. A complete list of failure rates used as input the the quantitative
analysis in this report can be found in Appendix B.2.
4.1.4 BOP system failure modes
Based on the system familiarization, functional analysis and analysis of operational situations,
the failure modes which can potentially lead to DU failures in the BOP system have been identi-
fied. An overview of the failure modes used as input for the quantitative analysis is shown Table
4.1.
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Main control system Annular preventers Pipe rams Blind shear ram Casing shear ram Accumulators
Severe leakage in pod selector valve. Annular preventer 
internal failure; causes 
fail to close. 
Tool joint in ram 
closing area; causes 
fail to seal.
Tool joint in ram closing area; 
causes fail to shear/seal.
Tool joint in ram closing area; 
causes fail to shear.
Severe leak through stack mounted 
accumulator isolation valve. 
Blue/yellow surface control valve 
failure.
Blue/yellow pod 
solenoid valve fails to 
open. 
Pipe ram internal 
failure; causes fail to 
close.
Blind shear ram internal failure; 
causes fail to shear/seal.
Casing shear ram internal 
failure; causes fail to shear.
External leakage in subsea accumulator. 
Topside control panel PLC's fail to 
signal pods.
Shuttle valve or line to 
preventer leaks.
Blue/yellow pod 
solenoid valve fails to 
open. 
Blue/yellow pod solenoid valve fails 
to open. 
Blue/yellow pod solenoid valve 
fails to open. 
Leakage in pod mounted accumulator 
isolation valve, blue pod.
Blue/yellow pod SEM fail to fire 
solenoid valve.
Shuttle valve stuck in 
opposite position.
Shuttle valve or line to 
preventer leaks.
Shuttle valve or line to preventer 
leaks.
Shuttle valve or line to 
preventer leaks.
Loss of power/communications to 
blue/yellow pod due to MUX cable and 
associated equipment failure. 
Shuttle valve stuck in 
opposite position.
Shuttle valve stuck in opposite 
position.
Shuttle valve stuck in opposite 
position.
DCP/TCP Push button failure.
BOP failure modes
Loss of hydraulic fluid due severe 
leakage in blue/yellow pod hydraulic 
supply lines. 
Hydraulic control valve 
failure. 
Hydraulic control 
valve failure. 
Hydraulic control valve failure. Hydraulic control valve failure. 
Leakage in pod mounted accumulator 
isolation valve, yellow pod. 
Table 4.1: Failure modes in the BOP system.
In addition to the failure modes listed in Table 4.1, the sources for potential CCFs in the system
should also be identified. The following section gives a short introduction to CCF and CCF mod-
eling, and describes the potential for CCFs in the BOP system and how these can be included in
the reliability assessment of the system.
4.2 Common cause failures
4.2.1 Introduction
Safety critical systems often have a high degree of redundancy. Redundancy is introduced in the
architecture of safety critical systems in order to enchance reliability (Lundteigen and Rausand,
2007). A core principle behind the design of the BOP system is redundancy of functions capable
of isolating the well in the event of a well kick.
When we quantify the reliability of redundant safety critical systems it is essential to distin-
guish between independent and dependent failures (Hauge and Onshus, 2010b). In this respect
it is also important to distinguish between random hardware failures and systematic failures.
Most random hardware failures caused by natural stressors are considered as independent fail-
ures, i.e. failure of one component is not assumed to influence the failure frequency of other
components in the system Hauge and Onshus (2010b). In contrast, systematic failures such as
excessive stress related failures, installation failures and operational failures are by nature po-
tentially dependent failures (Hauge and Onshus, 2010b). Systematic, dependent failures have
the potential to lead to common cause failures, i.e. simultaneous failure of more than one com-
ponent in the system by the same cause. Common cause failures can therefore reduce the effect
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of redundancy in safety critical systems.
The system reliability of a redundant system such as the BOP can be strongly influenced by
potential common cause failures. It is therefore important to identify the potential CCFs in a
system and to take the necessary precautions to prevent such failures from occurring (Rausand
and Hoyland, 2004). The objective of this section is to present the fundamental principles of
common cause failure modeling, as well as identifying potential CCFs in the BOP system and
suggesting an approach to how these should be modeled.
4.2.2 Theoretic principles behind CCF modeling
There is no widely accepted definition of CCFs. The understanding of what a CCF is will there-
fore depend on different personal opinions in different industry sectors. IEC 61511 (2004) de-
fines a CCF as "a failure which is the result of one or more events, causing failures of two or more
separate channels in a multiple channel system, leading to a system failure." A channel is a single
redundant path within a safety function, or alternatively a single safety function where more
than one of the system’s safety functions are required to achieve the necessary risk reduction
(Lundteigen and Rausand, 2007).Whereas NASA (2002b) defines a CCF event as "the failure (or
unavailable state) of more than one component due to a shared cause during the system mis-
sion.
A important aspect of determining how to model CCF is how the term simultaneous is inter-
preted. In the aviation industry, the term CCF describes the multiplicity of failures occuring
during the same flight (Hokstad and Rausand, 2008). In the case of the BOP system, the most
relevant failures from a safety perspective are those classified in IEC 61508 (2010) as DU failures.
DU failures can only be detected through proof testing, hence a multiple in the BOP system fail-
ure should only be considered a CCF so long as it occurs within the same test interval τ.
By direct implication, the term CCF suggests the existence of a cause-effect relationship be-
tween the failure and some failure cause (Hokstad and Rausand, 2008). Such a relationship may
however in many cases be difficult to identify. According to Rausand and Hoyland (2004), CCF
for which the causes can be identified should be modeled explicitly in e.g. a fault tree or an RBD.
In most cases, it will be difficult to find high quality input data for explicitly modeled common
causes. According to Rausand and Hoyland (2004), even with low quality input data, the result
of explicit modeling will still usually be more accurate compared to the outcome of including
these CCF in an implicit model. InLundteigen and Rausand (2009), it is argued that for systems
with several types of common causes, such as the BOP system, the explicit approach may lead
to large fault tree which are difficult to interpret, and that dependent events may then be easily
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overlooked or incorrectly included in the model. Based on this argument, the implicit approach
will be used for modeling of CCF in the BOP system.
Standard beta-factor model versus PDS approach
Traditionally, the most commonly used implicit model for common cause failures of safety crit-
ical systems has been the standard beta-factor model (Rausand and Hoyland, 2004). The model
assumes that a fraction beta of all the failures in a system or subsystem are common cause fail-
ures, so that the contribution to the system DU failure rate from independent and CCF failures
is equal to (1−β)λDU and βλDU , respectively.
A problem with the beta-factor model is that it does not take into account the voting of the sys-
tem. A M-out-of-N (MooN) voting (M>N) means that at least M of the N redundant components
have to give a shutdown signal for a shutdown to be activated (Hauge and Onshus, 2010b). In
the standard beta-factor model, any MooN voting is given the same rate of CCF, regardless of the
values of M and N. With a component failure rate for dangerous, undetected failures λDU , the
contribution from CCF is always equal to βλDU . Consequently, the resulting system failure rate
due to CCF will be equal for e.g. 1oo2, 1oo3 and 2oo3 voted systems.
OLF-070 (2004) rejects the use of the beta-factor model as an appropriate method of modeling
CCF, and suggests the use of the PDS approach instead. The PDS approach is a method that
distinguishes between different types of voting by including a modification factor CMooN so that
the beta-factor of a MooN voted system can be expressed by(Hauge and Onshus, 2010b):
β(MooN )=β ·CMooN , (M <N ), (4.1)
where β is the factor applying to a 1oo2 voted system.
Hence, for a MooN voted system of components with failure rate λDU , the contribution from
CCF to the total system failure rate is equal to:
λDUCC F =CMooN ·βλDU (4.2)
The PDS approach is quite easy to use in practice, since the effect from voting is included as
the separate factor CMooN which is independent of β (Hauge and Onshus, 2010b). The BOP
system contains several subsystems with voting logics where N is larger than 2, and it is therefore
considered that the PDS approach is the most appropriate method for modeling potential CCF
in the BOP system.
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4.2.3 CCF data sources
In order to determine the beta-factor and the modification factor CM ooN , one is dependent on
relevant failure data regarding CCF. The access to relevant failure data on CCF is limited, and
alternative methods to support estimation of these parameters have therefore been suggested.
Hauge and Onshus (2010b) mentions the checklist in IEC 61508 (2010) as an alternative method
of estimating the beta-factor. Also, OLF-070 (2004) lists beta-factor values for a selection of com-
ponents which are frequently used in safety instrumented systems, such as logic controllers,
valves and sensors, which will be applied in this report. It is however emphasised in OLF-070
(2004) that these values are not to be considered as the recommended values, rather examples
of typical values.
For estimation of CMooN , Hauge and Onshus (2010b) suggests an approach based on expert
judgments, and presents a seletion of CMooN values for typical voting configurations based on
this approach. These CMooN values are used as input to the quantitative analysis in Chapter
5.
4.2.4 CCF in the BOP system
In general, common causes failures may be caused by (NASA, 2002a):
• A common design or material deficiency
• A common installation error
• A common maintenance error
• A common harsh environment
When attempting to identify potential CCF in the BOP system, we should review each of these
aspects for each set of components that may to susceptible to CCF.
The BOP system contains various subsystems of identical, redundant components which can be
considered susceptible to CCF, including the solenoid valves in each pod, shuttle valves, control
valves, pod accumulator isolation valves, hydraulic fluid hoses, MUX cables, SEMs and PLCs. In
order to identify in detail which sources of CCF each of these component types can be exposed
to, CCF identification should be included as part of FMECA/FMEA or HAZID/HAZOP activities
for BOP systems, utilizing expertise from across all relevant engineering disciplines.
As part of the reliability quantification method in Chapter 5, beta-factors and CMooN values for
the relevant components have been chosen based on values listed in OLF-070 (2004), Hauge
and Onshus (2010a), or otherwise conservative guesstimates.
Chapter 5
Reliability assessment model for the BOP
system
5.1 Quantification of BOP reliability
5.1.1 Introduction
So far in this report, we have described the composition of the BOP system, defined its essential
functions and its functional boundaries. We have also provided a functional analysis of the BOP,
and a discussion of how the BOPs ability to act as a safety barrier is affected by the operational
situations and conditions to which it is exposed, and also by the configuration of the BOP stack.
Previous studies of BOP reliability have been evaluated, mainly by discussing the validity of the
assumptions made in order to quantify the relability of the BOP in these studies. The most rel-
evant BOP failure modes have been presented, along with an identification of potential sources
for common cause failures in the BOP system, and discussion of the contribution from CCF
may be included in BOP reliability calculations. Based on the results from the previous sections,
a new approach to quantifying the reliability of the BOP system through fault tree and event tree
analysis (ETA) is now suggested.
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5.1.2 Background for the approach
Choice of reliability performance metric
The BOP is a system whose reliability we seek to quantify by some reliability metric based on
probabilistic formulas and empirical data about the system’s use. The purpose of the quantifi-
cation may be to verify compliance to some regulatory requirement, e.g. a safety integrity level
(SIL). According to the definition in (IEC 61511, 2004), a SIL is a:
"Discrete level (one out of four) for specifying the safety integrity requirements of the safety instru-
mented functions to be allocated to the safety instrumented systems."
In order for this definition be applied when assessing the safety integrity (reliability) of the BOP,
the system should also be in accordance with the definition of a safety instrumented system (SIS),
governing one or more safety instrumented function(s) (SIF). Placing the BOP under the SIS def-
inition implies that the system is "composed of any number of sensor(s), logic solver(s) and final
element(s) (IEC 61511, 2004), which is correct. However, the term SIS is mainly intended to refer
to a dedicated safety system which automatically responds to a process demand by automati-
cally performing some SIF. Meanwhile, the BOP does not perform any such SIFs automatically
in response to a process demand. Rather, it is a complex system which is entirely dependent on
both the physical interaction and professional judgment of the operator(s) in order to perform
its functions. Moreover, the BOPs functions are not dedicated to its role as a safety barrier, but
part of normal operation as well. Hence, the SIS definition is not directly applicable to the BOP
system.
Despite the inaccuracies in terms of definitions described above, BOP reliability is considered
under the SIL methodology in OLF-070 (2004), where it is recommended that the required PFD/SIL
levels be calculated specifically for each well and tolerable risk levels set as part of the applica-
tion process for exploration and development drilling consent. As the minimum, SIL 2 require-
ments are recommended for both isolation of the well using the annulus function, and for clos-
ing of the blind shear ram (OLF-070, 2004). An important note is that a minimum SIL require-
ment has not been recommended for the actual shearing of the pipe (OLF-070, 2004).
Depending on whether the safety system is operating in a demand mode of operation, or a conti-
nous/high demand mode of operation, compliance to SIL must be demonstrated either through
verification that the average probability of failure on demand (PFD), or average probability of
dangerous failure per hour (PFH), is within the range of the SIL in question. According to
IEC 61508 (2010), the BOP should be considered as operating in an on demand mode of opera-
tion, and thus the reliability target for a SIF performed by the BOP system should be expressed
by the average PFD of the SIF.
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Selection of modeling approach
In order to determine the PFD of the BOP functions, a reliability analysis method must be cho-
sen. (IEC 61511, 2004) and (IEC 61508, 2010) recommend the use of FTA, RBD or Markov meth-
ods for this analysis, and that the effect from CCF be taken into account using the PDS ap-
proach. Both RBD and FTA are applicable methods for analyzing the reliability of a complex
SIF (Lundteigen and Rausand, 2009). We wish to select the method which is most suitable for
modeling the SIF Isolate well, defined in Chapter 2, which is fulfilled by one or more of the three
essential functions specified in OLF-070 (2004), also listed in Chapter 2.
FTA is a deductive, failure oriented method which focuses on how a function may fail. The FTA
method makes it simpler to identify failures that are not directly linked to a component function,
and it is an intuitive and structured approach, compared to the RBD and Markov methods.
RBD models often bear a greater resemblance to the physical structure of the system in the
sense that the functional block may be set up to be similar to the sequence in which the sys-
tem components are activated. A block diagram is established by focusing on how functions
are acheived, rather than how they may fail. Lundteigen and Rausand (2009) point to this as a
possible strength, but also a weakness, since functions that are installed, or should be installed,
to protect the main system functions may easily be overlooked. Unlike the physical structure,
the RBD may include the same component in different sections of the model, if the component
is part of more than one function. To personnel who are unfamiliar with reliability modeling,
the model may therefore become confusing (Lundteigen and Rausand, 2009).
The strength of Markov methods is the ability to model systems which are frequently switch-
ing between different operational modes, and have complex maintenance and repair processes
(Rausand and Hoyland, 2004). For such applications, the FTA and RBD methods may provide
too "static" an image of the system (Lundteigen and Rausand, 2009). However, when the system
has a high number of components, the Markov models will become very large, and the number
of fault states and operational, maintenance and repair modes may be too difficult to compre-
hend (Lundteigen and Rausand, 2009).
The BOP has a large variety of components, and is a complex system both in terms of design,
and in terms of operation and maintenance. While it is also exposed to different operational
situations, the frequency with which each of these are visited is not very high. Markov meth-
ods are therefore considered less suitable for modeling of the BOP system. RBDs can be used
to model parts of the system, and has been a useful tool in terms of reviewing the effect on sys-
tem redundancy when analysing the different operational situations. However, it is considered
of great importance to have a strong involvement from design engineers and operators in the
analysis, both in order to increase their awareness of critical failure combinations, and in order
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to utilize their competence and experience with the system in the identification of potential fail-
ures and system weaknesses. Hence, we wish to select the most intuitive, structured and failure
oriented approach. Based on these arguments, FTA is considered the most suitable method for
the reliability assessment of the BOP system SIFs.
5.1.3 Fault tree analysis of the BOP system
Achieving conservative PFD approximations
In the previous BOP reliability studies discussed in this report, the authors have used FTA to
calculate the PFD of BOP failing to close in a well kick. PFD calculations are usually based
on approximations. It is therefore essential that these approximations are conservative, such
that the "true" PFD is less than the calculated PFD (Lundteigen and Rausand, 2009). Previous
studies have used the FTA software tool CARA Faultree to calculate the TOP event probabilities
of the fault trees. Along with most other FTA software tools, CARA FaultTree produces non-
conservative, inaccurate PFD approximations.
Lundteigen and Rausand (2009) present an FTA-based approach which produces more con-
servative and accurate estimates of the PFD through post-processing of minimal cut sets. By
following the approach by Lundteigen and Rausand (2009), the contribution from CCF can also
be included in the calculations. Hence, some important weaknesses found in previous BOP
reliability studies can be overcome by using this approach. In the following, it will be demon-
strated how the approach presented by Lundteigen and Rausand (2009) can be applied to the
BOP system in order to produce conservative PFD estimates which take into account CCF.
Consider a fault tree for a specified TOP event, with m minimal cut sets, or minimal cuts, MC1,
MC2,...,MCm . Let PFD j ,i denote the (average) PFD of component i in minimal cut set j , for
j = 1,2, ...,m. Minimal cut j of order m j is a 1oom j voted structure, and will fail only when all
m j components in the cut set are in a failed state simultaneously. When all the components in
minimal cut j are independent components, the PFD of the minimal cut is normally calculated
by (Lundteigen and Rausand, 2009):
PF DMC j ≈
m j∏
i=1
PF D j (5.1)
Along with most other FTA software tools, CARA FaultTree uses Equation 5.1 to calculate the
PFD of a minimal cut, which does not give an accurate result (Dutuit et al., 2008). Due to the
well known Schwartz’ inequality saying that "the average of a product is not equal to the prod-
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uct of averages" (Lundteigen and Rausand, 2009), Equation 5.1 produces non-conservative PFD
approximations.
For a single component i in minimal cut j , with a constant DU failure rate λDU , j ,i , which is
periodically tested with fixed intervals τ, the average PFD j ,i can be calculated as (Rausand and
Hoyland, 2004):
PF D j ,i = 1
τ
∫ τ
0
(1−e−λDU , j ,i ·t )d t ≈ (λDU , j ,i ·τ)
2
(5.2)
All BOP components are covered by the same functional test with test interval τ. The component
index i is therefore omitted in the following.
According to Rausand and Hoyland (2004), Equation 5.2 is a conservative PFD approximation,
which produces adequate results when:
• λDU , j ·τ< 10−2. For higher values, the approximation might be too conservative (Lundteigen
and Rausand, 2009).
• Operation is halted upon the detection of a DU failure, and is not commenced before the
failure has been repaired.
• The functional is perfect; all DU failures are revealed by the test.
For the BOP, the first two conditions are fulfilled, while the third is not fulfilled because of the
imperfect functional testing conditions for the shear rams. As described in section 3.1, this issue
can be overcome by two main approaches. Either by adding the TIF probability PT I F to the
critical safety unavailability (CSU), or by including a test coverage factor C to account for the
fraction (1-C) of DU failures which are not revealed by the functional test, when calculating the
PFDMC j .
In Hauge and Onshus (2010b), the PT I F is included in the reliability calculations as a contribu-
tion to the total loss of safety, or critical safety unavailability(CSU) as:
C SU = PF D+PT I F (5.3)
Hauge and Onshus (2010b) list TIF probabilities for various components typical to safety sys-
tems. For redundant components, the contribution from TIF to loss of safety can for a MooN
voting be expressed as (Hauge and Onshus, 2010b):
PT I F ≈CMooN ·β ·PT I F (5.4)
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where the numerical values of CMooN are assumed to be identical to the values used in the PFD
calculations. In Hauge and Onshus (2010b) TIF probabilities are listed for various components
typical to safety systems.
Alternatively, the issue of imperfect tests can be introduced by the test coverage factor C. Hauge
et al. (2010) gives an example of how the test coverage factor is included in the reliability calcu-
lations for a workover control system. In this example, the test coverage factor is set to 75%, and
the test interval τ with which the unrevealed fraction of DU failures (1-C) can be detected is set
equal to the re-certification interval τC T . The BOP is re-certified with 5 year intervals (Holand,
1986). Assuming that DU failures undetected by weekly functional BOP tests cannot be de-
tected outside of these re-certification intervals, we find that the PFD for a single component
failure mode, e.g. "BSR fail to shear drill pipe", with assumed failure rate λBSR = 1 ·10−6, when
incuding the test coverage factor C becomes:
PF DBSR ≈C ·λBSR τ
2
+ (1−C )λBSR τC T
2
(5.5)
PF DBSR ≈ 0,75 ·1 ·10−6 · 168
2
+0,25 ·1 ·10−6 · 5 ·8760
2
= 6,3 ·10−5+5,475 ·10−3 = 5,538 ·10−3 (5.6)
Hence, in this example, the fraction of the total PFDShear contributed from DU failures unre-
vealed by tests is 0,05475/0,05538 = 0,98862, i.e 98,9%. This example is perhaps too conserva-
tive either in terms of the assumed value of the test coverage factor, or in terms of the assumed
interval τCer ti f i cati on with which these failure can be detected. However, the example certainly
indicates that the contribution from DU failures unrevealed by shear ram tests may be signifi-
cant, and that the test coverage factor C should therefore be included when calculating the PFD
for the BOP components/systems which are exposed to such failures.
The PFDMC j of any minimal cut j with m j independent components and test interval τ can be
expressed as (Lundteigen and Rausand, 2009):
PF D j ,i = 1
τ
∫ τ
0
m j∏
i=1
(1−e−λDU , j ·t )d t ≤ 1
τ
∫ τ
0
m j∏
i=1
(λDU , j · t )d t =
(
∏m j
i=1λDU , j ) ·τm j
m j +1
= (λ¯DU , j ·τ)
m j
m j +1
(5.7)
where
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λ¯DU , j = (
m j∏
i=1
λDU , j )
1
m j (5.8)
is the geometric mean of the m j DU failure rates in minimal cut j .
To illustrate the difference between the conservative and non-conservative approximations,
consider a minimal cut j consisting of two independent components with failure rate λDU , j .
By combining 5.1 and 5.2, we get PFDMC j = (λDU , j · τ)2/4, while from 5.3 we get PFDMC j =
(λDU , jτ)2/3, i.e. the non-conservative approximation is 25 percent lower than the conserva-
tive value. This percentage increases with the order m j of the minimal cut. Thus, the accu-
racy of PFD approximations achieved through FTA software tools can be greatly improved by
post-processing the minimal cut sets using the approach presented by Lundteigen and Rausand
(2009).
TOP event definition
Earlier in this report, four main BOP operational situations A,B,C and D have been presented.
The purpose of the current FTA is to assess the BOP system’s ability to perform the overall sys-
tem SIF Isolate well for each of these operational situations. For each operational situation, a
separate TOP event representing the non-fulfillment of the SIF has been defined:
• TOP event A: Failure of the BOP to isolate well when 5" drill pipe is running through BOP
• TOP event B: Failure of the BOP to isolate well during large/small pipe diameter
• TOP event C: Failure of the BOP to isolate well during high wellbore pressure
• TOP event D: Failure of the BOP to isolate well during open hole
Fault tree construction
In the ideal situation, the fault tree should be constructed in close cooperation with BOP design
engineers and operators such as drillers, toolpushers, subsea engineers and so forth. The author
of this report has not had access to such expertise directly, but has received consultation from
DNV personnel, both with competence within well control and BOP reliability, and with compe-
tence regarding operation of the BOP system. It should be emphasised that due to the author’s
lack of experience with the system’s use, and due to the limited access to expert knowledge and
experience, some critical failures may have been overlooked or incorrectly included in the fault
tree.
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Using CARA FaultTree (Exprosoft AS, 2008), a separate fault tree has been constructed for each
of the TOP events A, B, C and D listed above. The fault trees can be found in Appendix B.1.
The basic events included in each fault tree are listed in Appendix B.2.
Identification and verification of minimal cut sets
The minimal cut sets for each fault tree were easily identified using the built-in function in CARA
FaultTree. The minimal cuts have then been verified, and then post-processed using Excel. An
important finding is that most of the minimal cuts containing "preventer-specific" basic events,
e.g. BSRSOLVBP, BSRSHV, LPRIF and so forth, produce negligible PFD values (PFDMC j < 10−5
i.e. below the SIL 4 requirement). Some of the negligible minimal cuts have been included
in the further calculations nonetheless, for the purpose of demonstrating the methodology for
including CCF contributions. An overview of all cut sets up to order 4 for each TOP event can be
found in Appendix B.3.
TOP event A minimal cuts
The minimal cuts for TOP event A included in PFD calculations is shown in Table 5.1 below.
ID (j) Minimal cut sets j of order up to 4
A1 {SELECT} 
A2 {PWR} 
A3 {HYSLBLU,HYSLYEL} 
A4 {SCVYP,SCVBP} 
A5 {PLCA,PLCB} 
A6 {MUXBP, MUXYP}
A7 {SEMAYP,SEMBYP,SCVBP} 
A8 {SCVYP,SEMABP,SEMBBP} 
A9 {ACCVL,EXLACC,ACCIVBP,ACCIVYP} 
A10 {[SEMAYP,SEMBYP],[SEMABP,SEMBBP] } 
Table 5.1: TOP event A minimal cuts.
TOP event B minimal cuts
The minimal cuts for TOP event B included in PFD calculations is shown in Table 5.2 below.
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ID (j) Minimal cut sets j of order up to 4
B1 {SELECT} 
B2 {PWR} 
B3 {SCVYP,SCVBP} 
B4 {HYSLBLU,HYSLYEL}
B5 {PLCA,PLCB} 
B6 {MUXBP, MUXYP}
B7 {SCVYP,SEMABP,SEMBBP} 
B8 {SEMAYP,SEMBYP,SCVBP} 
B9 {BSRTJOC,UAPIF,LAPIF,MPRIF} 
B10 {BSRIF,UAPIF,LAPIF,MPRIF} 
B11 {ACCVL,EXLACC,ACCIVBP,ACCIVYP} 
B12 {[SEMAYP,SEMBYP],[SEMABP,SEMBBP]} 
Table 5.2: TOP event B minimal cuts.
TOP event C minimal cuts
The minimal cuts for TOP event C included in PFD calculations is shown inTable 5.3 below.
ID (j) Minimal cut sets j of order up to 4
C1 {SELECT} 
C2 {PWR} 
C3 {HYSLBLU,HYSLYEL} 
C4 {SCVYP,SCVBP} 
C5 {PLCA,PLCB} 
C6 {SEMAYP,SEMBYP,SCVBP} 
C7 {SCVYP,SEMABP,SEMBBP} 
C8 {MUXBP, MUXYP}
C9 {ACCVL,EXLACC,ACCIVBP,ACCIVYP} 
C10 {[SEMAYP,SEMBYP],[SEMABP,SEMBBP]} 
C11 {BSRTJOC,LPRIF,MPRIF,UPRIF} 
C12 {BSRIF,LPRIF,MPRIF,UPRIF} 
C13 {CSRTJOC,LPRIF,MPRIF,UPRIF} 
C14 {CSRIF,LPRIF,MPRIF,UPRIF} 
Table 5.3: TOP event C minimal cuts.
CHAPTER 5. RELIABILITY ASSESSMENTMODEL 55
TOP event D minimal cuts
The minimal cuts for TOP event D included in PFD calculations is shown in Table 5.4 below.
ID (j) Minimal cut sets j of order up to 4
D1 {SELECT} 
D2 {BSRIF} 
D3 {PWR} 
D4 {BSRHCV} 
D5 {BSRSHV} 
D6 {PLCA,PLCB} 
D7 {HYSLBLU,HYSLYEL} 
D8 {SCVYP,SCVBP} 
D9 {MUXBP, MUXYP}
D10 {BSRPBDCP, BSRPBTCP }
D11 {SCVYP,BSRSOLVBP} 
D12 {SCVYP,BSRSHVBP} 
D13 {BSRSOLVYP,SCVBP} 
D14 {BSRSOLVYP,BSRSOLVBP } 
D15 {BSRSOLVYP,BSRSHVBP} 
D16 {BSRSHVYP,SCVBP} 
D17 {BSRSHVYP,BSRSOLVBP} 
D18 {BSRSHVYP,BSRSHVBP} 
D19 {SEMAYP,SEMBYP,SCVBP} 
D20 {SEMAYP,SEMBYP,BSRSOLVBP} 
D21 {SEMAYP,SEMBYP,BSRSHVBP} 
D22 {SCVYP,SEMABP,SEMBBP} 
D23 {BSRSOLVYP,SEMABP,SEMBBP} 
D24 {BSRSHVYP,SEMABP,SEMBBP} 
D25 {ACCVL,EXLACC,ACCIVBP,ACCIVYP} 
D26 {[SEMAYP,SEMBYP],[SEMABP,SEMBBP]} 
Table 5.4: TOP event D minimal cuts.
Identification of common cause component groups
For each minimal cut MC j , it must be determined whether the components in the cut are in-
dependent or dependent. Each minimal cut must be reviewed looking for root causes and
coupling factors. BOP components that are dependent and share the same common failure
cause, are included in the same common cause component group CG j ,ν, for j = 1,2, ...,m, and
ν= 1,2, ...,r j , where r j is the number of different common cause component groups in minimal
cut MC j (Lundteigen and Rausand, 2009). In many cases, one minimal cut will only contain a
single common cause component group. The index ν is then omitted from the notation. Each
CG j ,ν is then assigned a beta factor β j ,ν(MooN ) according to the PDS approach.
The identified common cause component groups CG j ,ν for each of the TOP events A, B, C and D
are shown in bold in Figures 5.1, 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4 above. Among the minimal cuts included in the
current calculation, CG1, CG2, CG3, CG4, CG5, CG7, CG8 are common cause components groups
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containing only identical components which are thought to be dependent and susceptible to
the same common failure cause such as similar design and materials, and/or exposure to the
same excess stressors (temperature, vibration, pressure and so forth). CG6,1 and CG6,2 are two
common cause component groups belonging to the same minimal cut.
Determine β j ,ν for CG j ,ν
All of the identified CG j ,ν have voting logic 1oo2, meaning that the CMooN factor is equal to 1.
Hence, the use of the PDS approach as opposed to the standard beta-factor model does not have
any consequences for the assignment of β factors in the current analysis.
The assigned beta-factors are shown it Table 5.5 below. The β-values for PLCs and SEMs have
been in Table 5.5 have been obtained from OLF-070 (2004). Otherwise, conservative estimates
have been used. Alternatively, the beta-factors can be determined through thorough analysis of
each sets of components using the checklist in IEC 61508 (2010).
CCF component groups (CG) Components Beta
CG A5 PLCA,PLCB 0,01
CG A3 HYSLBLU, HYSLYEL 0,10
CG A6 MUXBP, MUXYP 0,10
CG A9 ACCIVBP, ACCIVYP 0,10
CG A4 SCVBP, SCVYP 0,10
CG A10,1 SEMABP, SEMBBP 0,01
CG A10,2 SEMYP, SEMBYP 0,01
Table 5.5: β-factors.
Methodology used for PFD calculations
Based on the minimal cuts and common cause component groups identified, the PFD of each
minimal cut has been calculated. The calculation method presented in the following is mostly
reproduced from (Lundteigen and Rausand, 2009), and applied to the BOP system.
The calculation of the PFDMC j is influenced by (Lundteigen and Rausand, 2009):
1. The order m j of the minimal cut
2. Whether or not the components of the minimal cut are dependent
3. Whether or not the components of the minimal cut are identical
4. Whether or not the components of the minimal cut are tested simultaneously
CHAPTER 5. RELIABILITY ASSESSMENTMODEL 57
As mentioned above, only minimal cuts of order up to 4 have been included in the calculations.
Also, we know that all components are tested simultaneously.
For the minimal cuts consisting only of independent BOP components, e.g. minimal cut D11,
the PFDMCD11 has been calculated directly from 5.3.
For minimal cut sets where the components are identical, but dependent, e.g. minimal cut A4,
the PFDMC j is calculated from (Lundteigen and Rausand, 2009):
PF DMC j ≈
((1−β)λDU , jτ)m j
m j +1
+ βλDU , jτ
2
(5.9)
Minimal cuts consisting of non-identical components may still be susceptible to the same CCF,
such as a temperature or pressure increase. According to Hauge and Onshus (2010b), the beta-
factor should then be smaller than for identical components, since "diverse redundancy" gives
a lower degree of dependency or coupling. Lundteigen and Rausand (2009) states that some
care must be taken when using the beta-factor model to calculate the contribution from CCF
when the failure rates of the components in the minimal cut are different, and suggest that this
problem may be overcome by defining the beta-factor to be a fraction of the lowest component
failure rate, as this rate will often limit the frequency with which the parallel structure may fail
simultaneously.
Using this approach, the PFDMC j of a minimal cut with non-identical, dependent components
which belong to the same common cause component group becomes (Lundteigen and Rau-
sand, 2009):
PF DMC j ≈
[(1−β)λ¯DU , j ·τ]m j
m j +1
+
β ·λmi nDU , j ·τ
2
(5.10)
where
λmi nDU , j =mi n{λDU , j ,i } (5.11)
is the lowest DU failure rate in minimal cut MC j .
When a minimal cut consists of more than one common cause component group, or includes
both independent and dependent components, the calculation of the PFDMC j becomes more
complex. Lundteigen and Rausand (2009) suggest an approach which can be applied in such
cases. Consider minimal cut A10, illustrated as an RBD in Figure 5.1, which in the following
will be used as an example to illustrate the approach. The minimal cut has two common cause
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component groups, CGA10,1 and CGA10,2, each with two components. The CCF are included as
virtual components in series with each parallel structure.
CGA10,2
CGA10,1
SEMABP
SEMBBP
SEMAYP
SEMBYP
C1
C2
Figure 5.1: Minimal cut A10, with two common cause component groups.
The remaining components, H j , are the number of independent components in MC j (Lundteigen
and Rausand, 2009). The order of H j is denoted by k
(I )
j , and the order of CG j ,ν is denoted by k
(C )
j ,ν
(Lundteigen and Rausand, 2009). Components in H j have failure rates λ
(I )
DU , j ,i for i = 1,2, ...,k(I )j
and the components in CG j ,ν have failure rates λDU j ,ν,l for ν = 1,2, ...,r j and l = 1,2, ...,k(C )j ,ν
(Lundteigen and Rausand, 2009). For the minimal cut in Figure 5.5, k(I ) = 0, r = 2, k(C )1 = 2,
and k(C )2 = 2.
According to the approach by Lundteigen and Rausand (2009), the PFD of the virtual cut set
of lowest order in a minimal cut containing more than one common cause component group
and/or both dependent and independent components is:
PF D (1)MC j ≈
(∏k(I )j
i=1λ
(I )
DU j ,i ·
∏r j
ν=1β j ,ν ·λmi n,νDU , j
)
·τk(I )j + r j
k(I )+ r j +1
(5.12)
where λmi n,νDU , j is the lowest DU failure rate in CG j ,ν in minimal cut MC j .
Minimal cut A10 shown in Figure 5.6 has virtual cut sets {C1,C2}, {C1, SEMAYP, SEMBYP}, {C2,
SEMABP, SEMBBP} and {SEMABP, SEMBBP, SEMAYP, SEMBYP}. All of the components in MCA10
have the same failure rate, and the same β-factor. {C1,C2} is the virtual cut of the lowest order.
DU failure rates are identical. Using 5.12, with k(I )A10 = 0, k(C )A10,1 = 2, k(C )A10,2 = 2, r A10 = 2, the PFD
of {C1,C2} is then:
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PF D (1)MC A10 ≈
β2A10λ
2
DU ,A10 ·τ2
3
(5.13)
The PFD of the remaining virtual cuts in MCA10 is determined in a similar way using the method
presented in (Lundteigen and Rausand, 2009):
PF D (2)MC A10 = PF D
(3)
MC A10
≈
(1−βA10)2λ2DU ,A10βA10λDU ,A10 ·τ3
4
(5.14)
PF D (4)MC A10 ≈
(1−βA10)2λ2DU ,A10(1−βA10)2λ2DU ,A10 ·τ4
5
(5.15)
Similar equations have been derived for all minimal cuts included in the current FTA which have
more than one common cause component group or include both dependent and independent
BOP components.
The PFDMC j of a minimal cut j can then be calculated by using the "upper bound approxima-
tion" (Lundteigen and Rausand, 2009):
PF DMC j ≈ 1−
n∏
i=1
(1−PF D (k)MC j ) (5.16)
where n is the number of virtual cuts in MC j .
Calculate the system PFDSI F
Finally, we can evaluate the SIF Isolate well for each of the TOP events A, B, C and D by cal-
culating the system PFDSI F in each case. This is done by once again using the "upper bound
approximation", this time on the minimal cuts MC1, MC2, ... , MCm :
PF DSI F ≈ 1−
m∏
j=1
(1−PF DMC j ) (5.17)
The results from the calculations are presented in the following section.
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PFD calculation results
In this section, the resulting PFDSI F for each of the TOP events, i.e. the probability that the
BOP is unable to perform the SIF Isolate well, are presented and discussed. The PFDs of each
minimal cut from each separate fault tree have been calculated in Excel using the methodology
described above. The results are shown in Tables 5.6, 5.7, 5.8 and 5.9.
TOP Event A: Failure of the BOP to isolate well when 5" drill pipe is running through BOP
ID (j) Minimal cut sets j of order up to 4 Geometric mean
Non-Cons. 
PFD w/out 
CCF
Cons. PFD 
w/out CCF
Cons. 
PFD w/ 
CCF
1-PFD
A1 {SELECT} - - 1,75E-05 - 0,99998250000
A2 {PWR} - - 8,40E-06 - 0,99999160000
A3 {HYSLBLU,HYSLYEL} - 6,00E-06 8,00E-06 2,51E-04 0,99974851730
A4 {SCVYP,SCVBP} - 3,06E-10 4,08E-10 1,75E-06 0,99999824967
A5 {PLCA,PLCB} - 3,46E-09 4,08E-10 5,93E-07 0,99999940748
A6 {MUXBP, MUXYP } - 3,46E-09 4,08E-10 3,36E-07 0,99999966399
A7 {SEMAYP,SEMBYP ,SCVBP} 6,69E-07 1,78E-13 3,56E-13 2,96E-09 0,99999999704
A8 {SCVYP,SEMABP,SEMBBP } 6,69E-07 1,78E-13 3,56E-13 2,96E-09 0,99999999704
A9 {ACCVL,EXLACC,ACCIVBP,ACCIVYP } 1,97E-06 7,50E-16 2,40E-15 1,15E-10 0,99999999988
A10 {[SEMAYP,SEMBYP],[SEMABP,SEMBBP] } - 1,03E-16 3,30E-16 1,40E-12 0,999999999999
PFDsif 2,80060E-04
Table 5.6: PFD calculation results for TOP Event A.
TOP event B: Failure of the BOP to isolate well during large/small pipe diameter
ID (j) Minimal cut sets j of order up to 4 Geometric mean
Non-Cons. 
PFD w/out 
CCF
Cons. PFD 
w/out CCF
Cons. PFD 
w/ CCF 1-PFD
B1 {SELECT} - - 1,75E-05 - 0,999982500000
B2 {PWR} - - 8,40E-06 - 0,999991600000
B3 {SCVYP,SCVBP } - 3,06E-10 4,08E-10 1,75E-06 0,999998249669
B4 {HYSLBLU,HYSLYEL } - 6,00E-06 8,00E-06 2,51E-04 0,999748517300
B5 {PLCA,PLCB} - 3,46E-09 4,61E-09 5,93E-07 0,999999407482
B6 {MUXBP, MUXYP } - 1,13E-11 1,51E-11 3,36E-07 0,999999663988
B7 {SCVYP,SEMABP,SEMBBP } - 5,36E-15 1,07E-14 2,96E-09 0,999999997036
B8 {SEMAYP,SEMBYP ,SCVBP} - 5,36E-15 1,07E-14 2,96E-09 0,999999997036
B9 {BSRTJOC,UAPIF,LAPIF,MPRIF} 6,40E-05 8,36E-10 2,68E-09 - 0,9999999973
B10 {BSRIF,UAPIF,LAPIF,MPRIF} 9,72E-06 4,44E-13 1,42E-12 - 0,999999999999
B11 {ACCVL,EXLACC,ACCIVBP,ACCIVYP } 1,97E-06 7,50E-16 2,40E-15 1,15E-10 0,999999999885
B12 {[SEMAYP,SEMBYP] ,[SEMABP,SEMBBP] } - 1,03E-16 3,30E-16 1,40E-12 0,999999999999
PFDsif 2,80063E-04
Table 5.7: PFD calculation results for TOP Event B.
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TOP event C: Failure of the BOP to isolate well during high wellbore pressure
ID (j) Minimal cut sets j of order up to 4 Geometric mean
Non-Cons. 
PFD w/out 
CCF
Cons. PFD 
w/out CCF
Cons. PFD 
w/ CCF 1-PFD
C1 {SELECT} - - 1,75E-05 - 0,99998250000
C2 {PWR} - - 8,40E-06 - 0,99999160000
C3 {HYSLBLU,HYSLYEL } - 6,00E-06 8,00E-06 2,51E-04 0,99974851730
C4 {SCVYP,SCVBP} - 3,06E-10 4,08E-10 1,75E-06 0,99999824967
C5 {PLCA,PLCB} - 3,46E-09 4,08E-10 5,93E-07 0,99999940748
C6 {SEMAYP,SEMBYP ,SCVBP} - 3,79E-17 7,59E-17 2,96E-09 0,99999999704
C7 {SCVYP,SEMABP,SEMBBP } - 3,79E-17 7,59E-17 2,96E-09 0,99999999704
C9 {MUXBP, MUXYP } - 1,13E-11 1,51E-11 3,36E-07 0,999999663988
C10 {ACCVL,EXLACC,ACCIVBP,ACCIVYP } 1,97E-06 7,50E-16 2,40E-15 1,15E-10 0,999999999885
C11 {[SEMAYP,SEMBYP] ,[SEMABP,SEMBBP] } 4,00E-08 1,03E-16 3,30E-16 1,40E-12 0,999999999999
C12 {BSRTJOC,LPRIF,MPRIF,UPRIF} 3,70E-05 9,29E-11 2,97E-10 - 0,999999999703
C13 {BSRIF,LPRIF,MPRIF,UPRIF} 5,61E-06 4,93E-14 1,58E-13 - 0,9999999999998
C14 {CSRTJOC,LPRIF,MPRIF,UPRIF} 3,70E-05 9,29E-11 2,97E-10 - 0,9999999997027
C15 {CSRIF,LPRIF,MPRIF,UPRIF} 5,61E-06 4,93E-14 1,58E-13 - 0,9999999999998
PFDsif 2,80061E-04
Table 5.8: PFD calculation results for TOP Event C.
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TOP event D: Failure of the BOP to isolate well during open wellbore
ID (j) Minimal cut sets j of order up to 4 Geometric mean
Non-Cons. 
PFD w/out 
CCF
Cons. PFD 
w/out CCF
Cons. PFD w/ 
CCF 1-PFD
D1 {SELECT} - - 1,75E-05 - 0,99998250000
D2 {BSRIF} - - 1,87E-03 - 0,99812750000
D3 {PWR} - - 8,40E-06 - 0,99999160000
D4 {BSRHCV} - - 8,40E-06 - 0,99999160000
D5 {BSRSHV} - - 2,10E-05 - 0,99997900000
D6 {PLCA,PLCB} - 3,46E-09 4,61E-09 5,93E-07 0,99999940748
D7 {HYSLBLU,HYSLYEL } - 6,00E-06 8,00E-06 2,51E-04 0,99974851730
D8 {SCVYP,SCVBP} - 3,06E-10 4,08E-10 1,75E-06 0,99999824967
D9 {MUXBP, MUXYP } - 1,13E-11 1,51E-11 3,36E-07 0,99999966399
D10 {BSRPBDCP, BSRPBTCP } - 1,13E-09 1,51E-09 3,37E-07 0,99999966252
D11 {SCVYP,BSRSOLVBP} 1,83E-07 2,35E-10 3,14E-10 - 0,99999999969
D12 {SCVYP,BSRSHVBP} 1,86E-07 2,45E-10 3,27E-10 - 0,99999999967
D13 {BSRSOLVYP,SCVBP} 1,83E-07 2,35E-10 3,14E-10 - 0,99999999969
D14 {BSRSOLVYP,BSRSOLVBP } - 1,81E-10 2,41E-10 1,34E-06 0,99999865580
D15 {BSRSOLVYP,BSRSHVBP} 1,63E-07 1,88E-10 2,51E-10 - 0,99999999975
D16 {BSRSHVYP,SCVBP} 1,83E-07 2,35E-10 3,14E-10 - 0,99999999969
D17 {BSRSHVYP,BSRSOLVBP} 1,63E-07 1,88E-10 2,51E-10 - 0,99999999975
D18 {BSRSHVYP,BSRSHVBP} - 1,96E-10 2,61E-10 - 0,99999999974
D19 {SEMAYP,SEMBYP, SCVBP} 2,08E-07 5,36E-15 1,07E-14 2,96E-09 0,99999999704
D20 {SEMAYP,SEMBYP,BSRSOLVBP} 6,13E-07 1,37E-13 2,73E-13 2,37E-09 0,99999999763
D21 {SEMAYP,SEMBYP,BSRSHVBP} 6,21E-07 1,42E-13 2,84E-13 2,96E-09 0,99999999704
D22 {SCVYP,SEMABP,SEMBBP} 2,08E-07 5,36E-15 1,07E-14 2,96E-09 0,99999999704
D23 {BSRSOLVYP,SEMABP,SEMBBP} 6,13E-07 1,37E-13 2,73E-13 2,28E-09 0,99999999772
D24 {BSRSHVYP,SEMABP,SEMBBP} 6,21E-07 1,42E-13 2,84E-13 2,37E-09 0,99999999763
D25 {ACCVL,EXLACC,ACCIVBP,ACCIVYP } 1,97E-06 7,50E-16 2,40E-15 1,15E-10 0,99999999988
D26 {[SEMAYP,SEMBYP] ,[SEMABP,SEMBBP] } - 1,03E-16 3,30E-16 1,40E-12 0,999999999999
PFDsif 2,18306E-03
Table 5.9: PFD calculation results for TOP Event D.
Discussion
The calculated PFDSI F for the base case TOP event is approximately 2,80 ·10−4 , i.e. within the
SIL 3 requirement specified by IEC 61508 (2010). The PFD SI F for TOP events B and C have
also been estimated to 2,80 ·10−4, while in the open hole situation the PFDSI F is approximately
2,18 · 10−3, i.e. within the SIL 2 requirement (OLF-070, 2004). Hence, a key finding is that the
PFDSI F is largely unaffected by the impact of the different operational situations, except for in
the open hole situation, where the PFD becomes significantly higher due to the severely reduced
system redundancy from unavailability of the annular BOP functions. In Holand and Skalle
(2001), it is stated that the open hole situation was present only in 4.2% of the cases where a
kick was detected, while in 85.4% of the cases, all preventers were available. This distribution
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of operational situations in which kicks are recorded should be taken into consideration when
interpreting the calculation results.
The results indicate the criticality of the components in the control system, such as the hydraulic
supply lines, rather than of those specific to each preventer, e.g. solenoid valves, shuttle valves
and so forth. Preventer-specific components produce only negligible contributions to the total
PFDSI F , and are therefore seemingly insignificant in terms of the system reliability in cases A, B
and C. This is also to a certain extent consistent with the results from FTAs performed as part
of previous BOP reliability studies (Holand, 1997),(Holand, 1999), (Holand and Skalle, 2001).
This is an interesting finding, given that there is currently a tendency in the industry towards
wanting to increase the number of rams in the BOP stack as a measure towards increasing the
reliability. It could be argued that, based on the findings in the current FTA, and in previous BOP
reliability studies, the focus should rather be placed on increasing the redundancy of the control
system. The redundancy of functions that are capable of sealing around the drill pipe does not
increase the reliability of the system so long as the redundancy in the control system remains so
limited.
The results from the calculations clearly illustrate the importance of using conservative PFD
approximations, and how these can be achieved by applying the approach by Lundteigen and
Rausand (2009). By post-processing the minimal cut sets as opposed to producing the PFD ap-
proximations directly from the fault tree software tool, the PFDMC j of the cut sets consisting of
two or more components are significantly increased. It can also be observed that the contribu-
tion from CCF gives a substantial increase in the PFDMC j of the minimal cuts containing one or
more common cause components group. It should be noted that this effect may however have
been overstated by the use of too conservative beta-factors.
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5.1.4 Event tree analysis
Introduction
A fault tree model represents a "static" image of a system in a given condition at a given time,
and illustrates the various paths along which the system may reach a failed state through a se-
ries of events. A weakness of the fault tree is that it does not take into account the sequence
with which these events occur. As such, an event tree can be described as a more "dynamic"
method of modeling a system. According to Rausand and Hoyland (2004) ETA is the most com-
monly used method for analysis of accident progression. It starts with an initiating event, e.g. a
subsea well kick, and provides a systematic coverage of the time sequence of event propagation
to its potential outcome, e.g. a blowout (Rausand and Hoyland, 2004). In this section, some
suggestions are made regarding how ETA can be used to support the reliablity analysis of BOP
systems.
Event tree analysis of well barrier systems
In order to gain a wider perspective of how the risk picture may develop during the escalation
of a well control situation, and the risks associated with different BOP operational situations,
ETA can be a useful method. However, in order to establish a model which describes how the
sequence of events leading to a loss of well control may take place, it is necessary to take into
account systems that are outside of the scope of this master thesis, such as the mud column,
the IBOP, and the choke and kill lines, since these are essential to the process of mitigating a
well control situation. Since no reliability assessment has been performed for these systems,
only a qualitative event tree model for selected operational situations which incorporates these
barriers has been developed in order to illustrate how event trees may be used as a possible
improvement to reliability assessments of BOP systems and well barrier systems as a whole.
Event trees which illustrate the potential escalation of a well control situation into loss of well
control for the two operational situations Case B and Case C, in the event that the kick is detected
before the hydrocarbons reach the BOP annulus, can be found in Appendix C. The event trees,
modified from Lundteigen and Rausand (2011), illustrate the number of paths along which a
well control situation may escalate, and also provides an image of the residual risk. The PFD
estimates produced from a fault tree analysis may be used as input for quantification of the
event tree. However, a wider reliability analysis which also incorporates the other well barrier
systems must be performed in order to be able to quantify the event tree in its entirety.
Chapter 6
Summary and Recommendations for
Further Work
6.1 Introduction
So far in this report, a typical deepwater drilling BOP system has been described, and analysed
both qualitatively and quantitatively using proven methods from the reliability engineering dis-
cipline, with the objective of assessing the system’s ability to act as a safety barrier in different
operational situations. In this final section of the report, a short summary of the previous sec-
tions is given, before the conclusions that can be drawn from the thesis work are presented.
Finally, a few recommdations are given based on the key findings of the master thesis, along
with some suggestions for further work within the area of BOP reliability.
6.2 Summary and conclusions
The failure of the DWH drilling rig’s BOP has been pointed to as one of the main causes of the
Macondo accident on April 10th 2010. The BOP system is one the most important safety bar-
riers in a hydrocarbon well. The Macondo accident has created a demand for improved meth-
ods of assessing the reliability of BOP systems. The objective of this master thesis has been
to propose improvements to current reliability assessment methods for complex safety critical
systems such as the BOP.
In Chapter 2 of this report, a typical subsea drilling BOP system designed for deepwater appli-
cation has been presented, with a description of its main components and functions. The BOP
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has been classified as a safety barrier in light of the terminology in D-010 (2004). Furthermore,
a functional analysis of the BOP system has been performed, where an overall system SIF and
three essential BOP sealing functions have been specified. Methods for classifying BOP func-
tions, and assigning them with performance criteria have also been proposed. Chapter 2 has
also discussed different operational situations that the BOP system is exposed to during the
course of a typical exploration drilling program, whose characteristics have implications for the
system’s ability to act as a safety barrier. The pros and cons of different widely used BOP system
configurations have also been discussed. Three main types of configurations have been con-
sidered in this report; the "modern" configuration,the "traditional" configuration and the DWH
BOP system configuration.
Chapter 3 has documented a literature survey on previous BOP reliability studies performed by
Per Holand on behalf of SINTEF. An evaluation of the validity of the operational assumptions
which have been made in these previous studies have been provided, such as assumptions re-
garding operational situations, failure input data, and several important assumptions regarding
testing of BOP systems. Regulations and guidelines which are relevant to BOP reliability have
also been described in Chapter3.
In Chapter 4, the report has discussed how the BOP may fail, and which types of failures modes
are considered critical from a safety perspective. Some theoretic principles behind common
cause failures have been presented, along with a description of how common cause failures
should be included in reliability assessments of safety critical systems through an approach
called the PDS approach. In the final section of Chapter 3, possible sources for common cause
failures in the BOP system have been commented on.
As a suggestion towards how reliability assessments of BOPs can be improved, and some of the
identified challenges solved, a reliability quantification method has been presented in Chapter
5. The method is based on post-processing of minimal cut sets from an FTA of the BOP system,
and produces more conservative and accurate approximations of the reliability than those pro-
duced through conventonal methods. The method is also capable of taking into account com-
mon cause failures. The results from the calculations have been presented and discussed.
Event trees which illustrate the escalation of a well kick in two different operational situations
have also been presented in Chapter 5, along with a discussion of how event tree analysis may
be used to improve the quality of BOP reliability assessments and well barrier reliability in gen-
eral.
The main conclusions from this master thesis can be summarized by three key findings. One is
that the approach based on fault trees and post-processing of minimal cut sets which has been
applied to the BOP system, improves the quality of BOP reliability estimates, and also provides a
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sound platform for including common cause failures in the analysis. Another key finding is that
the failure modes in control system components contribute by far the majority of unreliablility
in the BOP system, since it has been shown that the unavailablility of certain BOP functions due
to operational conditions has little or no implication on the reliability estimates produced. The
third key finding is that a test coverage factor should be introduced when calculating the PFD of
the shearing BOP functions to account for the proportion of failures that cannot be revealed by
shear ram function tests.
6.3 Recommendations and ideas for further work
It is recommended that a test coverage factor be included when calculating the reliability of
shearing rams, since these cannot be fully function tested through conventional, non-destructive
BOP function tests. It is also recommended that the industry investigate the accuracy with
which the location of tool joints in the wellbore annulus can be determined through current
methods.
To further improve the reliability of well barrier systems, it is also suggested that the industry
investigate possible gains from modeling well control situations through event trees that are not
limited to the BOP system, buth which incorporate all of the well barrier systems involved in the
mitigation of well control situations. The author would also be very interested in helping with
the development of future master thesis assignments within the area of BOP reliability.
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Appendices
Appendix A
Acronyms
BOEMRE Bureau of Ocean Energy Management Regulation and Enforcement
BOP Blowout preventer
BSR Blind shear ram
CCF Common cause failures
CCU Central control unit
CG Common cause component group
CSR Casing shear ram
CSU Critical safety unavailability
DCP Driller’s control panel
DU Dangerous undetected
DWH Deepwater Horizon
DNV Det Norske Veritas
ETA Event tree analysis
FMEA Failure modes and effects analysis
FMECA Failure modes, effects and criticality analysis
FTA Fault tree analysis
HAZID Hazard identification
HAZOP Hazard and operability study
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HPU Hydraulic power unit
IEC International Electrotechnical Committee
LAP Lower annular preventer
LPR Lower pipe ram
LMRP Lower marine riser package
MC Minimal cut set (minimal cut)
MFDT Mean fractional dead time
MooN M-out-of-N
MPR Middle pipe ram
MUX Multiplexed
NPD Norwegian Petroleum Directorate
NSNS Norwegian Sector of the North Sea
OLF Oljeindustriens Landsforening (Norwegian Oil Industry Association)
O.D. Outer diameter
PFD Probability of failure on demand
PFH Probability of dangerous failure per hour
PLC Programmable logic solver
PSA Petroleum Safety Authority
RAMS Reliability, availability, maintainability, and safety
RBD Reliability block diagram
SCV Surface control valve
SEM Subsea electronic module
SIF Safety intstrumented function
SIL Safety integrity level
SIS Safety instrumented systeml
TCP Toolpusher’s control panel
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TIF Test independent failure
UAP Upper annular preventer
UPR Upper pipe ram
US GoM OCS United States Gulf of Mexico Outer Continental Shelf
VBR Variable bore ram
Appendix B
Fault Tree Analysis
B.1 Fault trees
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CARA Fault Tree version 4.2 (c) ExproSoft AS 2008
Single license.
ExproSoft AS
P2
Severe failure in 
hydraulic fluid supply 
system.
HYFSSF
Accumulator leakage.
ACC
Severe leak through 
stack mounted 
accumulator valve.
ACCVL
External leakage in 
subsea accumulator.
EXLACC
Leakage in both pod 
mounted accumlator 
isolation valves.
ISOL
Leakage in pod 
mounted accumulator 
isolation valve, blue 
pod.
ACCIVBP
Leakage in pod 
mounted accumulator 
isolation valve, yellow 
pod.
ACCIVYP
Leakage in pod 
hydraulic supply lines.
PODHYSL
Hydraulic supply line 
leaks, blue pod.
HYSLBLU
Hydraulic supply line 
leaks, yellow pod.
HYSLYEL
Severe leakage in pod
selector valve.
SELECT
Fail to isolate well when 5" drill pipe is running through BOP. 
Page 2 of 8: Severe failure in hydraulic fluid supply system.
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Single license.
ExproSoft AS
P3
Blind shear ram fail 
to shear drill pipe 
and seal well.
BSRF
Tool joint in ram 
closing area 
(causes fail to seal).
BSRTJOC
Blind shear ram 
internal failure; 
causes fail to close.
BSRIF
Both blue and 
yellow control pod 
fails activate 
function.
BSRPOD
Yellow pod fails to 
activate function.
BSRYEL
Surface control 
valve failure, yellow
pod.
SCVYP
Solenoid valve fails 
to open, yellow pod.
BSRSOLVYP
SEM fails to fire 
solenoid valve, 
yellow pod.
BSRYELSEM
SEM A failure, 
yellow pod.
SEMAYP
SEM B failure, 
yellow pod.
SEMBYP
Shuttle valve stuck 
in opposite position,
yellow pod.
BSRSHVYP
Blue pod fails to 
activate function.
BSRBLU
Surface control 
valve failure, yellow
pod.
SCVBP
Solenoid valve fails 
to open, blue pod.
BSRSOLVBP
SEM fails to fire 
solenoid valve, blue
pod.
BSRBLUSEM
SEM A failure, blue 
pod.
SEMABP
SEM B failure, blue 
pod.
SEMBBP
Shuttle valve stuck 
in opposite position,
blue pod.
BSRSHVBP
Blind shear ram 
hydraulic control 
valve failure.
BSRHCV
Shuttle valve or line
to preventer leaks.
BSRSHV
Failure in DCP/TCP
push buttons.
BSRCPF
DCP push button 
failure.
BSRPBDCP
TCP push button 
failure.
BSRPBTCP
Fail to isolate well when 5" drill pipe is running through BOP.                
Page 3 of 8: Blind shear ram fail to shear drill pipe and seal well.
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ExproSoft AS
P4
Lower annular 
preventer fails to 
seal around drill 
pipe.
LAPF
Annular preventer 
internal failure; 
causes fail to seal.
LAPIF
Shuttle valve or line 
to preventer leaks.
LAPSHV
Both blue and yellow
control pod fails 
activate function.
LAPPOD
Blue pod fails to 
activate function.
LAPBLU
Surface control valve
failure, yellow pod.
SCVBP
Solenoid valve fails 
to open, blue pod.
LAPSOLVBP
SEM fails to fire 
solenoid valve, blue 
pod.
LAPBLUSEM
SEM A failure, blue 
pod.
SEMABP
SEM B failure, blue 
pod.
SEMBBP
Shuttle valve stuck 
in opposite position, 
blue pod.
LAPSHVBP
Yellow pod fails to 
activate function.
LAPYEL
Surface control valve
failure, yellow pod.
SCVYP
Solenoid valve fails 
to open, yellow pod.
LAPSOLVYP
SEM fails to fire 
solenoid valve, 
yellow pod.
LAPYELSEM
SEM A failure, yellow
pod.
SEMAYP
SEM B failure, yellow
pod.
SEMBYP
Shuttle valve stuck 
in opposite position, 
yellow pod.
LAPSHVYP
Lower annular 
preventer hydraulic 
control valve failure.
LAPHCV
Failure in DCP/TCP 
push buttons.
LAPCPF
DCP push button 
failure.
LAPPBDCP
TCP push button 
failure.
LAPPBTCP
Fail to isolate well when 5" drill pipe is running through BOP. 
Page 4 of 8: Lower annular preventer fail to seal around drill pipe.
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ExproSoft AS
P5
Upper annular 
preventer fails to seal 
around drill pipe. 
UAPF
Annular preventer 
internal failure; 
causes fail to seal.
UAPIF
Shuttle valve or line to
preventer leaks.
UAPSHV
Both blue and yellow 
control pod fails 
activate function.
UAPPOD
Blue pod fails to 
activate function.
UAPBLU
Surface control valve 
failure, yellow pod.
SCVBP
Solenoid valve fails to 
open, blue pod.
UAPSOLVBP
SEM fails to fire 
solenoid valve, blue 
pod.
UAPBLUSEM
SEM A failure, blue 
pod.
SEMABP
SEM B failure, blue 
pod.
SEMBBP
Shuttle valve stuck in 
opposite position, blue
pod.
UAPSHVBP
Yellow pod fails to 
activate function.
UAPYEL
Surface control valve 
failure, yellow pod.
SCVYP
Solenoid valve fails to 
open, yellow pod.
UAPSOLVYP
SEM fails to fire 
solenoid valve, yellow 
pod.
UAPYELSEM
SEM A failure, yellow 
pod.
SEMAYP
SEM B failure, yellow 
pod.
SEMBYP
Shuttle valve stuck in 
opposite position, 
yellow pod.
UAPSHVYP
Upper annular 
preventer hydraulic 
control valve failure.
UAPHCV
Failure in DCP/TCP 
push buttons.
UAPCPF
DCP push button 
failure.
UAPPBDCP
TCP push button 
failure.
UAPPBTCP
Fail to isolate well when 5" drill pipe is running through BOP. 
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Single license.
ExproSoft AS
P6
Lower pipe ram fail to
seal.
LPRF
Lower pipe ram 
internal failure; 
causes fail to close.
LPRIF
Lower pipe ram 
hydraulic control 
valve failure.
LPRHCV
Both blue and yellow 
control pod fails 
activate function.
LPRPOD
Yellow pod fails to 
activate function.
LPRYEL
Surface control valve 
failure, yellow pod.
SCVYP
Solenoid valve fails 
to open, yellow pod.
LPRSOLVYP
SEM fails to fire 
solenoid valve, 
yellow pod.
LPRYELSEM
SEM A failure, yellow 
pod.
SEMAYP
SEM B failure, yellow
pod.
SEMBYP
Shuttle valve stuck in
opposite position, 
yellow pod.
LPRSHVYP
Blue pod fails to 
activate function.
LPRBLU
Surface control valve 
failure, yellow pod.
SCVBP
Solenoid valve fails 
to open, blue pod.
LPRSOLVBP
SEM fails to fire 
solenoid valve, blue 
pod.
LPRBLUSEM
SEM A failure, blue 
pod.
SEMABP
SEM B failure, blue 
pod.
SEMBBP
Shuttle valve stuck in
opposite position, 
blue pod.
LPRSHVBP
Lower pipe ram 
shuttle valve or line 
to preventer leaks.
LPRSHV
Failure in DCP/TCP 
push buttons.
LPRCPF
DCP push button 
failure.
LPRPBDCP
TCP push button 
failure.
LPRPBTCP
Fail to isolate well when 5" drill pipe is running through BOP. 
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Single license.
ExproSoft AS
P7
Middle pipe ram fail 
to seal.
MPRF
Middle pipe ram 
internal failure; 
causes fail to close.
MPRIF
Middle pipe ram 
hydraulic control 
valve failure.
MPRHCV
Both blue and yellow
control pod fails 
activate function.
MPRPOD
Yellow pod fails to 
activate function.
MPRYEL
Surface control 
valve failure, yellow 
pod.
SCVYP
Solenoid valve fails 
to open, yellow pod.
MPRSOLVYP
SEM fails to fire 
solenoid valve, 
yellow pod.
MPRYELSEM
SEM A failure, 
yellow pod.
SEMAYP
SEM B failure, 
yellow pod.
SEMBYP
Shuttle valve stuck 
in opposite position, 
yellow pod.
MPRSHVYP
Blue pod fails to 
activate function.
MPRBLU
Surface control 
valve failure, yellow 
pod.
SCVBP
Solenoid valve fails 
to open, blue pod.
MPRSOLVBP
SEM fails to fire 
solenoid valve, blue 
pod.
MPRBLUSEM
SEM A failure, blue 
pod.
SEMABP
SEM B failure, blue 
pod.
SEMBBP
Shuttle valve stuck 
in opposite position, 
blue pod.
MPRSHVBP
Middle pipe ram 
shuttle valve or line 
to preventer leaks.
MPRSHV
Failure in DCP/TCP 
push buttons.
MPRCPF
DCP push button 
failure.
MPRPBDCP
TCP push button 
failure.
MPRPBTCP
Fail to isolate well when 5" drill pipe is running through BOP.. 
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Single license.
ExproSoft AS
P8
Upper pipe ram fail
to seal.
UPRF
Upper pipe ram 
internal failure; 
causes fail to 
close.
UPRIF
Upper pipe ram 
hydraulic control 
valve failure.
UPRHCV
Both blue and 
yellow control pod 
fail to activate 
function.
UPRPOD
Yellow pod fails to 
activate function.
UPRYEL
Surface control 
valve failure, yellow
pod.
SCVYP
Solenoid valve fails
to open, yellow 
pod.
UPRSOLVYP
SEM fails to fire 
solenoid valve, 
yellow pod.
UPRYELSEM
SEM A failure, 
yellow pod.
SEMAYP
SEM B failure, 
yellow pod.
SEMBYP
Shuttle valve stuck 
in opposite 
position, yellow 
pod.
UPRSHVYP
Blue pod fails to 
activate function.
UPRBLU
Surface control 
valve failure, yellow
pod.
SCVBP
Solenoid valve fails
to open, blue pod.
UPRSOLVBP
SEM fails to fire 
solenoid valve, 
blue pod.
UPRBLUSEM
SEM A failure, blue 
pod.
SEMABP
SEM B failure, blue
pod.
SEMBBP
Shuttle valve stuck 
in opposite 
position, blue pod.
UPRSHVBP
Upper pipe ram 
shuttle valve or line
to preventer leaks.
UPRSHV
Failure in 
DCP/TCP push 
buttons.
UPRCPF
DCP push button 
failure.
UPRPBDCP
TCP push button 
failure.
UPRPBTCP
Fail to isolate well when 5" drill pipe is running through BOP. 
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CA
R
A 
Fa
ul
t T
re
e 
ve
rs
io
n 
4.
2 
(c)
 
Ex
pr
oS
of
t A
S 
20
08
Si
ng
le
 
lic
en
se
.
Ex
pr
oS
of
t A
S
TO
P 
Ev
en
t: 
Fa
il t
o 
iso
la
te
 
w
el
l d
ur
in
g 
la
rg
e/
sm
al
l p
ip
e 
di
am
et
er
. CA
SE
B
Fa
il t
o 
se
al
 
ar
ou
nd
 
dr
ill 
pi
pe
. FU
N
C1
F
Al
l a
nn
ul
ar
 
BO
Ps
 
fa
il 
to
 
se
al
.
AB
O
PF
An
nu
la
r 
pr
ev
en
te
rs
 
fa
il
to
 
se
al
.
AP
FT
S
Up
pe
r 
an
nu
la
r 
pr
ev
en
te
r 
fa
il t
o 
se
al
.
P4
Lo
w
er
 
an
nu
la
r 
pr
ev
en
te
r 
fa
il t
o 
se
al
.
P5
M
id
dl
e 
pi
pe
 
ra
m
 
fa
il t
o
se
al
 
ar
ou
nd
 
dr
ill 
pi
pe
P6
M
ajo
r 
hy
dr
au
lic
 
su
pp
ly
sy
st
em
 
fa
ilu
re
.
P2
PL
C 
fa
il t
o 
sig
na
l.
PL
CF
PL
C 
A 
fa
ilu
re
.
PL
CA
PL
C 
B 
fa
ilu
re
.
PL
CBL
os
s 
of
 
po
w
er
 
su
pp
ly.
PW
R
Lo
ss
 
of
 
po
w
er
/c
om
m
un
ica
tio
n
to
 
bo
th
 
po
ds
 
du
e 
to
 
M
UX
 
ca
bl
e 
fa
ilu
re
.
M
UX
Lo
ss
 
of
 
M
UX
 
po
w
er
/c
om
m
un
ica
tio
n,
bl
ue
 
po
d.
 
M
UX
BP
Lo
ss
 
of
 
M
UX
 
po
w
er
/c
om
m
un
ca
tio
n,
ye
llo
w
 
po
d.
M
UX
YP
Fa
il t
o 
sh
ea
r 
dr
ill 
pi
pe
 
an
d 
se
al
 
of
f w
el
l. 
FU
N
C3
F
M
ajo
r 
hy
dr
au
lic
 
su
pp
ly
sy
st
em
 
fa
ilu
re
.
P2
PL
C 
fa
il t
o 
sig
na
l.
PL
CF
PL
C 
A 
fa
ilu
re
.
PL
CA
PL
C 
B 
fa
ilu
re
.
PL
CBL
os
s 
of
 
po
w
er
 
su
pp
ly.
PW
R
Lo
ss
 
of
 
po
w
er
/c
om
m
un
ica
tio
n
to
 
bo
th
 
po
ds
 
du
e 
to
 
M
UX
 
ca
bl
e 
fa
ilu
re
.
M
UX
Lo
ss
 
of
 
M
UX
 
po
w
er
/c
om
m
un
ica
tio
n,
bl
ue
 
po
d.
 
M
UX
BP
Lo
ss
 
of
 
M
UX
 
po
w
er
/c
om
m
un
ca
tio
n,
ye
llo
w
 
po
d.
M
UX
YPB
lin
d 
sh
ea
r 
ra
m
 
fa
il t
o 
sh
ea
r 
dr
ill 
pi
pe
 
an
d 
se
al
 
of
f w
el
l. P3
Fa
ilu
re
 
to
 
iso
la
te
 
w
el
l d
ur
in
g 
la
rg
e/
sm
al
l p
ip
e 
di
am
et
er
.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pa
ge
 
1 
of
 
6:
 
TO
P 
Ev
en
t.
CARA Fault Tree version 4.2 (c) ExproSoft AS 2008
Single license.
ExproSoft AS
P2
Severe failure in 
hydraulic fluid supply 
system.
HYFSSF
Accumulator leakage.
ACC
Severe leak through 
stack mounted 
accumulator valve.
ACCVL
External leakage in 
subsea accumulator.
EXLACC
Leakage in both pod 
mounted accumlator 
isolation valves.
ISOL
Leakage in pod 
mounted accumulator 
isolation valve, blue 
pod.
ACCIVBP
Leakage in pod 
mounted accumulator 
isolation valve, yellow 
pod.
ACCIVYP
Leakage in pod 
hydraulic supply lines.
PODHYSL
Hydraulic supply line 
leaks, blue pod.
HYSLBLU
Hydraulic supply line 
leaks, yellow pod.
HYSLYEL
Severe leakage in pod 
selector valve.
SELECT
Failure to isolate well during large/small pipe diameter.
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ExproSoft AS
P3
Blind shear ram fail 
to shear drill pipe 
and seal well.
BSRF
Tool joint in ram 
closing area (causes
fail to shear).
BSRTJOC
Blind shear ram 
internal failure; 
causes fail to close.
BSRIF
Loss of power 
supply.
PWR
Both blue and yellow
control pod fails 
activate function.
PODBSR
Yellow pod fails to 
activate function.
BSRYEL
Surface control valve
failure, yellow pod.
SCVYP
Solenoid valve fails 
to open, yellow pod.
BSRSOLVYP
SEM fails to fire 
solenoid valve, 
yellow pod.
BSRYELSEM
SEM A failure, yellow
pod.
SEMAYP
SEM B failure, yellow
pod.
SEMBYP
Shuttle valve stuck 
in opposite position, 
yellow pod.
BSRSHVYP
Blue pod fails to 
activate function.
BSRBLU
Surface control valve
failure, yellow pod.
SCVBP
Solenoid valve fails 
to open, blue pod.
BSRSOLVBP
SEM fails to fire 
solenoid valve, blue 
pod.
BSRBLUSEM
SEM A failure, blue 
pod.
SEMABP
SEM B failure, blue 
pod.
SEMBBP
Shuttle valve stuck 
in opposite position, 
blue pod.
BSRSHVBP
Blind shear ram 
hydraulic control 
valve failure.
BSRHCV
Shuttle valve or line 
to preventer 
leak/failure.
BSRSHV
Failure in DCP/TCP 
push buttons.
BSRCPF
DCP push button 
failure.
BSRPBDCP
TCP push button 
failure.
BSRPBTCP
Failure to isolate well during large/small pipe diameter.
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ExproSoft AS
P4
Upper annular 
preventer fail to 
seal. 
UAPF
Annular preventer 
internal failure; 
causes fail to seal.
UAPIF
Shuttle valve or line 
to preventer leaks.
UAPSHV
Both blue and 
yellow control pod 
fails activate 
function.
BSRPOD
Blue pod fails to 
activate function.
UAPBLU
Surface control 
valve failure, yellow 
pod.
SCVBP
Solenoid valve fails 
to open, blue pod.
UAPSOLVBP
SEM fails to fire 
solenoid valve, blue 
pod.
UAPBLUSEM
SEM A failure, blue 
pod.
SEMABP
SEM B failure, blue 
pod.
SEMBBP
Shuttle valve stuck 
in opposite position,
blue pod.
UAPSHVBP
Yellow pod fails to 
activate function.
UAPYEL
Surface control 
valve failure, yellow 
pod.
SCVYP
Solenoid valve fails 
to open, yellow pod.
UAPSOLVYP
SEM fails to fire 
solenoid valve, 
yellow pod.
UAPYELSEM
SEM A failure, 
yellow pod.
SEMAYP
SEM B failure, 
yellow pod.
SEMBYP
Shuttle valve stuck 
in opposite position,
yellow pod.
UAPSHVYP
Upper annular 
preventer hydraulic 
control valve failure.
UAPHCV
Failure in DCP/TCP 
push buttons.
UAPCPF
DCP push button 
failure.
UAPPBDCP
TCP push button 
failure.
UAPPBTCP
Failure to isolate well during large/small pipe diameter.
 Page 4 of 6: Upper annular preventer fails to seal around drill pipe.
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Single license.
ExproSoft AS
P5
Lower annular 
preventer fail to seal.
LAPF
Annular preventer 
internal failure; 
causes fail to seal.
LAPIF
Shuttle valve or line 
to preventer leaks.
LAPSHV
Both blue and yellow
control pod fails 
activate function.
LAPPOD
Blue pod fails to 
activate function.
LAPBLU
Surface control valve
failure, yellow pod.
SCVBP
Solenoid valve fails 
to open, blue pod.
LAPSOLVBP
SEM fails to fire 
solenoid valve, blue 
pod.
LAPBLUSEM
SEM A failure, blue 
pod.
SEMABP
SEM B failure, blue 
pod.
SEMBBP
Shuttle valve stuck 
in opposite position, 
blue pod.
LAPSHVBP
Yellow pod fails to 
activate function.
LAPYEL
Surface control valve
failure, yellow pod.
SCVYP
Solenoid valve fails 
to open, yellow pod.
LAPSOLVYP
SEM fails to fire 
solenoid valve, 
yellow pod.
LAPYELSEM
SEM A failure, yellow
pod.
SEMAYP
SEM B failure, yellow
pod.
SEMBYP
Shuttle valve stuck 
in opposite position, 
yellow pod.
LAPSHVYP
Lower annular 
preventer hydraulic 
control valve failure.
LAPHCV
Failure in DCP/TCP 
push buttons.
LAPCPF
DCP push button 
failure.
LAPPBDCP
TCP push button 
failure.
LAPPBTCP
Failure to isolate well during large/small pipe diameter.
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Single license.
ExproSoft AS
P6
Middle pipe ram fail 
to seal.
MPRF
Middle pipe ram 
internal failure; 
causes fail to close.
MPRIF
Middle pipe ram 
hydraulic control 
valve failure.
MPRHCV
Both blue and yellow
control pod fails 
activate function.
PODMPR
Yellow pod fails to 
activate function.
MPRYEL
Surface control 
valve failure, yellow 
pod.
SCVYP
Solenoid valve fails 
to open, yellow pod.
MPRSOLVYP
SEM fails to fire 
solenoid valve, 
yellow pod.
MPRYELSEM
SEM A failure, yellow
pod.
SEMAYP
SEM B failure, 
yellow pod.
SEMBYP
Shuttle valve stuck 
in opposite position, 
yellow pod.
MPRSHVYP
Blue pod fails to 
activate function.
MPRBLU
Surface control 
valve failure, yellow 
pod.
SCVBP
Solenoid valve fails 
to open, blue pod.
MPRSOLVBP
SEM fails to fire 
solenoid valve, blue 
pod.
MPRBLUSEM
SEM A failure, blue 
pod.
SEMABP
SEM B failure, blue 
pod.
SEMBBP
Shuttle valve stuck 
in opposite position, 
blue pod.
MPRSHVBP
Middle pipe ram 
shuttle valve or line 
to preventer leaks.
MPRSHV
Failure in DCP/TCP 
push buttons.
MPRCPF
DCP push button 
failure.
MPRPBDCP
TCP push button 
failure.
MPRPBTCP
Failure to isolate well during large/small pipe diameter.
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CARA Fault Tree version 4.2 (c) ExproSoft AS 2008
Single license.
ExproSoft AS
P2
Severe failure in 
hydraulic fluid supply
system.
HYFSSF
Accumulator 
leakage.
ACC
Severe leak through 
stack mounted 
accumulator valve.
ACCVL
External leakage in 
subsea accumulator.
EXLACC
Leakage in both pod
mounted accumlator
isolation valves.
ISOL
Leakage in pod 
mounted 
accumulator 
isolation valve, blue 
pod.
ACCIVBP
Leakage in pod 
mounted 
accumulator 
isolation valve, 
yellow pod.
ACCIVYP
Leakage in pod 
hydraulic supply 
lines.
PODHYSL
Hydraulic supply line
leaks, blue pod.
HYSLBLU
Hydraulic supply line
leaks, yellow pod.
HYSLYEL
Severe leakage in 
pod selector valve.
SELECT
Failure to isolate well during high wellbore pressure.                           
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Single license.
ExproSoft AS
P3
Blind shear ram fails
to seal well.
BSRF
Tool joint in ram 
closing area (causes
fail to shear).
BSRTJOC
Blind shear ram 
internal failure; 
causes fail to close.
BSRIF
Loss of power 
supply.
PWR
Both blue and yellow
control pod fails 
activate function.
BSRPOD
Yellow pod fails to 
activate function.
BSRYEL
Surface control 
valve failure, yellow 
pod.
SCVYP
Solenoid valve fails 
to open, yellow pod.
BSRSOLVYP
SEM fails to fire 
solenoid valve, 
yellow pod.
BSRYELSEM
SEM A failure, 
yellow pod.
SEMAYP
SEM B failure, 
yellow pod.
SEMBYP
Shuttle valve stuck 
in opposite position, 
yellow pod.
BSRSHVYP
Blue pod fails to 
activate function.
BSRBLU
Surface control 
valve failure, yellow 
pod.
SCVBP
Solenoid valve fails 
to open, blue pod.
BSRSOLVBP
SEM fails to fire 
solenoid valve, blue 
pod.
BSRBLUSEM
SEM A failure, blue 
pod.
SEMABP
SEM B failure, blue 
pod.
SEMBBP
Shuttle valve stuck 
in opposite position, 
blue pod.
BSRSHVBP
Blind shear ram 
hydraulic control 
valve failure.
BSRHCV
Shuttle valve or line 
to preventer 
leak/failure.
BSRSHV
Failure in DCP/TCP 
push buttons.
BSRCPF
DCP push button 
failure.
BSRPBDCP
TCP push button 
failure.
BSRPBTCP
Failure to isolate well during high wellbore pressure.                            
Page 3 of 7: Blind shear ram fails to seal well.
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Single license.
ExproSoft AS
P4
Casing shear ram 
fails to shear drill 
pipe. 
CSRF
Tool joint in ram 
closing area (causes 
fail to shear).
CSRTJOC
Casing shear ram 
internal failure: 
causes fail to close.
CSRIF
Loss of power 
supply.
PWR
Both blue and yellow
control pod fails 
activate function.
CSRPOD
Yellow pod fails to 
activate function.
CSRYEL
Surface control valve
failure, yellow pod.
SCVYP
Solenoid valve fails 
to open, yellow pod.
CSRSOLVYP
SEM fails to fire 
solenoid valve, 
yellow pod.
CSRYELSEM
SEM A failure, yellow
pod.
SEMAYP
SEM B failure, yellow
pod.
SEMBYP
Shuttle valve stuck in
opposite position, 
yellow pod.
CSRSHVYP
Blue pod fails to 
activate function.
CSRBLU
Surface control valve
failure, yellow pod.
SCVBP
Solenoid valve fails 
to open, blue pod.
CSRSOLVBP
SEM fails to fire 
solenoid valve, blue 
pod.
CSRBLUSEM
SEM A failure, blue 
pod.
SEMABP
SEM B failure, blue 
pod.
SEMBBP
Shuttle valve stuck in
opposite position, 
blue pod.
CSRSHVBP
Casing shear ram 
hydraulic control 
valve failure.
CSRHCV
Shuttle valve or line 
to preventer 
leak/failure.
CSRSHV
Failure in DCP/TCP 
push buttons.
CSRCPF
DCP push button 
failure.
CSRPBDCP
TCP push button 
failure.
CSRPBTCP
Failure to isolate well during high wel                                                   
Page 4 of 7: Casing shear rams fails to shear drill pipe.
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Single license.
ExproSoft AS
P5
Lower pipe ram fail 
to seal.
LPRF
Lower pipe ram 
internal failure; 
causes fail to close.
LPRIF
Lower pipe ram 
hydraulic control 
valve failure.
LPRHCV
Both blue and yellow
control pod fails 
activate function.
LPRPOD
Yellow pod fails to 
activate function.
LPRYEL
Surface control valve
failure, yellow pod.
SCVYP
Solenoid valve fails 
to open, yellow pod.
LPRSOLVYP
SEM fails to fire 
solenoid valve, 
yellow pod.
LPRYELSEM
SEM A failure, yellow
pod.
SEMAYP
SEM B failure, yellow
pod.
SEMBYP
Shuttle valve stuck 
in opposite position, 
yellow pod.
LPRSHVYP
Blue pod fails to 
activate function.
LPRBLU
Surface control valve
failure, yellow pod.
SCVBP
Solenoid valve fails 
to open, blue pod.
LPRSOLVBP
SEM fails to fire 
solenoid valve, blue 
pod.
LPRBLUSEM
SEM A failure, blue 
pod.
SEMABP
SEM B failure, blue 
pod.
SEMBBP
Shuttle valve stuck 
in opposite position, 
blue pod.
LPRSHVBP
Upper pipe ram 
shuttle valve or line 
to preventer leaks.
LPRSHV
Failure in DCP/TCP 
push buttons.
LPRCPF
DCP push button 
failure.
LPRPBDCP
TCP push button 
failure.
LPRPBTCP
Failure to isolate well during high wellbore pressure.                                  
 Page 5 of 7: Lower pipe ram fails to seal around drill pipe.
CARA Fault Tree version 4.2 (c) ExproSoft AS 2008
Single license.
ExproSoft AS
P6
Middle pipe ram fail 
to seal.
MPRF
Middle pipe ram 
internal failure; 
causes fail to close.
MPRIF
Middle pipe ram 
hydraulic control 
valve failure.
MPRHCV
Both blue and yellow 
control pod fails 
activate function.
MPRPOD
Yellow pod fails to 
activate function.
MPRYEL
Surface control valve
failure, yellow pod.
SCVYP
Solenoid valve fails 
to open, yellow pod.
MPRSOLVYP
SEM fails to fire 
solenoid valve, 
yellow pod.
MPRYELSEM
SEM A failure, yellow 
pod.
SEMAYP
SEM B failure, yellow
pod.
SEMBYP
Shuttle valve stuck in
opposite position, 
yellow pod.
MPRSHVYP
Blue pod fails to 
activate function.
MPRBLU
Surface control valve
failure, yellow pod.
SCVBP
Solenoid valve fails 
to open, blue pod.
MPRSOLVBP
SEM fails to fire 
solenoid valve, blue 
pod.
MPRBLUSEM
SEM A failure, blue 
pod.
SEMABP
SEM B failure, blue 
pod.
SEMBBP
Shuttle valve stuck in
opposite position, 
blue pod.
MPRSHVBP
Middle pipe ram 
shuttle valve or line 
to preventer leaks.
MPRSHV
Failure in DCP/TCP 
push buttons.
MPRCPF
DCP push button 
failure.
MPRPBDCP
TCP push button 
failure.
MPRPBTCP
Failure to isolate well during high wellbore pressure.                                  
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P7
Upper pipe ram fail to
seal.
UPRF
Lower pipe ram 
internal failure; 
causes fail to close.
UPRIF
Upper pipe ram 
hydraulic control 
valve failure.
UPRHCV
Both blue and yellow 
control pod fails 
activate function.
UPRPOD
Yellow pod fails to 
activate function.
UPRYEL
Surface control valve
failure, yellow pod.
SCVYP
Solenoid valve fails 
to open, yellow pod.
UPRSOLVYP
SEM fails to fire 
solenoid valve, 
yellow pod.
UPRYELSEM
SEM A failure, yellow 
pod.
SEMAYP
SEM B failure, yellow
pod.
SEMBYP
Shuttle valve stuck in
opposite position, 
yellow pod.
UPRSHVYP
Blue pod fails to 
activate function.
UPRBLU
Surface control valve
failure, yellow pod.
SCVBP
Solenoid valve fails 
to open, blue pod.
UPRSOLVBP
SEM fails to fire 
solenoid valve, blue 
pod.
UPRBLUSEM
SEM A failure, blue 
pod.
SEMABP
SEM B failure, blue 
pod.
SEMBBP
Shuttle valve stuck in
opposite position, 
blue pod.
UPRSHVBP
Upper pipe ram 
shuttle valve or line 
to preventer leaks.
UPRSHV
Failure in DCP/TCP 
push buttons.
UPRCPF
DCP push button 
failure.
UPRPBDCP
TCP push button 
failure.
UPRPBTCP
Failure to isolate well during high wellbore pressure.                            
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TOP Event: Fail to 
seal an open 
wellbore. 
CASED
PLC fail to signal.
PLCF
PLC A failure.
PLCA
PLC B failure.
PLCB
Loss of power supply.
PWR
Major failure in 
hydraulic supply 
system. 
P2
Blind shear ram fails 
to seal off well.
P3
Loss of 
power/communication
to both pods due to 
MUX cable failure.
MUX
Loss of MUX 
power/communication,
blue pod. 
MUXBP
Loss of MUX 
power/communcation,
yellow pod.
MUXYP
Failure to isolate well during open wellbore.                                           
Page 1 of 3: TOP Event.
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Single license.
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P2
Severe failure in 
hydraulic fluid supply 
system.
HYFSSF
Accumulator leakage.
ACC
Severe leak through 
stack mounted 
accumulator valve.
ACCVL
External leakage in 
subsea accumulator.
EXLACC
Leakage in both pod 
mounted accumlator 
isolation valves.
ISOL
Leakage in pod 
mounted accumulator 
isolation valve, blue 
pod.
ACCIVBP
Leakage in pod 
mounted accumulator 
isolation valve, yellow 
pod.
ACCIVYP
Leakage in pod 
hydraulic supply lines.
PODHYSL
Hydraulic supply line 
leaks, blue pod.
HYSLBLU
Hydraulic supply line 
leaks, yellow pod.
HYSLYEL
Severe leakage in pod
selector valve.
SELECT
Failure to isolate well during open wellbore.                                          
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P3
Blind shear ram fails 
to seal on open hole.
BSRF
Blind shear ram 
internal failure; 
causes fail to close.
BSRIF
Loss of power supply.
PWR
Both blue and yellow 
control pod fails 
activate function.
BSRPOD
Yellow pod fails to 
activate function.
BSRYEL
Surface control valve
failure, yellow pod.
SCVYP
Solenoid valve fails 
to open, yellow pod.
BSRSOLVYP
SEM fails to fire 
solenoid valve, 
yellow pod.
BSRYELSEM
SEM A failure, yellow 
pod.
SEMAYP
SEM B failure, yellow
pod.
SEMBYP
Shuttle valve stuck in
opposite position, 
yellow pod.
BSRSHVYP
Blue pod fails to 
activate function.
BSRBLU
Surface control valve
failure, yellow pod.
SCVBP
Solenoid valve fails 
to open, blue pod.
BSRSOLVBP
SEM fails to fire 
solenoid valve, blue 
pod.
BSRBLUSEM
SEM A failure, blue 
pod.
SEMABP
SEM B failure, blue 
pod.
SEMBBP
Shuttle valve stuck in
opposite position, 
blue pod.
BSRSHVBP
Blind shear ram 
hydraulic control 
valve failure.
BSRHCV
Shuttle valve or line 
to preventer leaks.
BSRSHV
Failure in DCP/TCP 
push buttons.
BSRCPF
DCP push button 
failure.
BSRPBDCP
TCP push button 
failure.
BSRPBTCP
Failure to isolate well during open wellbore.                                                
Page 3 of 3: Blind shear ram fails to seal on open hole.
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B.2 Fault tree basic events
The basic events of each fault tree are listed on the following pages. The failure rates marked
with purple color have been derived from Holand (1997). Those failure rates marked with blue
color have been derived from Hauge and Onshus (2010a), while those marked with yellow color
are guesstimates. Finally, the failure rate of shear rams due to tool joint obstruction is marked
with green.
Basic events Failure mode description Related component(s)/subsystem(s)
Failure rate 
per 10^6 h
SELECT Severe leakage in pod selector valve. Pod  selector valve 2,083E-07
PWR Loss of power supply Central Control Unit (CCU) 1,000E-07
SCVFBP Surface control valve failure, blue pod. Surface control valve, blue pod. 2,083E-07
SCVFYP Surface control valve failure, yellow pod. Surface control valve, yellow pod. 2,083E-07
HYSLBLU Hydraulic supply line leaks, blue pod. Hydraulic fluid supply line, blue pod. 2,917E-05
HYSLYEL Hydraulic supply line leaks, yellow pod. Hydraulic fluid supply line, yellow pod. 2,917E-05
PLC A PLC A failure. PLC A 7,000E-07
PLC B PLC B failure. PLC B 7,000E-07
MUXBP Loss of MUX power/communication , blue pod. MUX cables/reels, blue pod. 4,000E-08
MUXYP Loss of MUX power/commounication, yellow pod. MUX cables/reels, yellow pod. 4,000E-08
SEMABP SEM A failure, blue pod. SEM A, blue pod. 1,200E-06
SEMBBP SEM B failure, blue pod. SEM B, blue pod. 1,200E-06
SEMAYP SEM A failure, yellow pod. SEM A, yellow pod. 1,200E-06
SEMBYP SEM B failure, yellow pod. SEM B, yellow pod. 1,200E-06
BSRTJOC Tool joint in ram closing area; causes fail to shear. Blind shear ram. 4,200E-02
ACCVL Severe leak through stack mounted acc. isol. valve. Stack mounted acc. isol. valve . 2,083E-07
EXLACC External leakage in subsea accumulator. Subsea accumulator bottles. 1,667E-05
ACCIVBP Leakage in pod mounted acc. isol. valve, blue pod. Pod mounted acc. isol. valve, blue pod. 2,083E-06
ACCIVYP Leakage in pod mounted acc. isol. valve, yellow pod. Pod mounted acc. isol. valve, yellow pod. 2,083E-06
BSRPBDCP BSR push button fails, DCP. BSR push button, DCP 4,000E-07
BSRPBTCP BSR push button fails, TCP. BSR push button, TCP. 4,000E-07
UAPPBDCP UAP push button fails, DCP. UAP push button, DCP. 4,000E-07
UAPPBTCP UAP push button fails, TCP. UAP push button, TCP. 4,000E-07
LAPPBDCP LAP push button fails, DCP. LAP push button, DCP. 4,000E-07
LAPPBTCP LAP  push button fails, TCP. LAP push button, TCP. 4,000E-07
LPRPBDCP LPR push button fails, DCP. LPR push button, DCP. 4,000E-07
LPRPBTCP LPR push button fails, TCP. LPR push button, TCP. 4,000E-07
MPRPBDCP MPR push button fails, DCP. MPR push button, DCP. 4,000E-07
MPRPBTCP MPR push button fails, TCP. MPR push button, TCP. 4,000E-07
UPRPBDCP UPR push button fails, DCP. UPR push button, DCP. 4,000E-07
UPRPBTCP UPR push button fails, TCP. UPR push button, TCP. 4,000E-07
BSRIF BSR internal failure; causes fail to close. BSR. 2,229E-05
LAPIF LAP internal failure: causes fail to close. LAP 1,063E-05
UAPIF UAP internal failure: causes fail to close UAP. 1,063E-05
LPRIF LPR internal failure; causes fail to close. LPR (fixed). 3,542E-06
MPRIF MPR internal failure; causes fail to close. MPR (VBR) 3,542E-06
UPRIF UPR internal failure; causes fail to close. UPR (fixed). 3,542E-06
BSRSOLVBP BSR solenoid valve fails to open, blue pod. BSR solenoid valve, blue pod. 1,600E-07
BSRSOLVYP BSR solenoid valve fails to open, yellow pod. BSR solenoid valve, yellow pod. 1,600E-07
LAPSOLVBP LAP solenoid valve fails to open, blue pod. LAP solenoid valve, blue pod. 1,600E-07
LAPSOLVYP LAP solenoid valve fails to open, yellow pod. LAP solenoid valve, yellow pod. 1,600E-07
UAPSOLVBP UAP solenoid valve fails to open, blue pod. UAP solenoid valve, blue pod. 1,600E-07
UAPSOLVYP UAP solenoid valve fails to open, yellow pod. UAP solenoid valve, yellow pod. 1,600E-07
LPRSOLVBP LPR solenoid valve fails to open, blue pod. LAP solenoid valve, blue pod. 1,600E-07
LPRSOLVYP LPR solenoid valve fails to open, yellow pod. LAP solenoid valve, yellow pod. 1,600E-07
MPRSOLVBP MPR solenoid valve fails to open, blue pod. MPR solenoid valve, blue pod. 1,600E-07
MPRSOLVYP MPR solenoid valve fails to open, yellow pod. MPR solenoid valve, yellow pod. 1,600E-07
UPRSOLVBP UPR solenoid valve fails to open, blue pod. UPR solenoid valve, blue pod. 1,600E-07
UPRSOLVYP UPR solenoid valve fails to open, yellow pod. UPR solenoid valve, yellow pod. 1,600E-07
LAPSHV LAP shuttle valve or line to preventer leaks. LAP shuttle valve and fluid line. 2,500E-07
UAPSHV UAP shuttle valve or line to preventer leaks. UAP shuttle valve and fluid line. 2,500E-07
BSRSHV BSR shuttle valve or line to preventer leaks. BSR shuttle valve and fluid line. 2,500E-07
LPRSHV LPR shuttle valve or line to preventer leaks. LPR shuttle valve and fluid line. 2,500E-07
MPRSHV MPR shuttle valve or line to preventer leaks . MPR shuttle valve and fluid line. 2,500E-07
UPRSHV UPR shuttle valve or line to preventer leaks,. UPR shuttle valve and fluid line. 2,500E-07
LAPSHVBP LAP shuttle valve stuck in opposite position, blue pod LAP shuttle valve. 1,667E-07
LASPHVYP LAP shuttle valve stuck in opposite position, yellow pod. LAP shuttle valve. 1,667E-07
UAPSHVBP UAP shuttle valve stuck in opposite position, blue pod. UAP shuttle valve. 1,667E-07
UAPSHVYP UAP shuttle valve stuck in opposite position, yellow pod. UAP shuttle valve. 1,667E-07
LPRSHVBP LPR shuttle valve stuck in opposite position, blue pod. LPR shuttle valve. 1,667E-07
LPRSHVYP LPR shuttle valve stuck in opposite position, yellow pod. LPR shuttle valve. 1,667E-07
MPRSHVBP MPR shuttle valve stuck in opposite position, blue pod. MPR shuttle valve. 1,667E-07
MPRSHVYP MPR shuttle valve stuck in opposite position, yellow pod. MPR shuttle valve. 1,667E-07
UPRSHVBP UPR shuttle valve stuck in opposite position, blue pod. UPR shuttle valve. 1,667E-07
UPRSHVYP UPR shuttle valve stuck in opposite position, yellow pod. UPR shuttle valve. 1,667E-07
BSRSHVBP BSR shuttle valve stuck in opposite position, blue pod. BSR shuttle valve. 1,667E-07
BSRSHVYP BSR shuttle valve stuck in opposite position, yellow pod. BSR shuttle valve. 1,667E-07
BSRHCV BSR hydraulic control valve failure. BSR hydraulic control valve. 1,000E-07
LAPHCV LAP hydraulic control valve failure.. LAP hydraulic control valve. 1,000E-07
UAPHCV UAP hydraulic control valve failure. UAP hydraulic control valve. 1,000E-07
LPRHCV LPR hydraulic control valve failure. LPR hydraulic control valve. 1,000E-07
MPRHCV MPR hydraulic control valve failure. MPR hydraulic control valve. 1,000E-07
UPRHCV UPR hydraulic control valve failure. UPR hydraulic control valve. 1,000E-07
TOP EVENT A
Basic events Failure mode description Related component(s)/subsystem(s)
Failure rate 
(per 10^6 h)
SELECT Severe leakage in pod selector valve. Pod  selector valve 2,083E-07
PWR Loss of power supply Central Control Unit (CCU) 1,000E-07
SCVFBP Surface control valve failure, blue pod. Surface control valve, blue pod. 2,083E-07
SCVFYP Surface control valve failure, yellow pod. Surface control valve, yellow pod. 2,083E-07
HYSLBLU Hydraulic supply line leaks, blue pod. Hydraulic fluid supply line, blue pod. 2,917E-05
HYSLYEL Hydraulic supply line leaks, yellow pod. Hydraulic fluid supply line, yellow pod. 2,917E-05
PLC A PLC A failure. PLC A 7,000E-07
PLC B PLC B failure. PLC B 7,000E-07
MUXBP Loss of MUX power/communication , blue pod. MUX cables/reels, blue pod. 4,000E-08
MUXYP Loss of MUX power/commounication, yellow pod. MUX cables/reels, yellow pod. 4,000E-08
SEMABP SEM A failure, blue pod. SEM A, blue pod. 1,200E-06
SEMBBP SEM B failure, blue pod. SEM B, blue pod. 1,200E-06
SEMAYP SEM A failure, yellow pod. SEM A, yellow pod. 1,200E-06
SEMBYP SEM B failure, yellow pod. SEM B, yellow pod. 1,200E-06
BSRTJOC Tool joint in ram closing area; causes fail to shear. BSR. 4,200E-02
ACCVL Severe leak through stack mounted acc. isol. valve. Stack mounted acc. isol. valve . 2,083E-07
EXLACC External leakage in subsea accumulator. Subsea accumulator bottles. 1,667E-05
ACCIVBP Leakage in pod mounted acc. isol. valve, blue pod. Pod mounted acc. isol. valve, blue pod. 2,083E-06
ACCIVYP Leakage in pod mounted acc. isol. valve, yellow pod. Pod mounted acc. isol. valve, yellow pod. 2,083E-06
BSRPBDCP BSR push button fails, DCP. BSR push button, DCP 4,000E-07
BSRPBTCP BSR push button fails, TCP. BSR push button, TCP. 4,000E-07
UAPPBDCP UAP push button fails, DCP. UAP push button, DCP. 4,000E-07
UAPPBTCP UAP push button fails, TCP. UAP push button, TCP. 4,000E-07
LAPPBDCP LAP push button fails, DCP. LAP push button, DCP. 4,000E-07
LAPPBTCP LAP  push button fails, TCP. LAP push button, TCP. 4,000E-07
MPRPBDCP MPR push button fails, DCP. MPR push button, TCP. 4,000E-07
MPRPBTCP MPR push button fails, TCP. MPR push button, DCP. 4,000E-07
BSRIF BSR internal failure; causes fail to close. BSR. 2,229E-05
LAPIF LAP internal failure: causes fail to close. LAP. 1,063E-05
UAPIF UAP internal failure: causes fail to close UAP. 1,063E-05
MPRIF MPR internal failure; causes fail to close. MPR (VBR) 3,542E-06
BSRSOLVBP BSR solenoid valve fails to open, blue pod. BSR solenoid valve, blue pod. 1,600E-07
BSRSOLVYP BSR solenoid valve fails to open, yellow pod. BSR solenoid valve, yellow pod. 1,600E-07
LAPSOLVBP LAP solenoid valve fails to open, blue pod. LAP solenoid valve, blue pod. 1,600E-07
LAPSOLVYP LAP solenoid valve failst to open, yellow pod. LAP solenoid valve, yellow pod. 1,600E-07
UAPSOLVBP UAP solenoid valve fails to open, blue pod. UAP solenoid valve, blue pod. 1,600E-07
UAPSOLVYP UAP solenoid valve fails to open, yellow pod. UAP solenoid valve, yellow pod. 1,600E-07
MPRSOLVBP MPR solenoid valve fails to open, blue pod. MPR solenoid valve, blue pod. 1,600E-07
MPRSOLVYP MPR solenoid valve fails to open, yellow pod. MPR solenoid valve, yellow pod. 1,600E-07
LAPSHV LAP shuttle valve or line to preventer leaks. LAP shuttle valve and fluid line. 2,500E-07
UAPSHV UAP shuttle valve or line to preventer leaks. UAP shuttle valve and fluid line. 2,500E-07
BSRSHV BSR shuttle valve or line to preventer leaks. BSR shuttle valve and fluid line. 2,500E-07
MPRSHV MPR shuttle valve or line to preventer leaks . MPR shuttle valve and fluid line. 2,500E-07
LAPSHVBP LAP shuttle valve stuck in opposite position, blue pod LAP shuttle valve. 1,667E-07
LASPHVYP LAP shuttle valve stuck in opposite position, yellow pod. LAP shuttle valve. 1,667E-07
UAPSHVBP UAP shuttle valve stuck in opposite position, blue pod. UAP shuttle valve. 1,667E-07
UAPSHVYP UPR shuttle valve stuck in opposite position, yellow pod. UAP shuttle valve. 1,667E-07
MPRSHVBP MPR valve stuck in opposite position, blue pod. MPR shuttle valve. 1,667E-07
MPRSHVYP MPR shuttle valve stuck in opposite position, yellow pod. MPR shuttle valve. 1,667E-07
BSRSHVBP BSR shuttle valve stuck in opposite position, blue pod. BSR shuttle valve. 1,667E-07
BSRSHVYP BSR shuttle valve stuck in opposite position, yellow pod. BSR shuttle valve. 1,667E-07
BSRHCV BSR hydraulic control valve failure. BSR hydraulic control valve. 1,000E-07
LAPHCV LAP hydraulic control valve failure.. LAP hydraulic control valve. 1,000E-07
UAPHCV UAP hydraulic control valve failure. UAP hydraulic control valve. 1,000E-07
MPRHCV MPR hydraulic control valve failure. MPR hydraulic control valve. 1,000E-07
TOP EVENT B
Basic events Failure mode description Related component(s)/subsystem(s)
Failure rate 
(per 10^6 h)
SELECT Severe leakage in pod selector valve. Pod  selector valve 2,083E-07
PWR Loss of power supply Central Control Unit (CCU) 1,000E-07
SCVFBP Surface control valve failure, blue pod. Surface control valve, blue pod. 2,083E-07
SCVFYP Surface control valve failure, yellow pod. Surface control valve, yellow pod. 2,083E-07
HYSLBLU Hydraulic supply line leaks, blue pod. Hydraulic fluid supply line, blue pod. 2,917E-05
HYSLYEL Hydraulic supply line leaks, yellow pod. Hydraulic fluid supply line, yellow pod. 2,917E-05
PLC A PLC A failure. PLC A 7,000E-07
PLC B PLC B failure. PLC B 7,000E-07
MUXBP Loss of MUX power/communication , blue pod. MUX cables/reels, blue pod. 4,000E-08
MUXYP Loss of MUX power/commounication, yellow pod. MUX cables/reels, yellow pod. 4,000E-08
SEMABP SEM A failure, blue pod. SEM A, blue pod. 1,200E-06
SEMBBP SEM B failure, blue pod. SEM B, blue pod. 1,200E-06
SEMAYP SEM A failure, yellow pod. SEM A, yellow pod. 1,200E-06
SEMBYP SEM B failure, yellow pod. SEM B, yellow pod. 1,200E-06
BSRTJOC Tool joint in ram closing area; causes fail to shear. BSR. 4,200E-02
CSRTJOC Tool joint in ram closing area; causes fail to shear. CSR. 4,200E-02
ACCVL Severe leak through stack mounted acc. isol. valve. Stack mounted acc. isol. valve . 2,083E-07
EXLACC External leakage in subsea accumulator. Subsea accumulator bottles. 1,667E-05
ACCIVBP Leakage in pod mounted acc. isol. valve, blue pod. Pod mounted acc. isol. valve, blue pod. 2,083E-06
ACCIVYP Leakage in pod mounted acc. isol. valve, yellow pod. Pod mounted acc. isol. valve, yellow pod. 2,083E-06
BSRPBDCP BSR push button fails, DCP. BSR push button, DCP 4,000E-07
BSRPBTCP BSR push button fails, TCP. BSR push button, TCP. 4,000E-07
CSRPBDCP CSR push button fails, DCP. CSR push button, DCP. 4,000E-07
CSRPBTCP CSR push button fails, TCP. CSR push button, TCP. 4,000E-07
LPRPBDCP LPR push button fails, DCP. LPR push button, DCP. 4,000E-07
LPRPBTCP LPR push button fails, TCP. LPR push button, TCP. 4,000E-07
MPRPBDCP MPR push button fails, DCP. MPR push button, DCP. 4,000E-07
MPRPBTCP MPR push button fails, TCP. MPR push button, TCP. 4,000E-07
UPRPBDCP UPR push button fails, DCP. UPR push button, DCP. 4,000E-07
UPRPBTCP UPR push button fails, TCP. UPR push button, TCP. 4,000E-07
BSRIF Blind shear ram internal failure; causes fail to close. BSR. 2,229E-05
CSRIF Casing shear ram internal failure; causes fail to close. CSR. 2,229E-05
LPRIF LPR internal failure; causes fail to close. LPR (fixed). 3,542E-06
MPRIF MPR internal failure; causes fail to close. MPR (VBR) 3,542E-06
UPRIF UPR internal failure; causes fail to close. UPR (fixed). 3,542E-06
BSRSOLVBP BSR solenoid valve fails to open, blue pod. BSR solenoid valve, blue pod. 1,600E-07
BSRSOLVYP BSR solenoid valve fails to open, yellow pod. BSR solenoid valve, yellow pod. 1,600E-07
CSRSOLVBP CSR solenoid valve fails to open, blue pod. CSR solenoid valve, blue pod. 1,600E-07
CSRSOLVYP CSR solenoid valve fails to open, yellow pod. CSR solenoid valve, yellow pod. 1,600E-07
LPRSOLVBP LPR solenoid valve fails to open, blue pod. LAP solenoid valve, blue pod. 1,600E-07
LPRSOLVYP LPR solenoid valve fails to open, yellow pod. LAP solenoid valve, yellow pod. 1,600E-07
MPRSOLVBP MPR solenoid valve fails to open, blue pod. MPR solenoid valve, blue pod. 1,600E-07
MPRSOLVYP MPR solenoid valve fails to open, yellow pod. MPR solenoid valve, yellow pod. 1,600E-07
UPRSOLVBP UPR solenoid valve fails to open, blue pod. UPR solenoid valve, blue pod. 1,600E-07
UPRSOLVYP UPR solenoid valve fails to open, yellow pod. UPR solenoid valve, yellow pod. 1,600E-07
BSRSHV BSR shuttle valve or line to preventer leaks. BSR shuttle valve and fluid line. 2,500E-07
CSRSHV CSR shuttle valve or line to preventer leaks. CSR shuttle valve and fluid line. 2,500E-07
LPRSHV LPR shuttle valve or line to preventer leaks. LPR shuttle valve and fluid line. 2,500E-07
MPRSHV MPR shuttle valve or line to preventer leaks . MPR shuttle valve and fluid line. 2,500E-07
UPRSHV UPR shuttle valve or line to preventer leaks,. UPR shuttle valve and fluid line. 2,500E-07
LPRSHVBP LPR shuttle valve stuck in opposite position, blue pod. LPR shuttle valve. 1,667E-07
LPRSHVYP LPR shuttle valve stuck in opposite position, yellow pod. LPR shuttle valve. 1,667E-07
MPRSHVBP MPR shuttle valve stuck in opposite position, blue pod. MPR shuttle valve. 1,667E-07
MPRSHVYP MPR shuttle valve stuck in opposite position, yellow pod. MPR shuttle valve. 1,667E-07
UPRSHVBP UPR shuttle valve stuck in opposite position, blue pod. UPR shuttle valve. 1,667E-07
UPRSHVYP UPR shuttle valve stuck in opposite position, yellow pod. UPR shuttle valve. 1,667E-07
BSRSHVBP BSR shuttle valve stuck in opposite position, blue pod. BSR shuttle valve. 1,667E-07
BSRSHVYP BSR shuttle valve stuck in opposite position, yellow pod. CSR shuttle valve. 1,667E-07
CSRSHVBP CSR shuttle valve stuck in opposite position, blue pod. CSR shuttle valve. 1,667E-07
CSRSHVYP CSR shuttle valve stuck in opposite position, yellow pod. BSR shuttle valve. 1,667E-07
BSRHCV BSR hydraulic control valve failure. BSR hydraulic control valve. 1,000E-07
CSRHCV CSR hydraulic control valve failure. CSR hydraulic control valve. 1,000E-07
LPRHCV LPR hydraulic control valve failure. LPR hydraulic control valve. 1,000E-07
MPRHCV MPR hydraulic control valve failure. MPR hydraulic control valve. 1,000E-07
UPRHCV UPR hydraulic control valve failure. UPR hydraulic control valve. 1,000E-07
TOP EVENT C
Basic events Failure mode description Related component(s)/subsystem(s) (per 10^6 h)
SELECT Severe leakage in pod selector valve. Pod  selector valve 2,083E-07
PWR Loss of power supply Central Control Unit (CCU) 1,000E-07
SCVFBP Surface control valve failure, blue pod. Surface control valve, blue pod. 2,083E-07
SCVFYP Surface control valve failure, yellow pod. Surface control valve, yellow pod. 2,083E-07
HYSLBLU Hydraulic supply line leaks, blue pod. Hydraulic fluid supply line, blue pod. 2,917E-05
HYSLYEL Hydraulic supply line leaks, yellow pod. Hydraulic fluid supply line, yellow pod. 2,917E-05
PLC A PLC A failure. PLC A 7,000E-07
PLC B PLC B failure. PLC B 7,000E-07
MUXBP Loss of MUX power/communication , blue pod. MUX cables/reels, blue pod. 4,000E-08
MUXYP Loss of MUX power/commounication, yellow pod. MUX cables/reels, yellow pod. 4,000E-08
SEMABP SEM A failure, blue pod. SEM A, blue pod. 1,200E-06
SEMBBP SEM B failure, blue pod. SEM B, blue pod. 1,200E-06
SEMAYP SEM A failure, yellow pod. SEM A, yellow pod. 1,200E-06
SEMBYP SEM B failure, yellow pod. SEM B, yellow pod. 1,200E-06
ACCVL Severe leak through stack mounted acc. isol. valve. Stack mounted acc. isol. valve . 2,083E-07
EXLACC External leakage in subsea accumulator. Subsea accumulator bottles. 1,667E-05
ACCIVBP Leakage in pod mounted acc. isol. valve, blue pod. Pod mounted acc. isol. valve, blue pod. 2,083E-06
ACCIVYP Leakage in pod mounted acc. isol. valve, yellow pod. Pod mounted acc. isol. valve, yellow pod. 2,083E-06
BSRPBDCP BSR push button fails, DCP. BSR push button, DCP 4,000E-07
BSRPBTCP BSR push button fails, TCP. BSR push button, TCP. 4,000E-07
BSRIF BSR internal failure; causes fail to close. BSR. 2,229E-05
BSRSOLVBP BSR solenoid valve fails to open, blue pod. BSR solenoid valve, blue pod. 1,600E-07
BSRSOLVYP BSR solenoid valve fails to open, yellow pod. BSR solenoid valve, yellow pod. 1,600E-07
BSRSHV BSR shuttle valve or line to preventer leaks. BSR shuttle valve and fluid hose. 2,500E-07
BSRSHVBP BSR shuttle valve stuck in opposite position, blue pod. BSR shuttle valve. 1,667E-07
BSRSHVYP BSR shuttle valve stuck in opposite position, yellow pod. BSR shuttle valve. 1,667E-07
BSRHCV BSR hydraulic control valve failure. BSR hydraulic control valve. 1,000E-07
TOP EVENT D
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B.3 Minimal cut sets
CARA Fault Tree version 4.2 (c) ExproSoft AS 2000 
Single license. 
Supplied by ExproSoft AS  
Date: 31.05.2012 Time: 10:32:45 
 
File:  CASEA.CFT 
 
New fault tree 
 
Maximum cut size: 4 Mod. level: 0 Top event: CASEA 
 
Cut set(s) with 1 component (Total: 2) 
   {SELECT}  
   {PWR}  
  
Cut set(s) with 2 components (Total: 4) 
   {PLCA,PLCB}  
   {HYSLBLU,HYSLYEL}  
   {SCVYP,SCVBP}  
   {MUXBP,MUXYP}  
  
Cut set(s) with 3 components (Total: 2) 
   {SEMAYP,SEMBYP,SCVBP}  
   {SCVYP,SEMABP,SEMBBP}  
  
Cut set(s) with 4 components (Total: 2) 
   {ACCVL,EXLACC,ACCIVBP,ACCIVYP}  
   {SEMAYP,SEMBYP,SEMABP,SEMBBP}  
 Total number of cut sets up to order 4: 10   
 
CARA Fault Tree version 4.2 (c) ExproSoft AS 2000 
Single license. 
Supplied by ExproSoft AS  
Date: 31.05.2012 Time: 10:35:35 
 
File:  CASEB.CFT 
 
New fault tree 
 
Maximum cut size: 4 Mod. level: 0 Top event: CASEB 
 
Cut set(s) with 1 component (Total: 2) 
   {SELECT}  
   {PWR}  
  
Cut set(s) with 2 components (Total: 4) 
   {SCVYP,SCVBP}  
   {HYSLBLU,HYSLYEL}  
   {PLCA,PLCB}  
   {MUXBP,MUXYP}  
  
Cut set(s) with 3 components (Total: 2) 
   {SCVYP,SEMABP,SEMBBP}  
   {SEMAYP,SEMBYP,SCVBP}  
  
Cut set(s) with 4 components (Total: 110) 
   {SEMAYP,SEMBYP,SEMABP,SEMBBP}  
   {BSRTJOC,UAPIF,LAPIF,MPRIF}  
   {BSRIF,UAPIF,LAPIF,MPRIF}  
   {BSRHCV,UAPIF,LAPIF,MPRIF}  
   {BSRSHV,UAPIF,LAPIF,MPRIF}  
   {BSRTJOC,UAPIF,LAPIF,MPRHCV}  
   {BSRIF,UAPIF,LAPIF,MPRHCV}  
   {BSRHCV,UAPIF,LAPIF,MPRHCV}  
   {BSRSHV,UAPIF,LAPIF,MPRHCV}  
   {BSRTJOC,UAPIF,LAPIF,MPRSHV}  
   {BSRIF,UAPIF,LAPIF,MPRSHV}  
   {BSRHCV,UAPIF,LAPIF,MPRSHV}  
   {BSRSHV,UAPIF,LAPIF,MPRSHV}  
   {BSRTJOC,UAPIF,LAPSHV,MPRIF}  
   {BSRIF,UAPIF,LAPSHV,MPRIF}  
   {BSRHCV,UAPIF,LAPSHV,MPRIF}  
   {BSRSHV,UAPIF,LAPSHV,MPRIF}  
   {BSRTJOC,UAPIF,LAPSHV,MPRHCV}  
   {BSRIF,UAPIF,LAPSHV,MPRHCV}  
   {BSRHCV,UAPIF,LAPSHV,MPRHCV}  
   {BSRSHV,UAPIF,LAPSHV,MPRHCV}  
   {BSRTJOC,UAPIF,LAPSHV,MPRSHV}  
   {BSRIF,UAPIF,LAPSHV,MPRSHV}  
   {BSRHCV,UAPIF,LAPSHV,MPRSHV}  
   {BSRSHV,UAPIF,LAPSHV,MPRSHV}  
   {BSRTJOC,UAPIF,LAPHCV,MPRIF}  
   {BSRIF,UAPIF,LAPHCV,MPRIF}  
   {BSRHCV,UAPIF,LAPHCV,MPRIF}  
   {BSRSHV,UAPIF,LAPHCV,MPRIF}  
   {BSRTJOC,UAPIF,LAPHCV,MPRHCV}  
   {BSRIF,UAPIF,LAPHCV,MPRHCV}  
   {BSRHCV,UAPIF,LAPHCV,MPRHCV}  
   {BSRSHV,UAPIF,LAPHCV,MPRHCV}  
   {BSRTJOC,UAPIF,LAPHCV,MPRSHV}  
   {BSRIF,UAPIF,LAPHCV,MPRSHV}  
   {BSRHCV,UAPIF,LAPHCV,MPRSHV}  
   {BSRSHV,UAPIF,LAPHCV,MPRSHV}  
   {BSRTJOC,UAPSHV,LAPIF,MPRIF}  
   {BSRIF,UAPSHV,LAPIF,MPRIF}  
   {BSRHCV,UAPSHV,LAPIF,MPRIF}  
   {BSRSHV,UAPSHV,LAPIF,MPRIF}  
   {BSRTJOC,UAPSHV,LAPIF,MPRHCV}  
   {BSRIF,UAPSHV,LAPIF,MPRHCV}  
   {BSRHCV,UAPSHV,LAPIF,MPRHCV}  
   {BSRSHV,UAPSHV,LAPIF,MPRHCV}  
   {BSRTJOC,UAPSHV,LAPIF,MPRSHV}  
   {BSRIF,UAPSHV,LAPIF,MPRSHV}  
   {BSRHCV,UAPSHV,LAPIF,MPRSHV}  
   {BSRSHV,UAPSHV,LAPIF,MPRSHV}  
   {BSRTJOC,UAPSHV,LAPSHV,MPRIF}  
   {BSRIF,UAPSHV,LAPSHV,MPRIF}  
   {BSRHCV,UAPSHV,LAPSHV,MPRIF}  
   {BSRSHV,UAPSHV,LAPSHV,MPRIF}  
   {BSRTJOC,UAPSHV,LAPSHV,MPRHCV}  
   {BSRIF,UAPSHV,LAPSHV,MPRHCV}  
   {BSRHCV,UAPSHV,LAPSHV,MPRHCV}  
   {BSRSHV,UAPSHV,LAPSHV,MPRHCV}  
   {BSRTJOC,UAPSHV,LAPSHV,MPRSHV}  
   {BSRIF,UAPSHV,LAPSHV,MPRSHV}  
   {BSRHCV,UAPSHV,LAPSHV,MPRSHV}  
   {BSRSHV,UAPSHV,LAPSHV,MPRSHV}  
   {BSRTJOC,UAPSHV,LAPHCV,MPRIF}  
   {BSRIF,UAPSHV,LAPHCV,MPRIF}  
   {BSRHCV,UAPSHV,LAPHCV,MPRIF}  
   {BSRSHV,UAPSHV,LAPHCV,MPRIF}  
   {BSRTJOC,UAPSHV,LAPHCV,MPRHCV}  
   {BSRIF,UAPSHV,LAPHCV,MPRHCV}  
   {BSRHCV,UAPSHV,LAPHCV,MPRHCV}  
   {BSRSHV,UAPSHV,LAPHCV,MPRHCV}  
   {BSRTJOC,UAPSHV,LAPHCV,MPRSHV}  
   {BSRIF,UAPSHV,LAPHCV,MPRSHV}  
   {BSRHCV,UAPSHV,LAPHCV,MPRSHV}  
   {BSRSHV,UAPSHV,LAPHCV,MPRSHV}  
   {BSRTJOC,UAPHCV,LAPIF,MPRIF}  
   {BSRIF,UAPHCV,LAPIF,MPRIF}  
   {BSRHCV,UAPHCV,LAPIF,MPRIF}  
   {BSRSHV,UAPHCV,LAPIF,MPRIF}  
   {BSRTJOC,UAPHCV,LAPIF,MPRHCV}  
   {BSRIF,UAPHCV,LAPIF,MPRHCV}  
   {BSRHCV,UAPHCV,LAPIF,MPRHCV}  
   {BSRSHV,UAPHCV,LAPIF,MPRHCV}  
   {BSRTJOC,UAPHCV,LAPIF,MPRSHV}  
   {BSRIF,UAPHCV,LAPIF,MPRSHV}  
   {BSRHCV,UAPHCV,LAPIF,MPRSHV}  
   {BSRSHV,UAPHCV,LAPIF,MPRSHV}  
   {BSRTJOC,UAPHCV,LAPSHV,MPRIF}  
   {BSRIF,UAPHCV,LAPSHV,MPRIF}  
   {BSRHCV,UAPHCV,LAPSHV,MPRIF}  
   {BSRSHV,UAPHCV,LAPSHV,MPRIF}  
   {BSRTJOC,UAPHCV,LAPSHV,MPRHCV}  
   {BSRIF,UAPHCV,LAPSHV,MPRHCV}  
   {BSRHCV,UAPHCV,LAPSHV,MPRHCV}  
   {BSRSHV,UAPHCV,LAPSHV,MPRHCV}  
   {BSRTJOC,UAPHCV,LAPSHV,MPRSHV}  
   {BSRIF,UAPHCV,LAPSHV,MPRSHV}  
   {BSRHCV,UAPHCV,LAPSHV,MPRSHV}  
   {BSRSHV,UAPHCV,LAPSHV,MPRSHV}  
   {BSRTJOC,UAPHCV,LAPHCV,MPRIF}  
   {BSRIF,UAPHCV,LAPHCV,MPRIF}  
   {BSRHCV,UAPHCV,LAPHCV,MPRIF}  
   {BSRSHV,UAPHCV,LAPHCV,MPRIF}  
   {BSRTJOC,UAPHCV,LAPHCV,MPRHCV}  
   {BSRIF,UAPHCV,LAPHCV,MPRHCV}  
   {BSRHCV,UAPHCV,LAPHCV,MPRHCV}  
   {BSRSHV,UAPHCV,LAPHCV,MPRHCV}  
   {BSRTJOC,UAPHCV,LAPHCV,MPRSHV}  
   {BSRIF,UAPHCV,LAPHCV,MPRSHV}  
   {BSRHCV,UAPHCV,LAPHCV,MPRSHV}  
   {BSRSHV,UAPHCV,LAPHCV,MPRSHV}  
   {ACCVL,EXLACC,ACCIVBP,ACCIVYP}  
 Total number of cut sets up to order 4: 118   
 
CARA Fault Tree version 4.2 (c) ExproSoft AS 2000 
Single license. 
Supplied by ExproSoft AS  
Date: 31.05.2012 Time: 10:36:01 
 
File:  CASEC.CFT 
 
New fault tree 
 
Maximum cut size: 4 Mod. level: 0 Top event: CASEC 
 
Cut set(s) with 1 component (Total: 2) 
   {SELECT}  
   {PWR}  
  
Cut set(s) with 2 components (Total: 4) 
   {HYSLBLU,HYSLYEL}  
   {SCVYP,SCVBP}  
   {PLCA,PLCB}  
   {MUXBP,MUXYP}  
  
Cut set(s) with 3 components (Total: 2) 
   {SEMAYP,SEMBYP,SCVBP}  
   {SCVYP,SEMABP,SEMBBP}  
  
Cut set(s) with 4 components (Total: 218) 
   {ACCVL,EXLACC,ACCIVBP,ACCIVYP}  
   {SEMAYP,SEMBYP,SEMABP,SEMBBP}  
   {BSRTJOC,LPRIF,MPRIF,UPRIF}  
   {BSRIF,LPRIF,MPRIF,UPRIF}  
   {BSRHCV,LPRIF,MPRIF,UPRIF}  
   {BSRSHV,LPRIF,MPRIF,UPRIF}  
   {CSRTJOC,LPRIF,MPRIF,UPRIF}  
   {CSRIF,LPRIF,MPRIF,UPRIF}  
   {CSRHCV,LPRIF,MPRIF,UPRIF}  
   {CSRSHV,LPRIF,MPRIF,UPRIF}  
   {BSRTJOC,LPRIF,MPRIF,UPRHCV}  
   {BSRIF,LPRIF,MPRIF,UPRHCV}  
   {BSRHCV,LPRIF,MPRIF,UPRHCV}  
   {BSRSHV,LPRIF,MPRIF,UPRHCV}  
   {CSRTJOC,LPRIF,MPRIF,UPRHCV}  
   {CSRIF,LPRIF,MPRIF,UPRHCV}  
   {CSRHCV,LPRIF,MPRIF,UPRHCV}  
   {CSRSHV,LPRIF,MPRIF,UPRHCV}  
   {BSRTJOC,LPRIF,MPRIF,UPRSHV}  
   {BSRIF,LPRIF,MPRIF,UPRSHV}  
   {BSRHCV,LPRIF,MPRIF,UPRSHV}  
   {BSRSHV,LPRIF,MPRIF,UPRSHV}  
   {CSRTJOC,LPRIF,MPRIF,UPRSHV}  
   {CSRIF,LPRIF,MPRIF,UPRSHV}  
   {CSRHCV,LPRIF,MPRIF,UPRSHV}  
   {CSRSHV,LPRIF,MPRIF,UPRSHV}  
   {BSRTJOC,LPRIF,MPRHCV,UPRIF}  
   {BSRIF,LPRIF,MPRHCV,UPRIF}  
   {BSRHCV,LPRIF,MPRHCV,UPRIF}  
   {BSRSHV,LPRIF,MPRHCV,UPRIF}  
   {CSRTJOC,LPRIF,MPRHCV,UPRIF}  
   {CSRIF,LPRIF,MPRHCV,UPRIF}  
   {CSRHCV,LPRIF,MPRHCV,UPRIF}  
   {CSRSHV,LPRIF,MPRHCV,UPRIF}  
   {BSRTJOC,LPRIF,MPRHCV,UPRHCV}  
   {BSRIF,LPRIF,MPRHCV,UPRHCV}  
   {BSRHCV,LPRIF,MPRHCV,UPRHCV}  
   {BSRSHV,LPRIF,MPRHCV,UPRHCV}  
   {CSRTJOC,LPRIF,MPRHCV,UPRHCV}  
   {CSRIF,LPRIF,MPRHCV,UPRHCV}  
   {CSRHCV,LPRIF,MPRHCV,UPRHCV}  
   {CSRSHV,LPRIF,MPRHCV,UPRHCV}  
   {BSRTJOC,LPRIF,MPRHCV,UPRSHV}  
   {BSRIF,LPRIF,MPRHCV,UPRSHV}  
   {BSRHCV,LPRIF,MPRHCV,UPRSHV}  
   {BSRSHV,LPRIF,MPRHCV,UPRSHV}  
   {CSRTJOC,LPRIF,MPRHCV,UPRSHV}  
   {CSRIF,LPRIF,MPRHCV,UPRSHV}  
   {CSRHCV,LPRIF,MPRHCV,UPRSHV}  
   {CSRSHV,LPRIF,MPRHCV,UPRSHV}  
   {BSRTJOC,LPRIF,MPRSHV,UPRIF}  
   {BSRIF,LPRIF,MPRSHV,UPRIF}  
   {BSRHCV,LPRIF,MPRSHV,UPRIF}  
   {BSRSHV,LPRIF,MPRSHV,UPRIF}  
   {CSRTJOC,LPRIF,MPRSHV,UPRIF}  
   {CSRIF,LPRIF,MPRSHV,UPRIF}  
   {CSRHCV,LPRIF,MPRSHV,UPRIF}  
   {CSRSHV,LPRIF,MPRSHV,UPRIF}  
   {BSRTJOC,LPRIF,MPRSHV,UPRHCV}  
   {BSRIF,LPRIF,MPRSHV,UPRHCV}  
   {BSRHCV,LPRIF,MPRSHV,UPRHCV}  
   {BSRSHV,LPRIF,MPRSHV,UPRHCV}  
   {CSRTJOC,LPRIF,MPRSHV,UPRHCV}  
   {CSRIF,LPRIF,MPRSHV,UPRHCV}  
   {CSRHCV,LPRIF,MPRSHV,UPRHCV}  
   {CSRSHV,LPRIF,MPRSHV,UPRHCV}  
   {BSRTJOC,LPRIF,MPRSHV,UPRSHV}  
   {BSRIF,LPRIF,MPRSHV,UPRSHV}  
   {BSRHCV,LPRIF,MPRSHV,UPRSHV}  
   {BSRSHV,LPRIF,MPRSHV,UPRSHV}  
   {CSRTJOC,LPRIF,MPRSHV,UPRSHV}  
   {CSRIF,LPRIF,MPRSHV,UPRSHV}  
   {CSRHCV,LPRIF,MPRSHV,UPRSHV}  
   {CSRSHV,LPRIF,MPRSHV,UPRSHV}  
   {BSRTJOC,LPRHCV,MPRIF,UPRIF}  
   {BSRIF,LPRHCV,MPRIF,UPRIF}  
   {BSRHCV,LPRHCV,MPRIF,UPRIF}  
   {BSRSHV,LPRHCV,MPRIF,UPRIF}  
   {CSRTJOC,LPRHCV,MPRIF,UPRIF}  
   {CSRIF,LPRHCV,MPRIF,UPRIF}  
   {CSRHCV,LPRHCV,MPRIF,UPRIF}  
   {CSRSHV,LPRHCV,MPRIF,UPRIF}  
   {BSRTJOC,LPRHCV,MPRIF,UPRHCV}  
   {BSRIF,LPRHCV,MPRIF,UPRHCV}  
   {BSRHCV,LPRHCV,MPRIF,UPRHCV}  
   {BSRSHV,LPRHCV,MPRIF,UPRHCV}  
   {CSRTJOC,LPRHCV,MPRIF,UPRHCV}  
   {CSRIF,LPRHCV,MPRIF,UPRHCV}  
   {CSRHCV,LPRHCV,MPRIF,UPRHCV}  
   {CSRSHV,LPRHCV,MPRIF,UPRHCV}  
   {BSRTJOC,LPRHCV,MPRIF,UPRSHV}  
   {BSRIF,LPRHCV,MPRIF,UPRSHV}  
   {BSRHCV,LPRHCV,MPRIF,UPRSHV}  
   {BSRSHV,LPRHCV,MPRIF,UPRSHV}  
   {CSRTJOC,LPRHCV,MPRIF,UPRSHV}  
   {CSRIF,LPRHCV,MPRIF,UPRSHV}  
   {CSRHCV,LPRHCV,MPRIF,UPRSHV}  
   {CSRSHV,LPRHCV,MPRIF,UPRSHV}  
   {BSRTJOC,LPRHCV,MPRHCV,UPRIF}  
   {BSRIF,LPRHCV,MPRHCV,UPRIF}  
   {BSRHCV,LPRHCV,MPRHCV,UPRIF}  
   {BSRSHV,LPRHCV,MPRHCV,UPRIF}  
   {CSRTJOC,LPRHCV,MPRHCV,UPRIF}  
   {CSRIF,LPRHCV,MPRHCV,UPRIF}  
   {CSRHCV,LPRHCV,MPRHCV,UPRIF}  
   {CSRSHV,LPRHCV,MPRHCV,UPRIF}  
   {BSRTJOC,LPRHCV,MPRHCV,UPRHCV}  
   {BSRIF,LPRHCV,MPRHCV,UPRHCV}  
   {BSRHCV,LPRHCV,MPRHCV,UPRHCV}  
   {BSRSHV,LPRHCV,MPRHCV,UPRHCV}  
   {CSRTJOC,LPRHCV,MPRHCV,UPRHCV}  
   {CSRIF,LPRHCV,MPRHCV,UPRHCV}  
   {CSRHCV,LPRHCV,MPRHCV,UPRHCV}  
   {CSRSHV,LPRHCV,MPRHCV,UPRHCV}  
   {BSRTJOC,LPRHCV,MPRHCV,UPRSHV}  
   {BSRIF,LPRHCV,MPRHCV,UPRSHV}  
   {BSRHCV,LPRHCV,MPRHCV,UPRSHV}  
   {BSRSHV,LPRHCV,MPRHCV,UPRSHV}  
   {CSRTJOC,LPRHCV,MPRHCV,UPRSHV}  
   {CSRIF,LPRHCV,MPRHCV,UPRSHV}  
   {CSRHCV,LPRHCV,MPRHCV,UPRSHV}  
   {CSRSHV,LPRHCV,MPRHCV,UPRSHV}  
   {BSRTJOC,LPRHCV,MPRSHV,UPRIF}  
   {BSRIF,LPRHCV,MPRSHV,UPRIF}  
   {BSRHCV,LPRHCV,MPRSHV,UPRIF}  
   {BSRSHV,LPRHCV,MPRSHV,UPRIF}  
   {CSRTJOC,LPRHCV,MPRSHV,UPRIF}  
   {CSRIF,LPRHCV,MPRSHV,UPRIF}  
   {CSRHCV,LPRHCV,MPRSHV,UPRIF}  
   {CSRSHV,LPRHCV,MPRSHV,UPRIF}  
   {BSRTJOC,LPRHCV,MPRSHV,UPRHCV}  
   {BSRIF,LPRHCV,MPRSHV,UPRHCV}  
   {BSRHCV,LPRHCV,MPRSHV,UPRHCV}  
   {BSRSHV,LPRHCV,MPRSHV,UPRHCV}  
   {CSRTJOC,LPRHCV,MPRSHV,UPRHCV}  
   {CSRIF,LPRHCV,MPRSHV,UPRHCV}  
   {CSRHCV,LPRHCV,MPRSHV,UPRHCV}  
   {CSRSHV,LPRHCV,MPRSHV,UPRHCV}  
   {BSRTJOC,LPRHCV,MPRSHV,UPRSHV}  
   {BSRIF,LPRHCV,MPRSHV,UPRSHV}  
   {BSRHCV,LPRHCV,MPRSHV,UPRSHV}  
   {BSRSHV,LPRHCV,MPRSHV,UPRSHV}  
   {CSRTJOC,LPRHCV,MPRSHV,UPRSHV}  
   {CSRIF,LPRHCV,MPRSHV,UPRSHV}  
   {CSRHCV,LPRHCV,MPRSHV,UPRSHV}  
   {CSRSHV,LPRHCV,MPRSHV,UPRSHV}  
   {BSRTJOC,LPRSHV,MPRIF,UPRIF}  
   {BSRIF,LPRSHV,MPRIF,UPRIF}  
   {BSRHCV,LPRSHV,MPRIF,UPRIF}  
   {BSRSHV,LPRSHV,MPRIF,UPRIF}  
   {CSRTJOC,LPRSHV,MPRIF,UPRIF}  
   {CSRIF,LPRSHV,MPRIF,UPRIF}  
   {CSRHCV,LPRSHV,MPRIF,UPRIF}  
   {CSRSHV,LPRSHV,MPRIF,UPRIF}  
   {BSRTJOC,LPRSHV,MPRIF,UPRHCV}  
   {BSRIF,LPRSHV,MPRIF,UPRHCV}  
   {BSRHCV,LPRSHV,MPRIF,UPRHCV}  
   {BSRSHV,LPRSHV,MPRIF,UPRHCV}  
   {CSRTJOC,LPRSHV,MPRIF,UPRHCV}  
   {CSRIF,LPRSHV,MPRIF,UPRHCV}  
   {CSRHCV,LPRSHV,MPRIF,UPRHCV}  
   {CSRSHV,LPRSHV,MPRIF,UPRHCV}  
   {BSRTJOC,LPRSHV,MPRIF,UPRSHV}  
   {BSRIF,LPRSHV,MPRIF,UPRSHV}  
   {BSRHCV,LPRSHV,MPRIF,UPRSHV}  
   {BSRSHV,LPRSHV,MPRIF,UPRSHV}  
   {CSRTJOC,LPRSHV,MPRIF,UPRSHV}  
   {CSRIF,LPRSHV,MPRIF,UPRSHV}  
   {CSRHCV,LPRSHV,MPRIF,UPRSHV}  
   {CSRSHV,LPRSHV,MPRIF,UPRSHV}  
   {BSRTJOC,LPRSHV,MPRHCV,UPRIF}  
   {BSRIF,LPRSHV,MPRHCV,UPRIF}  
   {BSRHCV,LPRSHV,MPRHCV,UPRIF}  
   {BSRSHV,LPRSHV,MPRHCV,UPRIF}  
   {CSRTJOC,LPRSHV,MPRHCV,UPRIF}  
   {CSRIF,LPRSHV,MPRHCV,UPRIF}  
   {CSRHCV,LPRSHV,MPRHCV,UPRIF}  
   {CSRSHV,LPRSHV,MPRHCV,UPRIF}  
   {BSRTJOC,LPRSHV,MPRHCV,UPRHCV}  
   {BSRIF,LPRSHV,MPRHCV,UPRHCV}  
   {BSRHCV,LPRSHV,MPRHCV,UPRHCV}  
   {BSRSHV,LPRSHV,MPRHCV,UPRHCV}  
   {CSRTJOC,LPRSHV,MPRHCV,UPRHCV}  
   {CSRIF,LPRSHV,MPRHCV,UPRHCV}  
   {CSRHCV,LPRSHV,MPRHCV,UPRHCV}  
   {CSRSHV,LPRSHV,MPRHCV,UPRHCV}  
   {BSRTJOC,LPRSHV,MPRHCV,UPRSHV}  
   {BSRIF,LPRSHV,MPRHCV,UPRSHV}  
   {BSRHCV,LPRSHV,MPRHCV,UPRSHV}  
   {BSRSHV,LPRSHV,MPRHCV,UPRSHV}  
   {CSRTJOC,LPRSHV,MPRHCV,UPRSHV}  
   {CSRIF,LPRSHV,MPRHCV,UPRSHV}  
   {CSRHCV,LPRSHV,MPRHCV,UPRSHV}  
   {CSRSHV,LPRSHV,MPRHCV,UPRSHV}  
   {BSRTJOC,LPRSHV,MPRSHV,UPRIF}  
   {BSRIF,LPRSHV,MPRSHV,UPRIF}  
   {BSRHCV,LPRSHV,MPRSHV,UPRIF}  
   {BSRSHV,LPRSHV,MPRSHV,UPRIF}  
   {CSRTJOC,LPRSHV,MPRSHV,UPRIF}  
   {CSRIF,LPRSHV,MPRSHV,UPRIF}  
   {CSRHCV,LPRSHV,MPRSHV,UPRIF}  
   {CSRSHV,LPRSHV,MPRSHV,UPRIF}  
   {BSRTJOC,LPRSHV,MPRSHV,UPRHCV}  
   {BSRIF,LPRSHV,MPRSHV,UPRHCV}  
   {BSRHCV,LPRSHV,MPRSHV,UPRHCV}  
   {BSRSHV,LPRSHV,MPRSHV,UPRHCV}  
   {CSRTJOC,LPRSHV,MPRSHV,UPRHCV}  
   {CSRIF,LPRSHV,MPRSHV,UPRHCV}  
   {CSRHCV,LPRSHV,MPRSHV,UPRHCV}  
   {CSRSHV,LPRSHV,MPRSHV,UPRHCV}  
   {BSRTJOC,LPRSHV,MPRSHV,UPRSHV}  
   {BSRIF,LPRSHV,MPRSHV,UPRSHV}  
   {BSRHCV,LPRSHV,MPRSHV,UPRSHV}  
   {BSRSHV,LPRSHV,MPRSHV,UPRSHV}  
   {CSRTJOC,LPRSHV,MPRSHV,UPRSHV}  
   {CSRIF,LPRSHV,MPRSHV,UPRSHV}  
   {CSRHCV,LPRSHV,MPRSHV,UPRSHV}  
   {CSRSHV,LPRSHV,MPRSHV,UPRSHV}  
 Total number of cut sets up to order 4: 226   
 
CARA Fault Tree version 4.2 (c) ExproSoft AS 2000 
Single license. 
Supplied by ExproSoft AS  
Date: 31.05.2012 Time: 10:37:06 
 
File:  CASED.CFT 
 
New fault tree 
 
Maximum cut size: 4 Mod. level: 0 Top event: CASED 
 
Cut set(s) with 1 component (Total: 5) 
   {SELECT}  
   {BSRIF}  
   {PWR}  
   {BSRHCV}  
   {BSRSHV}  
  
Cut set(s) with 2 components (Total: 13) 
   {PLCA,PLCB}  
   {HYSLBLU,HYSLYEL}  
   {SCVYP,SCVBP}  
   {SCVYP,BSRSOLVBP}  
   {SCVYP,BSRSHVBP}  
   {BSRSOLVYP,SCVBP}  
   {BSRSOLVYP,BSRSOLVBP}  
   {BSRSOLVYP,BSRSHVBP}  
   {BSRSHVYP,SCVBP}  
   {BSRSHVYP,BSRSOLVBP}  
   {BSRSHVYP,BSRSHVBP}  
   {BSRPBDCP,BSRPBTCP}  
   {MUXBP,MUXYP}  
  
Cut set(s) with 3 components (Total: 6) 
   {SEMAYP,SEMBYP,SCVBP}  
   {SEMAYP,SEMBYP,BSRSOLVBP}  
   {SEMAYP,SEMBYP,BSRSHVBP}  
   {SCVYP,SEMABP,SEMBBP}  
   {BSRSOLVYP,SEMABP,SEMBBP}  
   {BSRSHVYP,SEMABP,SEMBBP}  
  
Cut set(s) with 4 components (Total: 2) 
   {ACCVL,EXLACC,ACCIVBP,ACCIVYP}  
   {SEMAYP,SEMBYP,SEMABP,SEMBBP}  
 Total number of cut sets up to order 4: 26   
 
Appendix C
Event trees
C.1 Event trees for Case B and C
115
YN
MPR seals
Y
N
Circulate out w/heavier mud
Y
N
CSR shears drill pipe
Y
N
IBOP closes drill string
Y
N
CSR shears drill pipe
Y
N
UAP seals
Y
N
LAP seals
Y
N
Choke/kill valves open
Y
N
BSR seals well
Y
N
CSR shears drill pipe
Y
N
Circulate out w/heavier mud
Y
N
CSR shears drill pipe
Y
N
IBOP closes drill string
Y
N
Circulate out w/heavier mud
Y
N
CSR shears drill pipe
Y
N
IBOP closes drill string
Y
N
BSR shears drillpipe and seals wellbore
Y
N
BSR shears drillpipe and seals wellbore
Y
N
BSR seals well
Y
N
BSR seals well
Y
N
BSR shears drillpipe and seals wellbore
Y
N
BSR seals well
Y
N
BSR shears drillpipe and seals wellbore
Well in balance with proper mud weight
Kick killed, but gas is trapped below BOP and in drill pipe
Kick killed, but gas is trapped below BSR and in drill pipe
Blowout through drill pipe.
Kick killed, but gas is trapped in drill pipe
Blowout through drill pipe.
Kick killed, but gas is trapped below BSR and in drill pipe
Blowout through drill pipe. 
Kick killed, but gas is trapped below BSR and in drill pipe
Blowout through drill pipe.
Kick killed, but gas is trapped below BSR and in drill pipe
Y
N
BSR seals well
Y
N
BSR shears drillpipe and seals wellbore
Blowout through drill pipe.
Well in balance with proper mud weight
Kick killed, but gas is trapped below BOP and in drill pipe
Kick killed, but gas is trapped below BSR and in drill pipe
Blowout through drill pipe.
Well in balance with proper mud weight
Kick killed, but gas is trapped below BSR and in drill pipe
Blowout through drill pipe.
Kick killed, but gas is trapped below BOP and in drill pipe
Kick killed, but gas is trapped below BSR and in drill pipe
Blowout through drill pipe.
Kick killed, but gas is trapped below BSR and in drill pipe
Blowout through drill pipe.
Kick killed, but gas is trapped below BSR and in drill pipe
FULL BLOWOUT.
Case B, early 
detection.
YN
MPR seals
BSR seals well
Y
N
CSR shears drill pipe
BSR shears drillpipe and seals wellbore
Y
N
Choke/kill valves open
Y
N
CSR shears drill pipe
Y
N
Circulate out w/heavier mud
Y
N
BSR seals well
Y
N
CSR shears drill pipe
BSR shears drillpipe and seals wellbore
Y
N
IBOP closes drill string
BSR shears drillpipe and seals wellbore
BSR shears drillpipe and seals wellbore
Case C, early 
detection.
Y
N
Y
N
Y
N
Y
N
Y
N
Well in balance with proper mud weight
Kick killed, but gas is trapped below BOP and in drill pipe
Kick killed, but gas is trapped below MPR and in drill pipe
Blowout through drill pipe.
Kick killed, but gas is trapped below BSR and in drill pipe
Blowout through drill pipe.
Kick killed, but gas is trapped below BSR and in drill pipe
Blowout through drill pipe.
Kick killed, but gas is trapped below BSR and in drill pipe
Blowout through drill pipe. 
Kick killed, but gas is trapped below BSR and in drill pipe
FULL BLOWOUT.
Kick killed, but gas is trapped below BSR and in drill pipe
FULL BLOWOUT.
